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Preamble
This dissertation was written during my work experience at the French Institut
National de la Recherche Agronomique / AgroParisTech (Joint Unit in Public
Economics, UMR INRA 210) and the Centre d’ Etudes Prospectives et d’ Infor-
mations Internationales (CEPII). During this experience, I have worked on trade
modeling, in particular (but not only) on the European Union and Mercosur. I
have carried out a variety of studies on this topic, for the French government, for
the European Commission, and for non-governmental organizations. I have been
particularly involved in the work of the team in charge of the development of the
MIRAGE model at CEPII, a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model,
and I have participated to the development and the improvement of some of the
features of the model, in particular the modeling of tariff-rate quotas. I have also
participated to the development of large scale datasets on international trade, on
the EU-Mercosur negotiations, including data on tariffs and tariff-rate quotas, on
Sanitary and phytosanitary measures, and on environmental indicators.
During this work, and especially when working on EU-Mercosur trade negotia-
tions, I ran into some empirical problems that required to develop some particular
instruments or methodologies. In this dissertation, I chose to focus on empirical
problems that have given me the opportunity of tackling more conceptual issues.
The thesis is organized in four different chapters. The reader should not expect
a fully coherent set of work on the EU-Mercosur negotiation, in the sense that not
all aspects of the negotiations are covered. Instead, the four chapters should be
seen as an illustration of some developments that seemed useful, and sometimes
necessary, to address a particular issue that was raised during a larger program
of work. In the dissertation, I will not focus on the policy oriented work done for
the negotiators, for example. Nor will I address the extensive work on data done
for that purpose. While I have worked and helped developing some specifications
of the MIRAGE model, here I will only focus on particular points. One is how to
use a CGE model for assessing the relative benefits of multilateral and regional
negotiation (Chapter 1). Another one, developed in the second chapter, is a
particular extension of the model to tackle the challenge of modeling Tariff-Rate
Quotas, which are central in the EU-Mercosur negotiations. The other chapters
also provide an illustration of conceptual work that was developed to address a
particular empirical issue. For example, a particular sector, beef, appears to be
one of the main obstacles to the conclusion of a regional agreement. Empirical
analysis showed that the fast growing imports of beef from Mercosur were heavily
driven towards particular qualities and that the bias could be significant is one did
not accounted for the composition of imports effect when assessing trade liberal-
iv
vization. I therefore attempted to address this topic, so as to develop a framework
that could be integrated in large scale models. This work is presented in the
third chapter. Sugar is another product that appears to be a major obstacle to a
EU-Mercosur agreement. Because of the willingness of some EU member states
to develop the use of renewable fuels, a selective liberalization of ethanol could
make an agreement easier while benefiting to the EU. The latter and trade of
organic products led me to explore further the trade-and-environment literature
and to analyze the rationale of trade liberalization conditional to the environ-
mental characteristics of the production process, from a welfare point of view, an
issue which I focus on in the fourth chapter of this dissertation.
In brief, the trade relations between the EU and Mercosur countries is a thread
that links the different chapters of this thesis. The organization of the dissertation
in four independent chapters corresponds to a set of empirical issues that required
some more conceptual work. That is, these chapters should be seen as snapshots
illustrating the different faces of the work I have been doing in a more general
framework. I believe that they provide a good image of the different techniques
that I have learnt to use during my stay at INRA and CEPII.
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Re´sume´
L’Union Europe´enne et le Mercosur ont commence´ les ne´gociations bilate´rales en
1995 au moment de la signature de l’Accord Cadre Inter-Regional de Coope´ration. Mal-
gre´ seize rondes de ne´gociations et un contexte propice aux les relations commerciales
(comple´mentarite´ intra et intersectorielle, liens historiques, langu¨istiques, culturelles et
des pre´fe´rences communes), ils ne sont pas parvenus a` signer un accord commercial,
et seulement les relations politiques et de coope´ration ont re´ellement avance´. Plusieurs
raisons, telles que l’interde´pendance entre les ne´gociations bilate´rales et multilate´rales
ou les sujets les plus controverse´s dans la libe´ralisation agricole, peuvent expliquer le
retour a` la case de de´part.
Chaque chapitre de cette the`se re´pond a` une question cruciale lie´e aux ne´gociations UE-
Mercosur. Le premier chapitre e´tudie les conse´quences d’un accord UE-Mercosur sous
diffe´rentes situations de re´fe´rence (entre´e du Venezuela dans le Mercosur et possibles
re´sultats pour Doha) en utilisant le mode`le MIRAGE. Le second chapitre est une con-
tribution me´thodologique a` la mode´lisation des contingents tarifaires dans le cadre d’un
mode`le CGE, et souligne les possibles biais lie´s a` l’absence de me´canismes de fonction-
nement des contingents. Le chapitre 3 pose la question de l’effet Alchian-Allen dans le
cadre d’une structure de protection complexe (contingents, tarifs compose´s) correspon-
dant a` la protection agricole en Europe. Le dernier chapitre e´tudie l’inte´reˆt des grands
pays importateur et exportateur a` une ne´gociation commerciale se´lective en faveur des
biens environnementalement pre´fe´rables (EPPs), lesquels peuvent repre´senter une niche
de marche´ a` exploiter pour les exportateurs mercosulins.
Mots cle´s: Union Europe´enne, Mercosur, Accord Pre´fe´rentiel de Commerce, Contin-
gents tarifaires, Ame´lioration de qualite´, Biens environnementalement pre´fe´rables.
Abstract
The European Union and Mercosur have started negotiations in 1995 with the signa-
ture of the “EU-Mercosur Interregional Framework Co-operation Agreement”. In spite
of sixteen round of negotiations and a propitious textbook for trade relationships (com-
plementary intra and inter-sectoral, historical links, common culture, languages and
tastes), they have not managed to achieve a successful bilateral trade agreement, and
only political and co-operation chapters have experienced major progresses. Many rea-
sons, such as the interdependence between the bilateral and multilateral negotiations or
their conflict-laden issues in agricultural liberalization, may explain why these negotia-
tions have been stalled.
Each chapter of this dissertation addresses one important question linked to the EU-
Mercosur negotiations. The first chapter analyzes the consequences of a EU-Mercosur
agreement under different baselines (Venezuela accession to Mercosur and plausible
outcomes of the Doha Round) using the MIRAGE CGE dynamic model. The second
chapter presents a methodological contribution for tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) modeling
in a CGE framework and highlights the possible biases linked to the lack of TRQ mecha-
nisms. Chapter 3 addresses the question of the typical Alchian-Allen effect by introduc-
ing complex policy instruments (TRQs, composite tariffs) used in European agricultural
protection. The last chapter analyze the rationale for large importing and exporting
countries (environmental and welfare impacts) to negotiate a selective liberalization for
Environmentally Preferable Products (EPPs), which could represent a rewarding niche
market for exporters in the Mercosur.
Keywords: European Union, Mercosur, Preferential Trade Agreement, Tariff-rate
quotas, Quality upgrading, Environmentally Preferable Products.
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Context
The Mercosur and the European Union (EU) countries seem to be a textbook
case for a harmonious trade relationship. The geography is such that produc-
tions are highly complementary. Europe lacks raw materials and large surfaces,
and has a more capital-intensive, high-tech economy. Even in the agricultural
sector, the seasonality of production between the two hemispheres creates some
complementarity. In addition, because of their historical links, the EU and Mer-
cosur share culture, languages and tastes, and all the gravity based literature has
shown that these factors were important trade enhancers. Indeed, some of the
Ricardian effects take place in practice including the food sector where Mercosur
and European countries share relatively similar consumption habits. Mercosur is
a significant market for European spirits for example, while producing crops with
a seasonal complementarity (fruits) as well as a climatic one (coffee, soybean).
However, there are a few sectors where the productive structure of the two
parties compete more than they complement each other. It is particularly inter-
esting to see that a limited number of sectors, such as beef, sugar and to a minor
extent pork and poultry on the one hand, and a rather limited number of services
on the other hand, end up creating a real gridlock in the negotiation towards a
free trade area.
In 1995, the EU and Mercosur countries did indeed sign the “EU-Mercosur
Interregional Framework Co-operation Agreement”. While major progress has
been experienced on the political and co-operation chapters of the agreement, the
negotiations aiming at creating a free trade area by removing trade barriers have
1
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largely stalled. The EU proposal on agriculture is seen as being too restrictive
by Mercosur, while the one on non-agricultural sectors and services is seen as too
limited by the EU.
The prospect of freer trade between the EU and Mercosur is one of the major
challenge for both sides of the Atlantic and it is important to understand the issues
at stake and to help progressing towards an agreement. For a long time, the EU
has given priority to the multilateral negotiations (together with developing tight
relations with those countries that would eventually join the EU and granting
preferential tariffs to its former colonies). Bilateral or regional agreements were
not a priority. However, the memorandum on bilateral talks ended with the
Commission Prodi and the EU is now much more open to such negotiations. It is
possible that multilateral trade negotiations under the World Trade Organization
(WTO) keep lasting for years, or even collapse. In such a case the EU will have
little alternative to conclude regional agreements with large countries as a second
best. While an agreement with Russia, sometimes seen as the best alternative to
a WTO agreement for the EU, faces growing diplomatic concerns, the one with
Mercosur appears as a feasible alternative. Interestingly, this prospect has led
Mercosur countries, such as Brazil, which are aware that the EU would be left
with few alternatives for a large scale deal, to raise the bar in the bilateral talks
with the EU.
The EU-Mercosur negotiations are intimately linked to the multilateral ne-
gotiations. In the WTO arena, the stakes and the difficulties to reach a multi-
lateral trade agreement (MTA) for both regions are similar to those under the
EU-Mercosur negotiations. For the EU, it is difficult to define concessions to the
Mercosur countries without knowing what would be the general tariff cuts faced in
the multilateral framework. According to the WTO fora, an agreement between
the EU and Mercosur on market access concessions could play, to a minor extent,
a role such as the one played by the bilateral Blair House agreement during the
Uruguay Round. The interaction between both negotiations is important to un-
derstand the present situation of the EU-Mercosur talks and the implications in
terms of trade and welfare gains for each partner.
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For these reasons, the relationship between the EU and Mercosur in the agri-
cultural trade area is a far-fetching issue that deserves thorough investigation.
Throughout the dissertation, one of our objectives will be to assess the potential
gains resulting from a EU-Mercosur agreement (under different reference scenar-
ios, i.e. the success or failure of the Doha Round). The issue nevertheless raises
some technical difficulties.
Major technical challenges
The negotiations can be seen as a trade-off game between the different parties,
seeking concessions in one sector to offset what they see as losses in others. For
this reason, and in particular because the negotiations involve both agricultural
and non-agricultural market access talks, a global approach such as one provided
by a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model is especially attractive. How-
ever, most CGE models run into the problem of aggregation. That is, they can
only include a limited number of countries and aggregated goods (typically less
that 30 or 40 sectors) without running into computational problems. This creates
a serious challenge, since, in the case of EU-Mercosur negotiations, most of the
obstacles focus on particular products that must be analyzed at a very detailed
level. Typically, CGE models, by treating large aggregates, are likely to introduce
some bias in the analysis.
An accurate representation of trade and tariffs is crucial for reaching policy
relevant conclusions. Indeed, we observed that, for many modelers, a trade lib-
eralization between the EU and Mercosur would have little impact, including in
the agricultural sector. An in-depth analysis shows that this is partly caused by
what we think is an underestimation caused by misspecification of the model and
data issues.
One cannot simply assess the impact of trade liberalization by cutting the
(easily available) bound tariffs, i.e. the ones that countries negotiate on under
the WTO. The use of standard models and commercially available datasets could
lead to questionable conclusions if one does not acknowledge some specifications
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and data issues that are particular to the EU-Mercosur case. Mercosur countries
have a considerable degree of binding overhang in their tariffs. Cutting bound
tariffs by a large percentage might only dent the actual applied protection. Con-
versely, the EU applies tariffs to Mercosur exports that are not the bound ones
either. Mercosur countries are eligible for the European Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP). However, for some particular products, they are subject to
graduation. That is, their preferential access is waived. For all these reasons, it is
necessary to characterize the tariffs in a very detailed way, but also the non-tariff
barriers facing by each party. An illustration of this issue is given in our first
chapter.
Many authors only find a limited increase in EU imports of sugar and beef.
One reason can be the specification of the model. For example, given that there is
basically no import of sugar, it is easy, when using a model based on elasticities,
to find that even a large increase in percentage term leads to limited absolute
quantities. The Armington assumption may also exaggerate the differentiation of
a product like sugar according to the origin. In the case of beef, most CGE mod-
elers use the readily available database from the Global Trade Analysis Project
(GTAP). Because these data are calibrated for the year 2001, before the very
large surge in the EU beef imports from Brazil, the results might also be affected.
These are also issues addressed in the first chapter, in particular by re-calibrating
the model for a more recent year and developing detailed tariff data for that
particular year.
In the bilateral negotiation, but also under a multilateral liberalization, the
EU fears that a liberalization of the beef sector would lead to flood its internal
market by imports from Brazil and Argentina.1 Beef is a politically sensitive
issue, the production involving a large number of small farmers in the EU. Sugar
is also a sensitive issue, less because of its social implications than because EU
producers are the well-organized pressure group. In such cases, the EU insists
1For example, at the end of 2005, the European Commission released some simulation where
Brazilian imports would increase be multiplied by more than ten and reach 6 million tons, i.e.
nearly half of the EU consumption, see Agra-Europe November 11 EP/3.
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on a “managed trade” liberalization, i.e. on imposing ceilings to the quantities
subject to a lower tariff. In the EU-Mercosur negotiation, the EU offer relies
mainly on Tariff-Rate Quotas (TRQs).2 TRQs are also central in the multilateral
trade negotiations, given the large number of TRQs opened by the EU under the
commitments of current access and minimum access during the Uruguay Round.
However, CGE models are ill-equipped for representing such instruments, which
are particularly complex given that the tariff varies in a non-linear way with the
level of imports. This is an issue addressed in the second chapter of the thesis.
Using a CGE model, with the constraint on the limited number of product
aggregates that are implied, causes particular questions when trade focuses on
particular goods. The case of beef, where trade that takes place is limited to
particular market segments, is an illustration. If one considers beef as an aggre-
gate commodity, it is likely that the simulations with a CGE model will miss an
important point, which is the composition of trade. In order to assess how the
combination of instruments (TRQs, but also specific tariffs) introduce a bias to-
wards importing higher quality, it is necessary to rely on a particular specification
of import demand functions that allow to distinguish several components of the
welfare variation, including a quality downgrading effect that may follow trade
liberalization. All these issues are addressed in the third chapter.
Agricultural trade liberalization between the EU and Mercosur might have im-
portant environmental implications, because of the increase in pollution-intensive
productions in exporting countries. In particular, the use of fertilizers and pes-
ticides in large agricultural countries is an increasing concern, because of inap-
propriate environmental regulations aimed at internalizing the damage - both in
Northern and Southern countries. Consumers in developed countries have become
more worried about the environmental characteristics of the production processes
of goods they purchase, and some of them are willing to pay higher prices for
Environmentally Preferable Products like organic products. This is generally
2“Tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) are two-level tariffs, with a limited volume of imports permitted
at the lower in-quota tariff and all subsequent imports charged the (often much) higher out-of-
quota tariff” (Ingco, 1996; Diakosavvas, 2001; De Gorter and Kliauga, 2006).
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considered as a rewarding niche market for exporters in developing countries, as
the EU has recently become a net importer of organic products. At the same
time, WTO members have launched negotiations aimed at liberalizing trade in
Environmental Goods and Services, with the idea to promote free trade in a way
that is consistent with sustainable development. Focusing on bilateral trade be-
tween the EU and Mercosur in both conventional agricultural commodities and
their Environmentally Preferable substitutes (organic products), I have tried to
compare the environmental and terms-of-trade implications of selective (only for
the organic products) and unselective (for both varieties) cuts in tariffs, and to
investigate how these changes in trade policy affect trade and the environment
compared to an environmental policy. This fourth chapter is mainly conceptual,
but the developments should prove useful in understanding the gains that Merco-
sur countries can expect under the present negotiations at the WTO Committee
on Trade and the Environment.
Four distinct chapters
The rest of this dissertation consists of four chapters and a conclusion. The overall
objectives in this dissertation are to:
1. Simulate and compare the welfare and trade implications of a multilateral
trade negotiations on the EU and Mercosur preferential trade agreement
(Chapter 1).
2. Improve the modeling of agricultural trade liberalization with regard to
TRQs and to highlight its consequences (Chapter 2).
3. Address the impacts of trade liberalization on the composition of trade, in
particular in the presence of TRQs and specific tariffs, which characterize
the EU tariff structure (Chapter 3).
4. Address the comparison of different trade liberalization patterns and foreign
environmental policy by decomposing welfare impacts (Chapter 4).
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Chapter 1 aims at showing why, after twelve years agreeing on the framework
of negotiations and eight after the beginning of the market access talks, the EU
and Mercosur have not achieved significant progresses in the bilateral negotia-
tions. First, the latter are held at the conclusion of the Doha Round. Second,
agricultural trade liberalization is a key issue of this Preferential Trade Agreement
(PTA) as agricultural sectors are the core of Mercosur’s comparative advantages
and their protection is still a major element of EU trade policy.
We use the MIRAGE CGE dynamic model (Bchir et al., 2002; Decreux and
Valin, 2007) from CEPII to assess the consequences of this PTA. The fact that
Venezuela has joined Mercosur is explicitly taken into account in the dynamic
baseline. Simulations are run by considering plausible outcomes of the Doha
Round, including its failure. Indeed, major concessions on agriculture in the Doha
Development Agenda (DDA) will have negative effects on what will be offered
in the bilateral talks, and vice versa. Between 20013 and 2004,4 trade patterns
between Mercosur and the EU have undergone important changes. In order to
retain a realistic reference situation for the negotiations, we update the trade flows
that will be used in our simulations. Liberalization scenarios (multilateral and
regional) are defined at the most detailed level available using the MAcMap-HS6
database (Boue¨t et al., 2004), which was jointly developed by the ITC (UNCTAD,
WTO, Gevena) and the CEPII, to take into account preferential tariff and quotas
for the year 2004. This particularity allows us to pay especial attention to the
sensitive products and exceptions issues.
Chapter 2 addresses the question of the importance of TRQ modeling in a
CGE framework. We focus on avoiding TRQ aggregation biases. Since the
Uruguay Round Agricultural Agreement (URAA) entered into force in 1994,
TRQs have become a widely used trade policy instrument to improve agricul-
tural market access while controlling import volumes at the same time (i.e. the
beef and sugar markets in the European Union or in the United States). So
far, CGE models, such as MIRAGE, have only taken into account the quota
3We consider GTAP 6.x data described by Dimaranan, ed (2006)
4Trade data is taken from BACI database described in Gaulier and Zignago (2004)
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rents, assuming most of time that they are kept by exporters. Unfortunately, this
methodology does not authorise any change in the TRQ regime when trade policy
changes (i.e. a quota-volume increase for very sensitive agricultural products or
a tariff reduction). In order to improve the treatment of TRQs in MIRAGE we
model them as bilateral TRQs at the HS6 level. Assuming a simple scenario of
bilateral trade agreement between the European Union and Mercosur, we com-
pare our approach to the standard one, using the same CGE model for identical
scenarios. A comparison of the results gives us an idea of the biases introduced
by the negligence of TRQ modeling.
Chapter 3 addresses the question of quality-upgrade in trade due to complex
trade policy instruments. The European Union tariff schedule includes a large
number of specific and composite tariffs as well as many TRQs, which affect the
composition of imports. By altering price ratios between products with different
unit values, both can generate the typical Alchian-Allen shipping the good apples
out effect in foreign countries’ exports to the EU. Different patterns of trade lib-
eralization, either through tariff reduction or an expansion in preferential-access
quotas, might have different consequences for producers and consumers because
of changes in the composition of trade. We illustrate the issues at stake in the
beef sector, focusing on Mercosur exports to the EU. We model import demand
for different qualities in the presence of a TRQ and we derive comparative statics
results for changes in various policy variables.
Chapter 4 addresses the question of selective tariff cuts for Environmentally
Preferable Products (EPPs) that could represent a rewarding niche market for ex-
porters in the Mercosur. The conceptual issues that we developed could be useful
for empirical analysis of the EU-Mercosur trade in biofuels and organic products.5
Current negotiations at the WTO’s Committee on Trade and the Environment
have brought up debates on selective tariff cuts for such products. This raises
5Argentina is one of the few countries with an equivalence agreement with the EU with
respect to the certification of organic products, so that -unlike many developing countries where
NTBs are likely to be an issue- tariff cuts may result in significant improvements in terms of
market access.
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questions on the environmental and welfare implications of trade policy when
a close substitute (”environmentally worse”) exists. Building on the theoretical
trade-and-environment literature, we analyze the rationale for large importing
and exporting countries to negotiate tariff cuts upon environmental character-
istics of the production process, focusing on environmental and terms-of-trade
effects.
Main results show that if consumers in the importing country value the ’Green’
product, selective tariff cuts always result in lower pollution levels in both coun-
tries, due to substitutions in consumption patterns. Other policies (full liberal-
ization / unilateral environmental tax) allow a more dramatic reduction of the
externality in one country, but an increase of pollution in the trading partner.
Chapter 1
Will Regionalism Survive
Multilateralism? The
EU-MERCOSUR Example
1
1This works has benefited from the cooperation of David LABORDE CEPII, Paris and
Universite´ de Pau.
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1.1 INTRODUCTION
Twelve years after the agreement on the framework of negotiations, eight years af-
ter the beginning of market access talks, the European Union (EU) and Mercosur
(Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and, since 2006, Venezuela) negotiations
have not managed to achieved significant progress for several reasons.
First, progress in the bilateral negotiations is subject to the evolution of the
Doha Round. Indeed, interest in reaching a bilateral agreement in the future
would decrease depending on whether the multilateral negotiations succeeded,
leading to the opening of markets, or failed. At the same time, concluding an
agreement right now would make no sense; most of the preferences granted could
be changed and even revoked by multilateral talks. Moreover, a conflict between
the EU and G202 leaders, such as Brazil and Argentina, on the WTO stage
would make any bilateral agreement more difficult. Nevertheless, a failure in the
Doha Round will increase the motivation to reach a Preferential Trade Agreement
(PTA).
Second, agricultural trade liberalization is one of the most conflict-laden is-
sues in both bilateral and multilateral negotiations. For the EU, trade liberal-
ization under the Doha Round and/or under the EU-Mercosur PTA would be
a severe blow to the EU farm sector. The “single pocket” approach links both
kinds of liberalization. If more tariff reduction is given in the Doha Development
Agenda (DDA) talks, less will be given in the EU-Mercosur PTA, and vice versa.
Moreover, bargaining on Tariff-Rate Quotas (TRQ), the most favored tool of EU
policymakers for warranting market access while retaining control of the volume
of imports, is difficult. Not only the size of the quotas but also the way TRQs
are administered are both controversial issues in negotiations.
Finally, Venezuela has recently signed a protocol to become a full Mercosur
2The G20 (or group of 20) is a bloc of developing countries which emerged at the 5th
Ministerial WTO Conference in Cancun (September 2003). They oppose the protectionist
measures of some developed countries on agricultural markets and focus on particular issues
of agricultural trade liberalization at the Doha Round. Chine, India, South Africa and Brazil
appear as the leaders of the group.
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member. An exhaustive schedule has been set in order to take into account trade
sensitivity aspects of each member. This new Mercosur member could change the
conditions of bilateral negotiations with the European Union.
We use the MIRAGE model, the CEPII’s CGE model aimed at studying
the impact of trade liberalization, in order to provide a detailed analysis of the
negotiations. MIRAGE is a dynamic multi-sector multi-country model, based on
the last release of the GTAP (version 6.2) database. Our contribution is that we
re-calibrated the model using trade variation from the BACI database between
2001 and 2004 to capture major changes in trade pattern during the last few
years. For instance, that analysis with a 2001 representation of the economy
could not capture the large increase in exports of beef production originating in
Mercosur to the EU.
Venezuela’s joining Mercosur is explicitly taken into account in the baseline.
Because it is the first net food importer country in the custom union, it is crucial
to assess the consequence of its integration. It is noteworthy that nowadays, no
such assessment has been done in a CGE framework.
Even if our main focus is on the agricultural part of the agreement, we also
give attention to liberalization in manufacturing sectors. Liberalization scenarios
(multilateral and preferential) are defined at the most detailed level available
(HS6), which allows us to make realistic assumptions on the products that the
EU might classify as sensitive. Indeed, it is likely that the EU list will be fine
tuned and target only for some tariff lines based on political reasons, within
a given product category. We assess the consequence of a EU-Mercosur PTA
scenario under different baselines, according to the different possibilities resulting
from Venezuela’s integration into Mercosur and the success or failure of the Doha
Round. This scenario corresponds to what we believe to be the center of gravity
between the EU proposal and the Mercosur proposal.
We focus on a detailed analysis of trade flows and welfare under a EU-Mercosur
PTA scenario.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 shortly discusses the theoretical
and empirical background on the EU-Mercosur PTA. Section 1.3 describes the
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bilateral trade relations and protection between both blocs. Section 1.4 presents
the specifications of the MIRAGE model and scenarios. Finally, in Section 1.5
we discuss the results and conclude.
1.2 The EU-Mercosur PTA: a survey
The new regionalism theory may be considered the most pertinent theoretical
framework to study the EU-Mercosur preferential trade agreement because of
its main assumptions, such as the linkage between trade-productivity and en-
dogenous growth, international factor mobility assumption, the role of imperfect
competition, and political economy consideration,3 i.e. the compatibility degree
between a preferential and a multilateral trade agreement (Ethier, 1998a,b). The
relation between Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) and Multilateral Trade
Agreements (MTAs) has stimulated rich discussions.
A static analysis of this question goes back to Viner (1950) who character-
ized PTAs as good or bad according to trade creation (shift of imports from an
inefficient to an efficient source) and trade diversion (vice versa) consequences.
However, this seminal contribution did not consider previous dynamic aspects
between PTAs and MTAs, such as between the EU-Mercosur and Doha negotia-
tions.
Bhagwati (1991) analyzes, in a dynamic sense, whether PTAs contribute to
MTAs either by adding new members or by accelerating free trade. Panagariya
(1999) formulates the time-path question according to the independence (or not)
of the PTA’s and the MTA’s time-path. In the case of the EU-Mercosur and the
Doha negotiation, it is more adequate to assume both time-path are embraced
simultaneously, and thus their interaction is essential for the final impact towards
freer trade.
More recently, the analysis of the dynamic question moved to political-economy-
theoretic modeling. In an oligopoly model where governments follow the interest
of lobbying firms (Bhagwati, 1990; Krishna, 1994), two countries with a bilateral
3All the assumptions related to the new regionalism are considered in the MIRAGE model.
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agreement do not have incentives to sign a multilateral agreement with non-
members. However, median-voter models under monopolistic competition (Levy,
1997) show that bilateral PTAs may be a political support for MTAs. The sequen-
tial bargaining argument was introduced by Bhagwati et al. (1994). They stated
that for non-hegemonic countries, simultaneous (PTA and MTA) bargaining is
profitable, but for hegemonic countries, the sequential bargaining is preferred by
picking the most vulnerable countries first, and then moving towards the rest.
In the presence of lobbying when the final goal is multilateral free trade, non-
hegemonic countries would abandon PTAs for MTAs, while hegemonic countries
would move in both directions at the same time. Both multilateral and bilateral
negotiations are very close, and the success or failure in the first ones could either
open new perspectives for the second ones or impose the same restrictions as at
the multilateral talks.
Many empirical works using CGE models, such as GTAP (Hertel, 1999), MI-
RAGE (Bchir et al., 2002; Decreux and Valin, 2007) and AMIDA (Flores, 2006),
have analyzed the impacts of the EU-Mercosur Free Trade Agreement (FTA).
Their simulations display similar results, with some slight differences according
to each model’s hypotheses (static vs. dynamics, perfect vs. imperfect competi-
tion on industrial sectors, number of factors, FDI, externalities and labor market
rigidities).
A PTA between the EU and Mercosur countries would generate economic
gains (welfare, GDP, trade and employment) for both regions. Monteagudo and
Watanuki (2001) simulate a EU-Mercosur FTA scenario and find a substantial
GDP and trade increase for Mercosur (2.94% for GDP, 7.9% for exports and
6.4% for imports), while those of the EU only increases slightly (0.06% for GDP
and 0.4% for imports and exports). According to these authors most of GDP
and trade variations for Mercosur are explained by export externality gains (be-
tween 10 and 13% of Mercosur’s exports increase) and the scale effect of a larger
economy has only a minor influence (6% of Mercosur’s exports increase). Flores
(2006)’s results using the AMIDA model show the same trend as Monteagudo and
Watanuki (2001)’s; however, trade variations are greater than Monteagudo and
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Watanuki (2001)’s (19.4% and 18.57% for total Mercosur’s exports and imports),
particularly due to the transaction costs modeling introduced in this paper (trans-
portation, bureaucracy, distribution margins, etc.). Boue¨t et al. (2003)’s results
are also close to those of Monteagudo and Watanuki (2001) but display a smaller
trade creation effect between the EU and Mercosur (5.8% and 6.4% for Mercosur
exports and imports and only 0.8% and 0.4% for those of the EU). Both papers
use static CGE models considering imperfect competition in the manufacturing
sectors, but the standard version of the model used by Boue¨t et al. (2003) is
compared with the rules of origin modeling version, showing that the rules of ori-
gin have a strong restrictive impact on trade flows. Other papers, such as Laens
and Terra (2006), which use a basic GTAP model (static, perfect competition in
all sectors, no externality effects, etc.) display smaller welfare and trade gains
for both regions than previous works. Conversely, Bchir et al. (2003) using the
MIRAGE model show that dynamic gains are important when compared to the
previous static models. A full liberalization scenario between the EU and the
Mercosur displays higher trade gains for both regions than in the previous static
models (22.6% and 19% for Mercosur’s exports and imports respectively, while
those of the EU gain 2.4% and 2.3%). The imperfect competition hypothesis in
industrialized sectors also leads to greater welfare gains than under other standard
models with perfect competition in these sectors.
Summarizing the previous results, we can say that all these papers show that
the primary source of gains for Mercosur comes from agricultural liberalization,
and that trade diversion effects are always non-negligible as a consequence of
this FTA. However, none of them have considered Venezuela as a full Mercosur
member. The recent work of Coelho et al. (2007) compare different scenarios for
Venezuela’s accession to Mercosur by assuming different hypotheses about the
implementation of the Common External Tariff (CET) and free trade between
partners. Trade results for Venezuela show that imports would increase more
quickly than exports, and Brazilian exports would benefit the most from this
process of integration due to bilateral trade composition.
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1.3 EU-Mercosur bilateral relations
1.3.1 Historical and Prospective relations
Bilateral trade talks between the EU and Mercosur began in 1995 when negotia-
tors set the structure, the methodology and the calendar for negotiations. The
first phase concluded with the political and co-operation dialogue, and in 2001,
the two blocs exchanged the first texts on goods, services and government procure-
ment in order to improve market access between the regions. In the Presidential
Summit in Madrid in 2002 the countries reiterated their political commitments
to reach the largest bi-regional trade agreement in history. Several rounds of ne-
gotiations followed the previous commitments, and in the 9th round, the first list
of most sensitive products under negotiation was exchanged. The latter has also
constrained the progress in recent negotiations because Mercosur countries insist
on a much larger access to the EU market. In the most recent proposals (October
2004), the EU made some concessions through several TRQs for these sensitive
products. The TRQ scheme was preferred because of fears that a more generous
European proposal on agriculture would allow Mercosur countries to capture an
extremely large market share (Bureau et al., 2006). However, for Mercosur coun-
tries the latter was considered as a too limited proposal on market access issues.
At the same time, the EU also rejected the Mercosur concessions in services and
government procurement as too limited. After this disagreement on proposals,
dialogue was interrupted until the Ministerial Meeting in Brussels on September
2005 when it was formally restarted (Ramos et al., 2006). Despite the strong
majority vote in the European Parliament in favor of a EU-Mercosur FTA and
recent discussions between representatives from both regions (November 2006 and
April 2007), no agreement seems forthcoming if concessions are not improved.
The EU-Mercosur negotiations have shown long slow progress and even some
backward steps, because of their protectionist attitudes. EU-Mercosur bilateral
negotiations seem to reject the classical thesis that postulates that PTAs are
much easier to attain than multilateral trade agreements because of the restric-
tion of the WTO non-discrimination clause on the one hand, and because of the
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predictability of trade impact on the other hand(Johnson, 1965). The conditions
for a EU-Mercosur PTA are that trade would be partly liberalized in a grad-
ual and reciprocal way, substantially covering most bilateral trade flows without
excluding any sector according to the WTO rules. This insures that a regional
integration process achieves a sufficient degree of compatibility with the multi-
lateral trading system (Giordano, 2003). Moreover, the demands and concessions
of each region under bilateral talks are subject to the evolution and outcomes of
WTO negotiations.
The ongoing integration in South America conditions the future of the EU-
Mercosur negotiations. Within Latin America, Mercosur countries have signed
different agreements with their neighbors. The trade agreements with Chile and
Bolivia (format “4+1”) have created two separate FTAs, leading these two coun-
tries to become Mercosur Associated Members. Such was the beginning of the
Mercosur “expansion” in Latin America. Trade negotiations between Mercosur
and the Andean Community would have been the first “bloc-to-bloc” trade agree-
ment in the region, but it failed many times due to the discrepancy between
members’ interests. Finally, on July, 1th 2004, a PTA was implemented between
Mercosur and the Andean Community according to the Economic Agreement
(ACE 59) at the Latin America Integration Association.4 One year later, Mer-
cosur countries became associated members of the Andean Community, and in
April 2006 Venezuela left its Andean partners to become a full member of Mer-
cosur. This step in Mercosur expansion will likely lead to future Latin America
integration.
The enlargement of Mercosur and the possibility to become a power region in
trade negotiation may have a considerable impact on the EU-Mercosur bi-regional
trade negotiations.
4The ALADI or LAIA is composed by all Latin-American countries and looks forward to
the establishment of a common market, alongside with social and economic development of the
region.
1.3. EU-MERCOSUR BILATERAL RELATIONS 18
1.3.2 Bilateral trade relation
The period from 1998-2004 shows important changes in the Mercosur economies,
including currency devaluation, social and macroeconomic crises and recent eco-
nomic recovery. These facts have affected their trade relations with the rest of
the world, and especially with the European Union.
Since 1997, Mercosur exports to the rest of the world (ROW excluding the EU)
have been fluctuating by following the crisis in the region. Agricultural exports
have obviously suffered more than the manufacturing sector (agricultural exports
fell 21% while manufactured exports rose 5% between 1997 and 1998). In 2001 the
situation was similar: agricultural exports fell 13% while manufactured exports
rose 1%. The variation in agricultural exports to the EU is not only related to
the local macroeconomic situation but also linked to sanitary crises, especially
ground exports of beef (foot and mouth disease) and poultry (avian influenza).
Between 2003 and 2004, Mercosur countries have improved their international
competitiveness through currency devaluation as a consequence of the financial
crisis in the region, but animal diseases limited animal product exports to the
EU especially because of extra sanitary controls (while 2003 saw a 34% increase,
2004 saw a -12% decrease in agricultural and food exports).
[INSERT Figure 1.1 and 1.2]
European Union (agricultural and industrial) exports to the ROW have grown
steadily during this period. However, their exports to the Mercosur countries have
been strongly linked to the macroeconomic situation in Latin America. European
exports to Mercosur have been falling since 1998, a phenomenon that can be
explained by the recession period in South America and the first devaluation of
the Brazilian Real. Industrial exports remained steady at the beginning of 1997,
but after the Real devaluation they suffered from a strong negative variation (-
8%). European exports recovered in the two following years (1999 and 2000)
until the next crisis in 2001 (-6% of industrial exports). At the end of 2001, the
economic crisis in Mercosur, and thus the devaluations of the Mercosur countries
currencies in 2002, resulted in a collapse of European exports to the region. Since
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then, and until 2004, a “healthier”Mercosur economy led to a steady increase in
European exports (between 30% and 40% per year even for agricultural and food
products).
[INSERT Figure 1.3 and 1.4]
Even if Mercosur is a minor EU world partner, it is the EU’s most important
partner in Latin America, because Mercosur is the destination of close to 50% of
the EU exports to the Latin region. At the same time, the EU is an important
partner of Mercosur countries especially in the domain of agricultural and food
exports (more than 30% of total non-Mercosur exports).
Figure 1.5 gives an idea of the patterns of trade of these two regions as well as
the dynamic bilateral trade balance. Mercosur countries are net exporters of agri-
cultural and food products (not only to the EU but also to the ROW), while the
EU exports to Mercosur are mostly manufactured products and services. Bilat-
eral trade was characterized by a deficit for the Mercosur region until 2001. Since
2002, because of the boom in their agricultural exports, the Mercosur countries
have reversed the negative trade balance with the EU.
[INSERT Figure 1.5]
European imports from Mercosur never stopped rising even during the crises.
Since 2002 European agricultural imports from Mercosur have shown a rapid
increase with a peak in 2003. Depreciation of Mercosur currencies had reinforced
the competitiveness of Mercosur exports and the appreciation of the Euro with
respect to the US dollar then contributed to the widening of the trade surplus
between Mercosur and the EU.
Bilateral trade between the European Union and Mercosur seems to be com-
plementary according to the previously presented trade patterns. Mercosur ex-
ports to the EU are concentrated in a few chapters, of which most are agricultural:
animal products (high-quality beef, poultry, pork and fish), cereals and seeds
(wheat, rice and corn), fruits and vegetables, and some foods and beverages.
European Union exports to Mercosur mainly concern manufactured products,
such as chemicals, pharmaceuticals, plastic, paper, iron and steel products and
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machinery, domestic electrical and electronic devices and vehicles, as we can see
in the composition by chapter in Figure 1.7.
However, bilateral trade in some chapters also display the complementarity in
their trade patterns. For instance, in the bilateral trade of papers and articles of
paper sector (chapter 48), Mercosur exports raw materials belonging to the paper
sector, while the EU exports final products of the same sector.
[INSERT Figure 1.6]
[INSERT Figure 1.7]
The complementarity between the trade patterns of both economic blocs, leads
us to predict important gains of this regional agreement. Moreover, adjustment
costs of this agreement would be negligible compared to the gains, due to the
high initial tariff level, especially on the European side (De Melo and Panagariya,
1993; DeRosa, 1998).
Bilateral trade is only a part of bilateral business relations between the two
regions. During the 1990’s, the Mercosur region has received more than 50% of
the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Latin America and most of the capital
came from European transnational groups (telecommunication, energy services
and agribusiness). With a EU-Mercosur agreement, the EU is looking to consol-
idate its presence in the Mercosur market through FDI. To ensure FDI, Euro-
pean companies demand a stable regulatory framework of direct investment and
intellectual property rights in order to reduce risks and avoid future problems
(Giordano, 2003).
In short, Mercosur and the EU have complementary trade patterns, but we will
see in the next subsection that potential trade flows are concentrated in politically
sensitive sectors that are now characterized by a high level of protection. The
latter and the insecure regulatory framework for FDI, both make this regional
trade agreement difficult to conclude.
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1.3.3 Reciprocal level of protection
1.3.3.1 Structure of protection in the European Union
Since the Mercosur countries are developing countries, they are eligible for the
EU Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). Venezuela benefited from the GSP
Drug before 2007, and now benefits from the GSP+. Because of the broader
coverage of the GSP+, 85% of its exports to the EU are duty free. Other Mercosur
countries are only eligible to the “standard” GSP, which has limited coverage for
agricultural sectors. Only a few products among their main exports are covered
by the GSP (fats, seafood, some fruits). In addition, the GSP seldom grants duty
free access but more often only waives a small component of the tariff. Moreover,
for products in which Mercosur countries are competitive, they face graduation
(designed to spread the benefits of the GSP to a large number of countries and
to avoid that a single exporter takes a very large market share).
The dispersion between agricultural and non-agricultural protection rates in
the European market explains the difference in average applied tariffs across Latin
American countries. For Uruguay and Paraguay, the average applied tariff in
agriculture is ten times higher than in non-agricultural sectors. However, for
agricultural products, Argentina is less harmed by the EU protection (14%) than
Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay. Brazil is affected by an average tariff in agricul-
tural products that is twice as big as Argentina, and Uruguay faces tariff barriers
five times greater than Argentina, even if the EU protection against meat exports
remains significant for Argentina. In contract, for non-agricultural goods, Brazil
only faces an average protection of 1.6%, while the Rest of Mercosur is affected
by an average tariff of 2.6%.
[INSERT Figure 1.8]
The EU tariff structure shows some tariff escalation, and effective protection
is higher for processed products. This is particularly true for meat, cocoa, semi-
processed products of the wood sector, flours, tobacco and leather and apparel
goods. While preferences granted under the GSP+ and agreements with other
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countries, such as Caribbean and Pacific countries, have largely eliminated tariff
escalation, it remains an issue for Mercosur exports to the EU. A PTA with EU,
will allow Mercosur countries to improve the degree of processing of their exports.
[INSERT Figure 1.9]
[INSERT Figure 1.10]
Tariff-rate quotas defined under the Uruguay Round Agriculture Agreement
(URAA) allow Mercosur countries to benefit from preferential tariffs for some
of their agricultural exports. These are either current access TRQs, opened so
as to ensure persistence of historical preferential trade flows, or minimum access
TRQs, given in order to open 5% of the EU consumption market to international
competition (all WTO members).
Most TRQs in the European Union are administered according to License-
on-demand (meat TRQs), Historical trade (animal products TRQs) and First-
come/First-serve (fruits and vegetables TRQs) methods which not only affect the
distribution of rights to imports but also the TRQ-rents between importers and
exporters (Skully, 1999).5
[INSERT Table 1.1]
5However, the capture of the rent is explained sometimes by the presence of importer (or
exporter)’s market power (Olarreaga and Ozden, 2005). Others explanations for the rent allo-
cation between countries under the same preferential agreement are the difference in the quality
composition of exports, the changes in world prices (or import prices) after the agreement or
the differentiation of imports across origins.
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European TRQs for Mercosur countries
The EU has opened more than 80 TRQs for agricultural products, some are granted for the
current access and others introduced under the Uruguay Round minimum access.
Mercosur countries benefit both from a preferential market access through TRQs for cereals
(maize, wheat, rice), meats (beef, pork and poultry), some fruits (peaches) and vegetables
(garlic), dairy products (milk powder, butter and cheeses), sugar and other food products.
Argentina and Brazil benefit especially from meat TRQs. The first one particularly uses
beef (fresh, frozen and processed) TRQs, and Brazil diversifies its meat exports, not only by
exporting inside the Hilton TRQ and frozen beef but also using poultry (minimum-access
TRQs) and pork TRQs. Most of WTO poultry TRQs are filled by Brazil who, in spite of the
very high tariffs in the EU, manages to ship large quantities of poultry outside the quota.
Brazil also exports frozen beef out of quota (80,000 tons in 2003).
Uruguay also benefits from beef TRQs but especially from the sheep and goat (current-
access) TRQs as well as Argentina because of the specific licenses allocation to these coun-
tries.
Particularly concerning the “Hilton” high-quality beef, Mercosur countries benefit from
40,300 tons per year, which is allocated differently across them: a 28,000-ton quota for
Argentina, 6,300 tons for Uruguay, 5,000 tons for Brazil and 1,000 tons for Paraguay. The
only country which does not fulfill its quota is Paraguay due to sanitary problems. The
Hilton in-quota tariff is 20% and the out-of-quota tariff is a composite tariff (ad valorem
tariff of 12.8% plus specific tariff between 140 and 300 euros per 100kg). In spite of the high
out-of-quota tariff, Mercosur countries manage to fulfill their quotas and even to export
small volumes out-of-quota. For instance, in 2003 Brazil exported 41,000 tons of Hilton beef
exceeding five times his quota.
Most part of meat TRQs are administered according to the License-on-demand methods.
Nevertheless, in some TRQs, such as the “Hilton” beef TRQ, Mercosur countries manage
their own licenses and capture most of the quota rent. This aspect explains the interests for
some Mercosur producers in keeping TRQs instead of negotiating MFN tariff reductions.
Other interesting cases, such as sugar TRQ for which Brazil is the main exporter, and some
cereals TRQs (durum wheat and corn for Argentina and Brazil), are also detailed in Table
1.1.
1.3.3.2 Structure of Protection of Mercosur
Since 1995, all Mercosur members have been applying a Common External Tariff
(CET) to all imports coming from outside Mercosur. At the beginning, the CET
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covered about 85% of imports but since 2001 Argentina and Brazil have strongly
increased the percentage of coverage, while Paraguay and Uruguay have more
recently done the same (2006). Nevertheless, there exist some exceptions, such as
for capital goods, telecommunication and electronics devices, sugar, automobiles
and the list of exceptions defined by each particular country.
The CET varies between 0 and 23%, in which the highest level of protection
is concentrated in manufactured products such as textiles, wood, machinery and
equipment, food and other manufactured goods and the lowest level of protection
is applied to animals, seeds, some chemical products, etc. The general criterion
is that tariffs increase with the share of the added value of goods; however, other
criteria have been also considered, such as the protection of production coming
from a particular region or country. Indeed, Mercosur applies the highest tariffs
on consumption goods and the lowest on agricultural raw materials. However,
the protection structure is much more homogeneous than the EU one. Due to
the trade structure, average protection is between 14% in agriculture and 10% in
industry, and falls to 2% for primary products.
[INSERT Figure 1.11]
[INSERT Figure 1.12]
The EU has no preferential access to the Mercosur market. European countries
face the CET from Mercosur in all products, which is higher for consumption and
non-agricultural products than it is for other products. Some Mercosur countries,
such as Brazil and the new member, Venezuela, have opened WTO TRQs on
agricultural products. Brazil has opened two TRQs, one on pears and apples
and the other on wheat. The former is not effective because the CET is lower
than the in-quota tariff, but the latter is always effective, used and has been
opened to all WTO members. Venezuela is the other Mercosur country which
has opened TRQs (more than 60) on many different agricultural products. These
TRQs are not Mercosur TRQs because they were individually opened by Brazil
and Venezuela. The rest of Mercosur does not use them because intra-Mercosur
trade is duty free (except for some exports, such as vehicles and vehicle parts
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exports, which are also sensitive products between Mercosur countries).
1.4 Modeling the EU-Mercosur bilateral agree-
ment
1.4.1 The MIRAGE model
The model we use is the multi-region, multi-sector computable general equilibrium
(CGE) model from CEPII, named MIRAGE, which was particularly developed
for trade policy analysis.
The main hypotheses of this model are imperfect competition (oligopolistic
framework “a` la Cournot”), vertical and horizontal product differentiation in a
sequential dynamic set-up, where the adjustment is linked to the capital reallo-
cation.
The demand side is modeled in each region through the representative-agent
assumption. Domestic products are assumed to benefit from a specific status
for consumers, making them less substitutable for foreign products than foreign
products between each other. In the absence of systematic information suitable
for the incorporation of vertical differentiation in a worldwide modeling exercise,
such as the one undertaken here, vertical differentiation is modeled in an ad hoc
way: products originating in developing countries and in developed countries are
assumed to belong to different quality ranges. This assumption is motivated
by the fact that several empirical works have shown that unit value differences
are able to reveal quality differences even at the most detailed level of product
classification. This hypothesis about quality differentiation is likely to have direct
consequence on the transmission of liberalization shocks since the elasticity of
substitution is lower between different qualities than between products of a given
quality.
Regarding the supply side of the model, producers use five factors: capital,
labor (skilled and unskilled), land and natural resources. The structure of the
value added is intended to take into account the well-documented relative skill-
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capital complementarity. These two factors are thus bundled separately, with a
lower elasticity of substitution, while a higher substitutability is assumed between
this bundle and other factors.
The production function assumes perfect complementarity between value added
and intermediate consumption. The sectoral composition of the intermediate con-
sumption aggregate stems from a CES function. For each sector of origin, the
nesting is the same as for final consumption, meaning that the sector bundle has
the same structure for final and intermediate consumption.
Constant returns to scale and perfect competition are assumed to prevail in
agricultural and transport sectors. In contrast, firms are assumed to feature
increasing returns to scale in other sectors. Each firm produces its own va-
riety facing constant marginal costs and fixed cost per year and not affecting
the production choices of its competitors through its own decision of production
(Cournot-Nash). However, its market power affects the price at the sector level.
The calibration of parameters and the adjustment in the number of firms are
linked to the zero-profit condition.
Capital goods are immobile across sectors and thus have the same composition
regardless of the sector. This assumption introduces a rigidity in the economy
suggested by empirical evidence. Capital is accumulated every year as the result
of investments in the most profitable sectors. Natural resources are considered
to be perfectly immobile and may not be accumulated. Both types of labor are
assumed to be perfectly mobile across sectors, whereas imperfect land mobility is
modeled with a constant elasticity of transformation function. Production factors
are assumed to be fully employed; accordingly, negative shocks are absorbed by
changes in prices (factor rewards) rather than in quantities. All production factors
are internationally immobile.
With respect to macroeconomic closure, the current balance is assumed to be
exogenous (and equal to its initial value in real terms), while real exchange rates
are endogenous.
The calculation of the dynamic baseline has been recently improved in order
to introduce a variable total factor productivity (TFP). This improvement is
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based on a more elaborate demographic and macroeconomic forecast in which
the labor and GDP growth rates are provided until 2015 by the World Bank.
In the baseline, the TFP is determined endogenously but under the simulation
scenarios it becomes fixed and thus the endogenous variables are the GDP and
labor.
Some particular changes have been done for this paper.
First, we have defined a specific aggregation between regions (13) and sec-
tors (30). All agricultural products are kept at GTAP original sector definitions
because we are especially interested on the trade liberalization consequences in
agriculture; however, due to vertical integration in some agricultural sectors in
large countries such as Brazil, we have decided to gather raw and processed goods
for rice, meat and sugar sectors. The rest of sectors have been disaggregated by
considering important trade between partners, e.g. motor and vehicles, textile,
paper, energy products. For instance, natural resources play an important role
in Venezuelan economy and to observe how trade agreements can help or hinder
the diversification processes around these assets, chemicals and energy products
have been splitted. Since we do not study liberalization in services, most of them
are aggregated. However, we do not aggregate services activities which are di-
rectly (transport and communication) or indirectly (business services) correlated
to trade. For regional aggregation we considered the most recent configuration for
the EU with all her new members (EU27) and also Mercosur countries are kept
separately except for the smaller on, Uruguay and Paraguay, which are joint in
the Rest of Mercosur in order to equilibrate the regional decomposition. For the
rest of regions we have chosen an aggregation which consider close competitions
of the EU-Mercosur PTA partners which would be harm by this agreement, e.g.
NAFTA, Sub-Saharan Africa, Mediterranean countries (see Table 1.2).
[INSERT Table 1.2]
Second, particular treatment to recalibrate the model has been considered
to mimic recent changes in trade flows between 2001 and 2004 using the BACI
database (Gaulier and Zignago, 2004).
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[INSERT Table 1.4]
[INSERT Table 1.5]
Comparing GTAP and BACI trade databases, we found that trade flows be-
tween these two regions have known major changes in the last years. Crises and
currency devaluations in Mercosur economies have led to important changes in
their patterns of trade. Mercosur bilateral trade with the EU has strongly in-
creased for cereals, meat and other traditional agricultural exports. Moreover,
the “mad cow” crisis has strongly weakened the meat sector in Europe and has
allowed new export possibilities to the European market. In contrast, EU exports
to Mercosur have decreased in the domain of traditional exports (chemicals, ma-
chines, vehicles, etc.) due to the different crises and currency devaluations in the
region.
Simulating the EU-Mercosur PTA scenario on the basis of 2001 trade data,
would result in a very distorted picture of the reality and would compromise any
utility that this exercise could have for policymakers.
Trying to reproduce the evolution of trade flows of these regions, we have
to adapt the dynamic path of the model between 2001 and 2004. After using
the standard dynamic calibration of MIRAGE, we compare the evolution of the
model’s trade flows and the one existing in BACI database for the each year from
2001 to 2004.
Thus starting from GTAP trade of this two regions (also including Chile and
Venezuela), we update them by reproducing the growth rate of trade flows, drawn
from BACI database, between 2001 and 2004. Indeed, for some sectors and some
small countries, such as “Other manufactures products” and “Rest of Mercosur”,
COMTRADE and consequently BACI display extreme variations of trade (in
volume), and in many cases they are inconsistent with the base year data in
GTAP. Taking into account relative changes instead of absolute ones allows us to
avoid modifying the Social Accounting Matrices (SAMs) in 2001 but recalibrate
the model for 2004.
Since the changes in trade policies during the period are already taken into
account in the model, we have to explain trade differences through alternative
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explanations. Three main mecanisms are considered:
1. Sectoral technical progress for some countries
2. Foreign Direct Investments
3. Changes in transaction/transport costs
Each of these channels has a differentiate impacts.
Growth in the total sectoral trade for these regions are assumed to be ex-
plained by a productivity improvement in some sectors and investment in the
other sectors. Changes in sectoral productivity will increase the sectoral exports
of one country on global market. More technically, the sectoral productivity will
become endogenous to reproduce growth rate of sectoral exports for Mercosur
countries and European Union on global markets. The Genetic Modification
technology in soja beans is a good illustration of this case.
Moreover, for some manufacturing sectors, such as paper industry, trade has
not initially taken place in the model because of very small values. However,
investment and particularly FDI have recently lead to increase trade and pro-
duction. For these sectors the investment function in MIRAGE is not able to
reproduce this new behaviour, and thus we decided to introduce exogenously new
investments in these activities.6
Finally, bilateral trade between the EU and these Latin American countries
increases also due to a reduction in transaction costs (20% per year from 2001
and 2004) in all sectors. More technically, given the new sectoral productiv-
ity and investments, bilateral sectoral transaction costs are shocked to complete
changes in the bilateral trade flows between the EU and Mercosur countries. The
changes in trasaction costs reflect not only transport costs reduction but also
the improvement in business networks and the reduction in non-tariff barriers to
trade.
6To maintain general equilibrium constraints, exogenous invest flows are taken from existing
capital in other sectors from other regions in the model. The lack of data on bilateral sectoral
FDI forbids us to achieve a better outcome.
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The sequential dynamic set-up of the model leads us to implement the three
previous mechanisms through which sectoral trade (total and bilateral) increases
for Mercosur and the EU in this particular study.
The model uses the GTAP database 6.2. However, instead of relying on
modeling tariff cuts at the sector level, we use a detailed database (MAcMapHS6)
at the HS6 level (5,113 products);7 this permits a better handling of the tariff
dispersion (which matters as far as the gains of tariff removal will depend on such
dispersion) as well as introducing sensitive products. TRQ data (in and out-
of-quota tariffs, quota levels, quota primes and imports under TRQs) are also
provided at the HS6 level, leading to state realistic scenarios about very sensitive
products. This data also allows the analysis to be based on actual applied tariffs,
including preferential provisions (e.g. GSP, FTAs, etc.).
1.4.2 Pre-experiment and reference baseline
Before the simulation of any scenario, several elements are included in the refer-
ence situation in order to have a realistic baseline: the end of the Multi-Fibers
Agreement (2005), the United States’ 2002 Farm Bill and the end of the imple-
mentation period of China commitments as a new WTO member (2005). All the
tariff simulations are applied at the HS6 level taking into account all relevant
information (Bound tariffs, MFN applied tariffs and preferential applied tariffs),
then aggregated to the model nomenclature (Table 1.2) using the reference group
weighting scheme in order to avoid biased tariffs due to tariff aggregation (Boue¨t
et al., 2002).8 Starting from the 2001 protection data provided by MAcMapHS6-
v1 (used in GTAP6), we move to the 2004 level of protection (MAcMapHS6-v2),
7Regarding border protection, the database used to construct the scenarios of trade liber-
alization at the product level is MAcMapHS6 (Boue¨t et al., 2004). The base year for the first
version of MAcMapHS6 (v1) is 2001 and for it second version the base year is 2004.
8The reference group weighting scheme used to aggregate MAcMaps’ tariffs was developed
by Boue¨t et al. (2002). For that purpose, authors have defined 5 groups of countries according
to their GDP per capita, imports per capita and also exports per capita. Trade of these five
groups of reference is used as weight to aggregate tariffs in order to avoid biased tariff due to
other aggregation schemes.
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and then we apply realistic trade policy changes.
Starting from this common ground, different baselines, used later as counter-
factual, are built:
• (R1): the “business as usual” situation, with a Mercosur without Venezuela.
• (R2): (R1) + a successful DDA
• (R3): (R1) + the Venezuela accession
• (R4): the Venezuela accession plus a successful DDA (R1) + (R2) + (R3)
The accession of Venezuela to Mercosur has two main aspects: Venezuela
adopting the Mercosur Common External Tariff (CET), and a trade liberaliza-
tion between Venezuela and its new Mercosur partners. However, we keep the
current preferences between Venezuela and the Andean Community constant.
This regional integration is implemented during the seven years between 2007
and 2014. Argentina and Brazil will eliminate their tariffs by 2010, and Uruguay
and Paraguay will do the same by 2013. Venezuela will start its tariff elimination
by 2012 (tariff cut for non-sensitive products) and will finish it by 2014 elimi-
nating tariff for sensitive products (chemical and petrochemical products, paper
products, automobile, etc.) at the full completion of the agreement.
The Doha scenario considered here is similar to Lamy’s 20-20-20 proposal.9
This expected compromise can be described as following: a Swiss formula with a
coefficient 10 for developed countries and 20 for developing ones in Non-Agricultural
Market Access (NAMA). The G20 proposal in agriculture: a tiered formula for
tariffs,10 a new ceiling for domestic support in the North, and the phasing out of
9G-20, Swiss 20 and below USD 20 billion overall trade-distorting supports. G-20
refers the cut into farms tariffs proposed by this group, a Swiss formula with a coefficient of 20
for reducing developing country industrial tariffs, and reducing the ceiling for the US overall
trade-distorting supports to below USD 20 billion (Bridges, 2006)
10A tiered formula with inflexion points at 20, 50 and 75 percent, using average tariff cuts of
45, 55, 65 and 75 percent. For developing countries, the inflexion points are placed at 30, 80
and 130 percent and the average cuts at 25, 30, 35 and 40 percent. Final tariffs are capped at
100% for developed countries and 150% for developing countries.
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export subsidies at the 2013 horizon; a Special and Differential Treatment making
LDCs exempted from any tariff cuts and asking them to just continue the binding
process (Fontagne´ et al., 2007). Other exclusions and flexibilities are introduced:
a series of developing countries will not liberalize their manufacturing sectors due
to a low initial binding rate (the so-called “Paragraph 6” countries of the NAMA
framework); small and vulnerable economies (including Paraguay and Bolivia)
are conceded zero liberalization. A final exception is that South Korea is treated
as a developing country for agriculture and as a developed country for the NAMA.
Next, we address the issue of special and sensitive products, in order to exam-
ine the “variations” around the central scenario. “Sensitive products” and “special
products” have to be defined for each country.
For both the agricultural and manufacturing sectors, sensitive products are
defined following a political criteria in line with that proposed by Jean et al.
(2005). We make the assumption that tariffs are currently higher where political
sensitivity is the highest, and that governments take into account the effective
impact on the formula of the applied tariffs and the price impact for domestic
producers and consumers. In agriculture, sensitive products can appointed by
all countries and are subject to a smaller liberalization than ordinary products.
In NAMA, sensitive products are totally excluded from liberalization but this
option is restricted to developing countries. In agriculture, developing countries
are entitled to have some special products related to food-safety issues that will
also be excluded from liberalization. More precisely, to define these products we
compare situations in which normal rules and specific treatments are applied.
As special products are concerned, we exclude 10% of the HS6 positions from
liberalization, giving priority to the list of positions selected on the basis of their
caloric contributions.11 Thus sensitive products are defined as 4% of the HS
115% of agricultural HS6 lines are chosen according to the caloric contribution of their trade.
Using the FAO data about caloric contribution per unit per product, we match with bilateral
trade (volume) at the HS6 level from BACI database. These products are ranked following this
indicator and 5% of their tariff lines are consider in prority to choose special products. Finally,
the choice of special and sensitive products is done following their political relevance (Jean et
al., 2005). The difference between special and sensitive products in the Doha scenario is that
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headings with the highest sensitivity indicator.12 For these products, we apply
half of the formula effect on bound rates. When HS6 positions entail TRQs, we
apply 2/3 of the formula (mimicking an increase in the quota). For NAMA, the
sensitive products of developing countries can cover 10% of their HS6 positions
and up to 10% of their trade. For sensitive and special products, no capping at
the HS6 level is considered.
The DDA commitments are fully implemented after four years for developed
countries (2008-2012) and seven years for developing countries (2008-2014).
1.4.3 Scenario
The accomplishment of the EU-Mercosur trade agreement is subordinate to the
multilateral negotiations at the WTO for two reasons: the ‘single pocket’ con-
straint for the EU, and the value of preferences on both markets. Indeed, if an
ambitious Doha Round succeeds, why making efforts to obtain a preferential ac-
cess in a market that is already largely open to other competitors? Because of
this uncertainty, our pre-experiment scenarios assume both possibilities, success
and failure of the multilateral trade agreement before the signature of the bilat-
eral EU-Mercosur agreement. The fact that we consider a WTO trade agreement
before the EU-Mercosur PTA also affects our choice of sensitive products for
the bilateral negotiation, leading thus to the second justification of our scenario
and pre-experiments. Moreover, Venezuela as a new Mercosur member also may
change the future of the EU-Mercosur PTA.
The current horizon of the EU-Mercosur agreement is seven years. Both
scenarios start in 2008.
Because in October 2004 there were no new proposals exchanged, we simulate
an average agreement between EU and Mercosur proposals (October 2004), also
the first 10% of tariff lines will not be liberalized (special products) and the following 4% of
agricultural tariff lines are considered as sensitive with a minor liberalization.
12This indicator was developed by Jean et al. (2005); it means that a product will be more
or less sensitive depending on value of its imports and the square proportional reduction in its
import price due to the bound rate cut.
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including some new TRQs opened by the EU for some particular products.
Trade liberalization for this bilateral trade agreement is total and reciprocal
for all products except for sensitive and very sensitive products. The former tariff
lines have been chosen following the same approach as for the DDA scenario. For
Mercosur, 10% of tariff lines are sensitive products in general. Very sensitive
products concern the first 5% of tariff lines and the former 5% of HS6 lines are
only sensitive products. In the case of the EU, very sensitive products are HS6
lines under WTO TRQs such as meats, cereals and some dairy products and also
other products for which the EU has the intention to open new bilateral TRQs
for Mercosur (ethanol, sugar, cocoa and tobacco).
This distinction between sensitive and very sensitive products leads us to
introduce different patterns of trade liberalization. Sensitive products of both
regions will be liberalized in five years, while very sensitive products will not be
liberalized in the case of Mercosur and liberalized only through TRQs in the case
of the EU.
EU sensitive products are almost equally shared between agricultural and
manufactured chapters; however sensitive and very sensitive products for Merco-
sur are essentially located in the industry.
[INSERT Figure 1.13]
[INSERT Figure 1.14]
In terms of trade, sensitive products represent 21% of EU imports and very
sensitive products 18%. Conversely, with just 5% of lines on both categories,
the Mercosur may classify 14% of its imports as sensitive and 44% as very sen-
sitive. This last share of unliberalized products is extremely high and a stronger
discipline on the number of lines should be considered (see Figure 1.14 and 1.13).
Since the sensitive product list is endogenous to the initial tariffs and trade
flows, the lists of sensitive products are baseline dependent. For the EU, without
the Venezuela into Mercosur, the sensitive product list related to the agreement
is not affected by the conclusion of the DDA. Indeed, most of the sensitive prod-
ucts in agriculture in the EU-Mercosur relation are also sensitive for the WTO
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talks and the DDA will not change the pattern of protection, i.e. the ranking
of sensitivity, on goods exported by Mercosur countries. However, Venezuela’s
accession has a more significant impacts. Nearly 20% of the list will be modi-
fied: agricultural products as well as clothings and footwear will be replaced by
chemicals (organic and inorganic), aluminum, metals, plastics and glass prod-
ucts. In this case, the DDA will bring a marginal change to the list (10 products)
adding aluminum, fisheries and organic chemicals. Indeed, without flexibility in
the DDA for the EU and with the application of a swiss formula, the structure of
tariff in non-agricultural goods will be more affected by the WTO Round. As for
Mercosur, sensitive and very sensitive product lists are impacted by the positive
outcome of the DDA. 10% of the products, among them chemical products, tan-
ning or dyeing extracts, textiles and vehicles, are replaced by machinery, organic
chemicals, photography and optics. The Venezuela accession has similar effects
in magnitude but in this case, the number of sensitive products in agriculture,
vehicles, wearing and apparel increased (see Figures 1.15 and 1.16).
[INSERT Figure 1.15]
[INSERT Figure 1.16]
The initial average rates of protection is positively related to the degree of
sensitivity, is a direct consequence of the criteria chosen. In the case of the
Mercosur, the selection criterion identifies industrial products as very sensitive
(14.3% to 17%), while for the EU very sensitive products are concentrated in the
tariff peaks in agricultural products.
Considering the very sensitive products, we made two assumptions for the
scenario concerning agricultural products. For products under WTO TRQs we
simulate a quota enlargement without any change in tariffs (inside and outside).
The quota enlargement for these products is based on the comparison of the
present utilization of the WTO TRQs by the Mercosur countries and the new
quota volume (average between EU and Mercosur proposals, See Table 1.3). Since
in the version of MIRAGE used here there is no explicit modeling of TRQs,13 the
13In Chapter 2 we will present a TRQ modeling for MIRAGE.
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quota enlargement does not affect the TRQ regimes (in, at or out-of-quota). The
quota enlargement simulated in the MAcMapHS6 database only leads to a larger
quota rent. For Mercosur very sensitive products, no liberalization takes place.
[INSERT Table 1.3]
For the new bilateral TRQs (ethanol, sugar, cocoa and tobacco) opened to
Mercosur countries we consider some special tariff lines at 8 and 4 digits level.14
The new TRQs will be set at 1.5 of traditional bilateral trade.
[INSERT Figure 1.17]
[INSERT Figure 1.18]
[INSERT Figure 1.19]
[INSERT Figure 1.20]
Due to the very sensitive products, this PTA is far from being a total liber-
alization scenario. In practice, the non-agricultural protection of the Mercosur
regarding EU exports is cut by 50% (Argentina) to 60% (Brazil); conversely, agri-
culture protection is reduced by more than 80%. For the EU, even if during the
implementation period sensitive products are excluded from liberalization, tariffs
will eventually be eliminated. Non-agricultural goods from Mercosur countries
gain free access to the EU, while the EU agricultural protection will be reduced
by 65% (for Argentina) to 95% (Uruguay and Paraguay). The different baselines
bring some significant changes. The accession of Venezuela to Mercosur will affect
the choice of sensitive lines by the enlarged trade bloc towards agricultural prod-
ucts. The market access gains for the EU will be slightly reduced (to nine tenth
of the basic cut). As expected, the main changes are driven by the DDA. The
DDA will already achieve one fifth of the opening of Mercosur non-agricultural
markets to EU exporters, and half of the market access improvement as regards
14The new quota for Ethanol would concern only 4 product lines (22071000, 22072000,
22089091, 22089099), for Sugar only 7 products (17025050, ex17499099 -17499080-, 18061090,
ex18062080 -18069080-, ex18062095 -18069080-, ex18069090 -18061980-, ex18069090 -18069980-
), for cocoa and Tobacco all products under the following HS4 codes: 1803, 1804, 1805 for cocoa
and 2402, 2403 for Tobacco.
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to Mercosur agricultural exports to the EU. It seems that the gains of the EU-
Mercosur agreement could be significantly impacted by a successful DDA: the
direct gains will be reduced, and the value of the granted preferences will be re-
duced by increasing competition of third countries. To check the consequences of
this limited agreement, we also assess a 100% liberalization (FTA).
1.5 Simulations Results
The EU-Mercosur PTA scenario is simulated under four different baselines (R1,
R2, R3 and R4) described in the previous sections. All results are presented in
terms of percentage variations compared to baseline R1 in order to become all
results comparable.
We firstly present the results of the EU-Mercosur PTA under our reference
scenario (baseline R1 without the Doha agreement nor the Venezuela accession
to Mercosur). Second, we show the results of this PTA under the rest of baselines
(R2, R3 and R4) by comparing them with those of the reference scenario (R1).
Finally, we discuss about the most profitable scenario for trade and welfare of
each partner.
1.5.1 EU-Mercosur PTA: the reference scenario (R1)
Venezuela has officially entered Mercosur in July 2006. However, Brazil and
Paraguay still need to ratify this decision. Furthermore, this implies a trade
liberalization between existing Mercosur countries and Venezuela that is still to
be undertaken. Obstacles may emerge at any time so that it was useful to consider
the possibility of Venezuela not to complete the entry process. It is also useful
as a way of comparing our results to those in the literature that do not consider
Venezuela as a Mercosur member.
The Doha agreement should has initially to be concluded in 2006 but the
disagreement in agricultural market access (subsidies and trade protection) trun-
cates the end of this round. Conversely, other many improvements have been
done during these years of negotiations but at the same time in last Ministerial
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Meetings some countries set the possibility of the collapse of trade liberalization
talks. For our EU-Mercosur PTA simulation is thus necessary to assume both
the success and the failure of the DDA.
• Trade Impact:
The EU-Mercosur agreement displays asymmetric consequences for trade
in both Mercosur and European regions. For example, Brazil total exports
increase by 8.7%, while those of the EU27 only increase by 0.8% (Table
1.21).
Concerning European bilateral trade, we find that the European exports
to Mercosur do not compensate its imports from the latter, and thus the
real exchange rate depreciates in the EU in order to preserve the current
account balance. The same situation is observed in the case of Venezuela
which suffers from a real depreciation. For the Mercosur countries, bilateral
trade with the EU leads to an appreciation of the real exchange rate (Table
1.23).
[See Table 1.21 for scenario R1]
[See Table 1.22 for scenario R1]
[See Table 1.23 for scenario R1]
Trade creation effects are strong in the EU and Mercosur trade relation,
since European exports to Mercosur increase more than 20% (21% to Ar-
gentina, 26% to Brazil and 27% to te resto of Mercosur) and her imports
from this Latin American region also increases (16% from Argentina, 59%
from Brazil and 55% from the rest of Mercosur) (Tables 1.25 and 1.24). Ar-
gentina and EU27 trade gains are equally shared between industrial (4.16%
and 1.52% respectively) and agricultural (3.95% and 1.5% respectively) sec-
tors. Most of agricultural trade increase in Argentina are concentrated in
a few sectors (MeatCattle 28% and Dairy products 50%), while those in
the EU27 are equally distributed among all sectors (Tables 1.26 and 1.28).
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In the case of the EU, all sectors benefit from an increase in exports, even
critical sectors, such as Sugar (7.4%) and Rice (3.4%). Brazil and the rest
of Mercosur only benefit from an incerase in agricultural sectors (5.8% and
4.9% respectvely), particularly for MeatCattle, Dairy products, Sugar, Rice
and Cereals sectors (Tables 1.27 and 1.29). All these sectors are initially
very protected in the EU and thus even an small tariff cut lead to these
crountries to benefit from this PTA with the EU. Moreover, the choice
in the sensitive products have an important impact in this agreement, an
smaller tariff cuts in agrocultural sensitive products lead to improve market
access for Mercosur countries in the EU, while protect (TRQs and lower
tariff cuts) some controversial sectors in the EU.
In spite of important trade creation effects, this PTA also generate some
important trade diversion consequences are also non-negligible under this
scenario. First of all, Venezuela is harmed by the fact that not to be con-
sidered as a Mercosur member at the moment of the EU-Mercosur PTA
signature, and thus its bilateral trade with the European Union decreases
(-1.5% in Table 1.25). The regions which suffer from trade diversion effects
are the rest of the Cairns group (developed and developing countries), the
rest of South American countries (-0.11% on its total exports), Sub-Saharan
African countries (-0.23% of their total exports) and some develped coun-
tries such as the NAFTA (-0.08% of total exports). Their bilateral trade
with the European Union are especially harmed as a consequence of the
improvement in trade relations with Mercosur (Table 1.25).
[See Table 1.25 for scenario R1]
[See Table 1.24 for scenario R1]
• Macroeconomic impact:
Assuming that the Doha agreement is not achieved nor the Venezuela acces-
sion to Mercosur, we find that the EU-Mercosur PTA is a welfare-improving
scenario for Mercosur (Argentina 0.12%; Brazil 0.47%, and Uruguay and
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Paraguay 1.23%) and the EU27 (0.1%). However, Venezuela shows a small
negative impact on its welfare (-0.01%). Decomposing welfare impact,
we observe that most welfare gains for Mercosur are due to capital ac-
cumulation and terms of trade gains (especially for Brazil, Uruguay and
Paraguay in Table 1.12).15 Terms of trade improve especially for Uruguay
and Paraguay because they initially suffer from highest protection compared
to their Mercosur partners (see Subsection 1.3.3). Very sensitive products
represent an important share of initial imports, and since they are not lib-
eralized, allocative efficiency gains are very weak in this PTA scenario.
[See Table 1.6 for scenario R1]
GDP increases in all Mercosur countries (Argentina 0.11%; Brazil 0.34%;
Uruguay and Paraguay 1%) and the EU (0.11%) as a consequence of this
bilateral agreement, whereas in Venezuela it slightly decreases (-0.08%) be-
cause this country does not benefit from the EU-Mercosur PTA under this
scenario.
[See Table 1.13 for scenario R1]
Even if sensitive products for the European Union are mainly concentrated
in agricultural products, their slight trade liberalization through this PTA
harms European agricultural employment (-0.64%in Table 1.14). The same
impact is observe in the case of non-agricultural employment in Mercosur
countries (Argentina -0.07%; Brazil -0.16%, and the Rest of Mercosur16 -1%)
for whom most sensitive products are in manufactured sectors (Table 1.15).
Moreover, capital returns decrease only in Argentina, and land returns only
do in Venezuela and the EU27 as it was expected (Tables 1.16, 1.17 and
1.18). However, skilled and unskilled labor wages increase for all partners
of the EU-Mercosur PTA (Tables 1.19 and 1.20).
15Note that TRQ gains may be overestimated since TRQ mechanisms are not modeled in
this version of MIRAGE. Only exogenous TRQ-rents have been introduced.
16Uruguay and Paraguay
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1.5.2 EU-Mercosur PTA: with and without DDA (R2 vs.
R1)
We next compare the trade and welfare results of the EU-Mercosur PTA after the
Doha agreement (R2) with those of the reference scenario (R1) presented above.
• Trade Impact:
The assumption of a successful Doha agreement in the baseline intensifies
asymmetries of this preferential agreement. Mercosur countries (and even
Venezuela) display a greater increase in total trade, while the European
trade increases less than under the scenario described above (see Tables
1.21 and 1.22 to compared scenarios R1 and R2). For instance, Brazil’s
exports increase by 10%, while EU exports only do by 0.3%. This scenario
is most profitable for Brazil than for the EU compared to R1.
Nevertheless, consequences on the real exchange rate shows that its depre-
ciation (appreciation) in the European Union (Brazil and Argentina) would
not be as big as if Doha agreement did not happen. This results infer that
bilateral trade for the EU (Brazil and Argentina) is less (more) disfavorable
than under the previous scenario (Table 1.23 for scenario R2).
Looking at bilateral trade between the European Union and different regions
of the world, we find that Doha in the baseline (R2 reference situation) leads
to trade gains with Mercosur countries, which are then intensified due to
the EU-Mercosur PTA (Tables 1.24 and 1.25). Bilateral trade between this
two regions more than the previous scenario, where most trade gains come
from the EU-Mercosur PTA and not from the Doha agreement, even if the
latter leads to an important increase in market access improvements. This
scenario is one of the most propitious one for Mercosur agricultural exports.
Compared to the previous scenario, Argentina only increase its agricultural
exports, benefiting the same sectors (MeatCattle 31% and Dairy products
40%) but also Rice (22%) and Wheat (25%) ones (Table 1.26). For Merco-
sur, Doha in the baselines oblige the EU to reduce even more the protection
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level especially for meat, rice and wheat, leading to greater trade increases
for Mercosur countries than under the scenario R1 (Tables 1.26, 1.29, 1.27).
For Brazilian exporting sectors and for the EU imports (by sector) there
is also slight trade increases; however no important difference between the
two first scenarios is observed (Tables 1.27 and 1.28).
Moreover, Doha agreement also leads to trade gains for other regions in bi-
lateral trade with the EU, such as with others Cainrs group countries (8.7%
for developed and 0.3% for developing countries) and other Latin American
countries (4.4% except for Chile which loses -2.6%) and NAFTA (0.9%)
but the EU-Mercosur PTA reduces the initial gains in Doha.17 However,
trade diversion effects intensify for Mediterranean (-2.3%) and Sub-Saharan
African countries (-2.6%), which are traditional trade partners of the EU
(Table 1.25 for R2). In short, a Doha agreement in the baseline not only
leads to trade creation effects between the EU and Mercosur but also re-
duces trade diversion effects for some other regions compared to the R1
scenario.
[See Table 1.25 for scenario R2]
• Macroeconomic impact:
In terms of welfare, this scenario is less favorable than the previous one
(R1). The welfare in the EU27 (-0.5%) and in the larger Mercosur coun-
tries18 decreases, while for the smaller Mercosur countries (0.75%) the EU-
Mercosur PTA is always a welfare-improving scenario due to their terms
of trade improvement. This result is also explained by smaller allocation
efficiency gains in these countries, because the EU-Mercosur PTA (after a
multilateral trade agreement) leads to a less efficient factor allocation (Ta-
bles 1.6 and 1.7).19 Real GDP results follow the same trend as welfare, with
17These results come from the comparison between baselines situations R1(Ref) and R2(Ref)
not available in Tables but under request.
18For Argentina -0.12% and for Brazil -0.8%
19Capital accumulation and land supply gains are also smaller but the differences compared
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a decrease for the EU, Argentina and Brazil and an increase for Uruguay
and Paraguay. For all countries, GDP variations are greater under R1 than
under this scenario.
[See Table 1.6 for scenario R2]
[See Table 1.13 for scenario R2]
Employment consequence of this scenario also differs from scenario R1.
Agricultural employment increases for all partners regions, even for the
EU (1%) especially due to the increase in food trade (Beverages 1.3%, Cat-
tleMeat 12.8%, Dairy products 4.8% and Fats 2.3%), while the employment
in non-agricultural sectors decrease also in all regions (i.e -0.4% in the EU
due to exports reduction in the Autombile and Textile sectors explained by
the Doha agreement in the baseline) (Tables 1.14 and 1.15 for scenario R2).
Factor returns also change due to the Doha agreement hypothesis in the
baseline. Real land returns increase in Mercosur countries and natural re-
sources returns also do in Venezuela as it was excepted after an important
trade liberalization scenario (Doha + EU-Mercosur PTA), while capital re-
turns decrease for all EU-Mercosur PTA partners (Tables 1.16, 1.17 and
1.18). Real skilled and unskilled labor wages also decrease for all partners,
except in Uruguay and Paraguay where they increase by 0.8% and 1.5%
respectively (Tables 1.19 and 1.20). These changes in factor returns also
contribute to a less efficient factor allocation due to the EU-Mercosur PTA.
1.5.3 EU-Mercosur PTA: with and without Venezuela into
Mercosur (R3 vs. R1)
We now analyze the consequences of the EU-Mercosur PTA depending on whether
Venezuela becomes a full Mercosur member or not.
to results in the scenario R1 are less dramatic (Tables 1.8 and 1.9). TRQ gains also decrease
except for the rest of Mercosur (Table 1.10) but, once again, this precise point in the results
is not fully reliable because the true TRQ mechanism is not represented in this version of
MIRAGE.
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• Trade Impact:
The asymmetry of the EU-Mercosur agreement persists for trade results by
considering Venezuela as a full Mercosur member. Total trade variations for
all partners are greater but quite similar to those of scenario R1, and thus
this baseline assumption slightly affects EU and Mercosur trade (excluding
Venezuela). However, the fact that Venezuela becomes a Mercosur member
is a crucial hypothesis for trade of this country, because its exports and
imports increase by 2.7% and 3.3% respectively (Tables 1.21 and 1.22 for
R3). The increase in Venezuela’s total trade comes basically from the EU-
Mercosur PTA, because the accession to Mercosur only represennts less
than 1/4 of this effect (0.4% for exports and 0.5% for imports), while the
PTA strongly intensifies this effect.
[See Table 1.21 for scenario R3]
[See Table 1.22 for scenario R3]
[See Table 1.23 for scenario R3]
Depreciation of the real exchange rate in the European Union does not
differ from the results of scenario R1; however, it intensifies in the case of
Venezuela (-0.16%). Venezuela as a new partner of the EU-Mercosur PTA
does not lead its exports to increase enough in order to compensate its
imports from the EU, and thus the real exchange rate depreciates even more
by comparing them to scenario R1. By contrast, the equilibrium condition
of the current account balance leads to a greater appreciation of the real
exchange rate in the case of Mercosur countries compared to scenario R1
(Table 1.23 for R3).
[See Table 1.25 for scenario R3]
[See Table 1.24 for scenario R3]
Bilateral trade results show that the Venezuela accession to Mercosur does
not reduce trade diversion effects, except for this country. Moreover, bilat-
eral trade between the EU and Mercosur countries displays smaller trade
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variations because of the new Mercosur member. European imports from
Venezuela increase by 15%, while its exports to the Venezuela increase by
23% (Table 1.25 and 1.24). Venezuelan exports to the EU mainly concern
agricultural sectors (26%), even if his manufactures and services exports
are not harmed by this preferential agreement (0.6% and 3% respectively
in Table 1.30). Agricultural sectors which benefits the most from this PTA
agreement are Diary products, which in terms of trade volumes remains
small, and Vegetables and Fruits which is the representative sector of the
agricultural trade of this country.20
[See Table 1.30 for scenario R3]
• Macroeconomic impact:
The EU-Mercosur PTA under this baseline scenario (Venezuela accession to
Mercosur) leads to greater welfare gains for Mercosur (excluding Venezuela)
and the EU. In terms of welfare consequence, this scenario does not seems
to be a great opportunity for Venezuela because of the deterioration in
its terms of trade (Table 1.6 and 1.12 for R3). However, looking at the
decomposition of welfare for this country, allocation efficiency gains increase
as well as land supply gains (Tables 1.7 and 1.9).21 GDP results displays the
same evolution as welfare in this scenario and their variations are greater
than under R1 (Table 1.13).
Agricultural employment does not differ much from the results presented
in scenario R1; however, the Uruguay and Paraguay employment in agri-
cultural sectors increases by more than 3%, which is normal since only
20The increase in Venezuela’s agricultural export to the EU may be explained by a problem
in the update of the MAcMap database. The last release of this database is for year 2004 and
thus it does not completely consider the Venezuela’s preferences under the European GSP+.
21Note that most welfare losses in the case of Venezuela is explained by capital accumulation
losses and other sources of losses (residual calculation). The welfare gains linked to TRQ-
rents may be a source of distortion in welfare decomposition as we will see in Chapter 2.
Nevertheless an improvement in welfare decomposition of this model should be done in order
to reduce residual gains/losses.
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agricultural trade and production increase (Table 1.14). Conversely, the em-
ployment in non-agricultural sectors slightly increases in Argentina (0.06%),
Brazil (0.05%) and the EU (0.06%), while it decreases in the smaller Merco-
sur countries (-0.9%) and Venezuela (-1%) because the latter moves to agri-
cultural sectors (Vegetables and Fruits in Venezuela, and MeatCattle, Rice,
Sugar and Dairy products in the rest of Mercosur). The Venezuela accession
to Mercosur lead to Mercosur countries, especially to Argentina and Brazil,
to increase their non-agricultural trade and thus their non-agricultural em-
ployment; however, the EU-Mercosur PTA introduces a trade diversion ef-
fects for harming Mercosur industrial trade in favor to European one (Table
1.15). Factors returns follow the same trend as in scenario R1 for most of
regions; however, the returns for Venezuela’s natural resources and land in-
crease (1.5% and 1.2% respectively) while capital returns decrease (-0.75%)
since agriculture and primary products benefits especially from this agree-
ment (Tables 1.16, 1.17 and 1.18 for R3). Skilled and unskilled labor wages
also decrease in Venezuela (1.8% and 0.9% respectively in Tables 1.19 and
1.20 for scenario R3).
1.5.4 EU-Mercosur PTA: with a successful DDA and the
Venezuela accession into Mercosur
We consider here the most optimistic future situation for all trade agreements.
We compare the results of the EU-Mercosur PTA under the R4 baseline to the
previous scenarios highlighting the main differences introduced by each baseline
assumption.
• Trade Impact:
The baseline scenario R4 (a successful DDA and the Venezuela accession to
Mercosur) combines the results shown for scenarios R2 and R3. In terms
of trade gains, this scenario leads to a greater total trade gains for all
partners of the EU-Mercosur PTA (also including Venezuela). This is the
scenario that leads us to infer that a PTA would survive a multilateral trade
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agreement, and even also to the Mercosur enlargement.
The equilibrium condition of the current account balance leads to lower
real depreciation (appreciation) in the EU (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay
and Paraguay) than under the three scenarios presented above, while in
Venezuela the increase in exports does not compensate that in imports and
thus leads to a greater real depreciation under this scenario (Tables 1.21,
1.22 and 1.23 for scenario 4).
[See Table 1.21 for scenario R4]
[See Table 1.22 for scenario R4]
[See Table 1.23 for scenario R4]
Total an bilateral trade shows that trade creation effects not only benefit
the partners of this PTA but also other developed and developing countries
(Cairns group, NAFTA, other South American countries) as well as under
scenario R2. For all EU-Mercosur PTA partners, this is the scenario pre-
ferred in terms of trade creation, except for Venezuela for which the better
scenario for trade is its accession to Mercosur (baseline scenario).
Moreover, trade diversion effects are lower than in the previous scenarios,
and countries like Chile would be even less harmed than under scenario R2.
However, trade diversion consequences persist and intensify in the case of
the bilateral trade relation between the EU for the Sub-Saharan African
and Mediterranean countries (-2.6% and -2.3% respecively in Table 1.25).
[See Table 1.25 for scenario R3]
[See Table 1.24 for scenario R3]
Looking at sectoral trade, Mercosur exports and EU imports increase mainly
for the most controversial products, sugar and meat, harming European pro-
duction. The smaller Mercosur countries (Uruguay and Paraguay) benefit
the most from this last scenario; however, this analysis does not take into
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account all non-tariff barriers that presently constrain their exports from
in the EU market, especially for meat exports.22 In the case of Venezuela,
vegetables and fruits and some dairy products would benefit the most from
this PTA.
[See Table 1.29 for scenario R4]
[See Table 1.28 for scenario R4]
[See Table 1.30 for scenario R4]
• Macroeconomic impact:
This scenario is also welfare-improving for all original Mercosur countries
(Argentina 0.02%, Brazil 0.13% and 0.9% for the rest of Mercosur), but
not for the EU (-0.5%) and Venezuela (-1.6%) mainly because of the de-
terioration in their terms of trade. Looking at Table 1.6 and comparing
results for R3 and R4, we can infer that adding the Doha agreement to the
Venezuela accession to Mercosur in the baseline, deteriores welfare gains of
the EU-Mercosur PTA for all partners. GDP also follows the same trend
as welfare for all PTA partners (Tables 1.13 for R4).
[See Table 1.6 for scenario R4]
Employment in agriculture increases in Mercosur (3% in Argentina, 5.5% in
Brazil, 3.8 in the rest of Mercosur and except in Venezuela -0.6%) and the
EU (1%) as a consequence of this PTA, while non-agricultural employment
decreases in all the EU-Mercosur PTA partners (-1.3 in the resto of Mercosur
and -1.8% in Venezuela). Mercosur employment is oriented to agricultural
sectors as a consequence of this PTA, and European one also does because
the agricultural production increases in all sectors except for cereals, crops,
fishing, sugar and rice, and her agricultural exports also increase, especially
for Dairy products (19%), MeatCattle (16%), MeatOther (14%) and even for
22For instance, nowadays Paraguay cannot export beef to the EU due to sanitary problems.
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Sugar (36%). The existence of sensitive products, which are less liberalized,
lead European agriculture to be less harmed than under an FTA with the
Mercosur. From a political point of view, and particularly for Mercosur,
we may say that the EU-Mercosur PTA would lead to recover agricultural
employment after the negative consequence of the DDA, even if we know
that it is a less efficient result (Tables 1.14 and 1.15 for R4). Real returns for
factors have also changed under this scenario. Capital real returns decrease
for all partners, while land returns increase in the Mercosur (excluding
Venezuela) and natural resources returns also increase in Venezuela (0.8%)
as it was expected (Tables 1.16, 1.17 and 1.18 for R4). Table 1.20 and 1.19
shows that skilled and unskilled labor wages increase only in Uruguay and
Paraguay (0.25% and 1.2% respectively), and unskilled wages also hold in
Argentina (0.08%).
1.6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The asymmetrical agreement between the EU and Mercosur simulated in this
paper leads to asymmetric welfare and trade results for the two blocs. Under all
scenarios, total trade increases more for Mercosur than for the EU, and Euro-
pean bilateral trade particularly shows an increase for meat and sugar imports
from Mercosur countries, which are the most controversial sectors in these nego-
tiations. Moreover, extra simulations of the EU-Mercosur free trade agreement
under the same baselines leads us to infer that TRQs constrain bilateral trade
for these sectors and thus a FTA between these regions would harm even more
their production in the EU. However, results for sectors under TRQs are not reli-
able because of the simplified treatment of TRQs in this version of the MIRAGE
model.23
Assuming the failure of the Doha agreement and the non-accession of Venezuela
into Mercosur, the EU-Mercosur PTA leads to stronger trade diversion effects,
while a successful Doha agreement in the baseline (reference situations R2 and
23This aspect is improved in Chapter 2.
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R4) leads to increase slightly trade with other non-PTA partners (Cairns group,
NAFTA and other South American countries). However, trade diversion conse-
quences persist in bilateral trade relations between the EU and its traditional
partners (Sub-Saharan Africa, Mediterranean countries and Chile). As expected,
DDA in the baseline reduces negative impacts of this PTA for th rest of the world.
The Venezuelan accession to Mercosur is a crucial assumption for bilateral
trade between this country and the EU. It leads to eliminate trade diversion ef-
fects suffered by Venezuela in the first baseline. Even if Venezuela exports to
European countries increase, they do not compensate the greater augmentation
in its imports coming from the EU. Moreover, for Mercosur this scenario is al-
ways welfare-improving and leads to trade gains, introducing slight differences
compared to the reference situation without Venezuela into Mercosur.
Baseline assumption are crucial to analyze not only the global impact of the
PTA in terms of trade but they also help to explain the interest of each partner
to attain to this PTA
Facing bilateral and multilateral negotiations, policymakers are mainly in-
teresting on welfare consequences for partners. For Mercosur countries there is
strong incentive to achieve this PTA with the EU before Doha. On one side,
Doha reduces their welfare gains and thus the incitation to sign the PTA after
Doha. On the other side, if the EU-Mercosur PTA is signed, Mercosur have less
incentives to continue to negotiate Doha. The main explanation is that for Mer-
cosur countries the trade liberalization issue on stake is agriculture. Their trade
gains are presently constrained by US agricultural supports and EU agricultural
tariff protection. Since in our scenarios no US support cut is simulated, only tar-
iff reduction would improve market access for Mercosur exports. For that reason
a EU-Mercosur PTA is the best scenario, since under Doha more competition
is introduced due to the non-preferential tariff cuts. Coming back to the title
question: Will regionalism survive multilateralism? the answer would be again
affirmative, because even after Doha, Mercosur countries may always increase
their welfare due to the EU-Mercosur PTA. In the particular case of Venezuela,
there is no real economic incentive to sign the EU-Mercosur agreement (welfare
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losses), and eventually it would accept it for the political reasons. Presently,
the Venezuela benefits from the GSP+ and thus there is no real market access
to improve. Moreover, Venezuela should reduce its tariff unilaterally to the EU
which would be the explanation of its welfare losses. Venezuela as partners of the
EU-Mercosur agreement has no important implications for the rest of partners,
except for Brazil which would improve its welfare with this assumption.24
Since income distribution issues and inequality in Latin America is a structural
problem of these economies, policymakers would ask about the gain distribution
between unskilled labor, and capital and land owners. In all Mercosur countries,
and particularly in Uruguay, Paraguay and Brazil, even after a Doha agreement
these countries are motivated to sign a PTA with the EU because it lead to
increase unskilled labor wages. If Doha is signed after the PTA agreement with
the EU, unskilled labor will be the most affected production factors (even in
the case of the EU). Capital and Land returns are not really affected by the
interdependence of the multilateral agreement with EU-Mercosur PTA.
Finally, the welfare analysis and the distribution of the PTA gains between
labor and other factors, lead us to conclude that the EU-Mercosur PTA will sur-
vive a multilateral trade agreement at the Doha Round. Moreover, the inclusion
of a new partner in the PTA (Venezuela) does not harmed initial motivations
of the original partners (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay and the EU27).
However, welfare consequences for the new Mercosur member are not encouraging
and thus would become an extra obstacle to a future EU-Mercosur PTA.
24The Venezuela accession to Mercosur would mainly benefit Brazil because of the market
access improvement for non-agricultural trade.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1.1: Mercosur (including Venezeula) total exports (in million dollar)
Source: BACI database - CEPII
Figure 1.2: Mercosur (including Venezuela) total exports (in % variation)
Source: BACI database - CEPII
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Figure 1.3: European Union (27) total exports (in million dollar)
Source: BACI database - CEPII
Figure 1.4: European Union (27) total exports (in % variation)
Source: BACI database - CEPII
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Figure 1.5: European Union - Mercosur bilateral trade (exports in million dollar)
Source: BACI database - CEPII
Figure 1.6: Mercosur exports to the European Union by HS2 level (in million
dollar)
Source: BACI database - CEPII
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Figure 1.7: European Union exports to Mercosur by HS2 level (in million dollar)
Source: BACI database - CEPII
Figure 1.8: European Union average protection
Note: Authors’ calculations using MacMapV2.03 (Base year 2004, Reference Group
weighted average) - CEPII
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Figure 1.9: Highest European average rate of protection by added value
Note: Authors’ calculations using MacMapV2.03 (Base year 2004, Reference Group
weighted average) - CEPII
Figure 1.10: Lowest European average rate of protection by added value
Note: Authors’ calculations using MacMapV2.03 (Base year 2004, Reference Group
weighted average) - CEPII
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Figure 1.11: Mercosur Bilateral Protection applied on EU products
Note: Authors’ calculations using MacMapV2.03 (Base year 2004, Reference Group
weighted average) - CEPII
Figure 1.12: Venezuela Bilateral Protection applied on Mercosur and EU products
Note: Authors’ calculations using MacMapV2.03 (Base year 2004, Reference Group
weighted average) - CEPII
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Figure 1.13: Number of sensitive products (without Venezuela accession nor
DDA)
Source: Authors’ calculations using MAcMaps database - CEPII
Figure 1.14: Trade volume of sensitive products (without Venezuela accession nor
DDA)
Note: Authors’ calculations using MacMapV2.03 (Base year 2004, Reference Group
weighted average) - CEPII
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Figure 1.15: Protection applied by Mercosur on EU imports
Note: Authors’ calculations using MacMapV2.03 (Base year 2004, Reference Group
weighted average) - CEPII
Figure 1.16: Protection applied by EU on Mercosur imports
Note: Authors’ calculations using MacMapV2.03 (Base year 2004, Reference Group
weighted average) - CEPII
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Figure 1.17: EU Bilateral Protection to Mercosur Manufactured Exports
Note: Authors’ calculations using MacMapV2.03 (End of the implementation period,
Difference computed from the relevant baseline tariffs, Reference Group weighted
average) - CEPII
Figure 1.18: EU Bilateral Protection to Mercosur Agricultural Exports
Note: Authors’ calculations using MacMapV2.03 (End of the implementation period,
Difference computed from the relevant baseline tariffs, Reference Group weighted
average) - CEPII
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Figure 1.19: Mercosur Bilateral Protection to EU Manufactured Exports
Note: Authors’ calculations using MacMapV2.03 (End of the implementation period,
Difference computed from the relevant baseline tariffs, Reference Group weighted
average) - CEPII
Figure 1.20: Mercosur Bilateral Protection to EU Agricultural Exports
Note: Authors’ calculations using MacMapV2.03 (End of the implementation period,
Difference computed from the relevant baseline tariffs, Reference Group weighted
average) - CEPII
FIGURES AND TABLES 62
Table 1.1: Geographical and sectoral aggregation
CEREALS Maize 247074
Wheat 2721600
Rice 236647
MEAT Beef 149503
Pork 60867
Sheep and Goats 29000
Poultry 32510
VEGETABLES Garlic 25170
DAIRY PRODUCTS Milk powder 68000
Butter 10000
Cheese 83400
SUGAR 241348
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Table 1.2: Geographical and sectoral aggregation
Sector Regions
Rice Primary CairnsDvped
Wheat Fats RestDvping
Cereals Dairy RestDvpd
VegFruits Food CairnsDvg
OilSeeds Beverages NAFTA
Sugar Textile SthAm
Crops Paper Venezuela
MeatCattle Chemicals Argentina
MeatOther Metal Brazil
Milk MotorVeh Chile
Wool TrspEqNec RoMercosur
Forestry Electronic EU27
Fishing Machinery Meditera
EnergyPdts OtherManuf SSA
OthSer TrT
BusServ
Table 1.3: TRQ enlargement scenario for the EU-Mercosur agreement
Products EU proposal MERCOSUR proposal Average Scenario (TN)
Bovine meat 160 315 237.5
Poultry meat 27.5 250 138.75
Swine meat 15 40 27.5
Wheat 200 1,000 600
Corn 200 4,000 2,100
Cheese 20 60 40
Milk 13 34 23.5
Butter 4 10 7
FIGURES AND TABLES 64
Table 1.4: Total trade variation (%) between GTAP-2001 and BACI-2004
Venezuela Argentina Brazil Chile RoMercosur EU27
Rice 7% 22% 36% 5%
Wheat 5% 15% 60% 5898% 16% 5%
Cereals 10% 8% 70% 5%
VegFruits 15% 1% 6% 11% 4%
OilSeeds 39% 11% 4% 14%
Sugar 49% 11% 305%
Crops 68% 10% 8% 81% 5% 13%
MeatCattle 368% 78% 44% 30% 14% 24%
MeatOther 28% 7% 4%
Wool 64% 418% 45% 76% 24%
Forestry 50% 14% 12% 17% 45% 5%
Fishing 23% 1%
Primary 62% 18% 14% 6% 2% 6%
Dairy 14% 3% 28% 3%
Food 5% 139% 69% 117%
Beverages 8% 8%
Textile 18% 2% 7%
Paper 6% 6% 2%
Chemicals 2% 9%
Metal 3%
TrspEqNec 4% 4% 2%
Electronic 5% 2% 21%
Machinery 20% 49% 11% 32% 9% 4%
OtherManuf 122% 102% 150% 42% 660% 67%
OthSer 250% 174% 46% 1931%
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Table 1.5: Bilateral trade variation (%) between GTAP-2001 and
BACI-2004
Venezuela Argentina Brazil Chile RoMercosur EU27
Rice Argentina 16%
Brazil 86% 12% 91%
Chile 289%
Wheat Brazil 32%
Chile 117%
RoMercosur 14%
EU27 47%
Cereals Venezuela 219% 856%
Argentina 468% 103%
Brazil 22% 351%
RoMercosur 83% 249% 65%
EU27 38% 89% 51%
VegFruits Argentina 120%
Brazil 467% 142%
Chile 89% 52%
RoMercosur 10%
EU27 103% 13% 88% 43% 19%
OilSeeds Argentina 2086% 6% 1892% 18%
Brazil 84%
Chile 92% 14% 301% 801%
RoMercosur 113% 141% 96%
EU27 55% 339% 160%
Sugar Venezuela 1394%
Argentina 401%
Chile 62% 6241%
RoMercosur 19%
EU27 3% 128%
Crops Venezuela 9%
Argentina 29% 70% 35%
Brazil 53%
Chile 27% 5%
EU27 15% 32% 2%
Continued on next page
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Table 1.5 – continued from previous page
Venezuela Argentina Brazil Chile RoMercosur EU27
MeatCattle Venezuela 23253% 2014%
Argentina 27%
Brazil 21% 23%
Chile 224% 100%
RoMercosur 22% 33% 262%
EU27 151% 33% 64% 18%
MeatOther Venezuela 1478% 169%
Argentina 161%
Brazil 11% 142% 192%
Chile 106% 189% 17%
RoMercosur 291% 119%
EU27 337% 119% 106% 200%
Wool Argentina 132% 1018%
Brazil 24457579% 366%
Chile 522%
RoMercosur 107% 1% 154%
Forestry Venezuela 15%
Brazil 129%
Chile 25% 434% 135% 2%
RoMercosur 25%
EU27 68% 31%
Fishing Argentina 170%
Brazil 59%
Chile 1587%
RoMercosur 112% 2607%
EU27 36% 172% 168% 123%
EnergyPdts Venezuela 1011981% 17942% 1174% 34832%
Argentina 6390% 65% 908% 228% 1153%
Brazil 78% 174% 505%
Chile 122% 52% 489% 1429%
RoMercosur 203% 789%
EU27 16% 118% 426%
Primary Venezuela 5%
Argentina 296% 7% 38%
Continued on next page
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Table 1.5 – continued from previous page
Venezuela Argentina Brazil Chile RoMercosur EU27
Brazil 15% 128% 133%
Chile 48% 22% 87%
RoMercosur 96%
EU27 125% 40% 268%
Fats Venezuela 492% 159323% 685% 339% 32%
Argentina 285% 13375% 804% 60%
Brazil 153% 335% 86%
Chile 4877% 43632% 15577% 142%
RoMercosur 85% 166% 409%
EU27 3340% 10895% 42% 376%
Dairy Venezuela 804% 4794% 1% 54%
Chile 3% 1122% 123% 5%
EU27 29% 83%
Food Venezuela 17% 10%
Brazil 73% 99%
Chile 22%
RoMercosur 11%
EU27 21% 99% 79%
Beverages Venezuela 260% 1174% 72% 16%
Argentina 13%
Brazil 973% 96% 836% 33%
Chile 213% 87% 60% 9% 43%
EU27 25% 349% 35%
Textile Venezuela 37% 35%
Argentina 4%
Brazil 40% 4%
Chile 73% 34%
RoMercosur 40% 76%
EU27 11% 36% 38% 77%
Paper Venezuela 60%
Chile 63% 29% 9% 18%
EU27 23% 68% 53% 39%
Chemicals Venezuela 40% 55% 60% 18%
Argentina 57% 1% 10%
Continued on next page
FIGURES AND TABLES 68
Table 1.5 – continued from previous page
Venezuela Argentina Brazil Chile RoMercosur EU27
Brazil 50% 45% 31% 42%
Chile 38% 62% 60% 76% 37%
RoMercosur 140% 42%
EU27 32% 87% 79% 43%
Metal Venezuela 34% 55% 311% 2%
Argentina 24% 37% 1% 80% 12%
Brazil 1% 4% 76% 47% 15%
Chile 76% 173% 122% 61%
RoMercosur 62% 12%
EU27 104% 13% 72% 55% 13%
MotorVeh Venezuela 50% 196% 1258%
Argentina 203% 38%
Brazil 2%
Chile 286% 340% 181% 1290% 21%
RoMercosur 31% 29% 44% 49%
EU27 14% 55% 23% 60%
TrspEqNec Venezuela 465% 23% 13% 61%
Argentina 204%
Brazil 18% 15%
Chile 210% 509%
RoMercosur 107% 2131%
EU27 8% 140% 469%
Electronic Venezuela 25%
Argentina 305% 31% 477% 6%
Brazil 8% 109%
Chile 50% 10% 63% 513% 21%
RoMercosur 46% 34% 33%
EU27 27% 116%
Machinery Venezuela 56% 67%
Argentina 26%
Chile 80% 12% 9% 131% 17%
RoMercosur 62% 20%
EU27 95% 99% 50%
OtherManuf Argentina 1647%
Continued on next page
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Table 1.5 – continued from previous page
Venezuela Argentina Brazil Chile RoMercosur EU27
Brazil 66%
Chile 93%
OthSer Argentina 460%
Brazil 181%
Chile 1353%
RoMercosur 3450%
Table 1.6: Welfare results compared to Ref-R1 (in % variation)
R1(Ref) R1(Sim) R2(Sim) R3(Sim) R4(Sim)
Argentina 499,197 0,12% -0,12% 0,22% 0,02%
Brazil 936,423 0,47% -0,08% 0,66% 0,14%
EU27 14983,149 0,1% -0,51% 0,10% -0,47%
RoMercosur 41,294 1,23% 0,75% 1,32% 0,89%
Venezuela 140,552 -0,01% -0,77% -0,75% -1,6%
Table 1.7: Welfare decomposition: Allocation efficiency gains (compared to Ref-
R1)
ResSR1 ResSR2 ResSR3 ResSR4
Argentina 0,0116 0,00% 0,00% -0,00%
Brazil -0,3551 -0,33% -0,35% -0,35%
EU27 0,1433 0,09% 0,14% 0,09%
RoMercosur 0,1269 0,1% 0,12% 0,1%
Venezuela -0,0044 -0,00% 0,05% 0,03%
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Table 1.8: Welfare decomposition: Capital Accumulation gains (compared to
Ref-R1)
R1(Sim) R2(Sim) R3(Sim) R4(Sim)
Argentina 0,0478 0,04% 0,04% 0,03%
Brazil 0,1532 0,12% 0,15% 0,12%
EU27 0,0066 0,00% 0,01% 0,00%
RoMercosur 0,4856 0,43% 0,46% 0,42%
Venezuela -0,0064 -0,00% -0,00% -0,01%
Table 1.9: Welfare decomposition: Land Supply gains (compared to Ref-R1)
R1(Sim) R2(Sim) R3(Sim) R4(Sim)
Argentina 0,0142 0,01% 0,01% 0,01%
Brazil 0,0470 0,04% 0,05% 0,04%
EU27 -0,0009 -0,01% -0,00% -0,00%
RoMercosur 0,1298 0,11% 0,13% 0,11%
Venezuela -0,0007 -0,00% 0,02% 0,02%
Table 1.10: Welfare decomposition: TRQ gains (compared to Ref-R1)
R1(Sim) R2(Sim) R3(Sim) R4(Sim)
Argentina 0,0116 0,02% 0,01% 0,02%
Brazil 0,1185 0,08% 0,12% 0,08%
EU27 -0,0081 -0,01% -0,01% -0,01%
RoMercosur 0,0638 0,07% 0,06% 0,07%
Venezuela 0,0000 0,00% 0,00% 0,00%
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Table 1.11: Welfare decomposition: Terms of Trade gains (compared to Ref-R1)
R1(Sim) R2(Sim) R3(Sim) R4(Sim)
Argentina 0,0158 0,01% 0,02% 0,01%
Brazil 0,2221 0,19% 0,22% 0,19%
EU27 -0,0122 -0,01% -0,01% -0,01%
RoMercosur 0,3764 0,34% 0,37% 0,33%
Venezuela -0,0028 -0,00% -0,03% -0,03%
Table 1.12: Terms of trade effects compared to Ref-R1 (% variation)
R1(Ref) R1(Sim) R2(Sim) R3(Sim) R4(Sim)
Argentina 1 0,1% 0,04% 0,11% 0,04%
Brazil 1 1,54% 1,32% 1,55% 1,31%
EU27 1 -0,08% -0,06% -0,07% -0,06%
RoMercosur 1 1,4% 1,23% 1,39% 1,22%
Venezuela 1 -0,05% -0,05% -0,22% -0,21%
Table 1.13: GDP results compared to Ref-R1 (% variation)
R1(Ref) R1(Sim) R2(Sim) R3(Sim) R4(Sim)
Argentina 593,5414 0,11% -0,13% 0,21% 0,01%
Brazil 1173,7731 0,34% -0,19% 0,52% 0,03%
EU27 18886,7067 0,11% -0,51% 0,11% -0,47%
RoMercosur 47,2558 1% 0,54% 1,1% 0,68%
Venezuela 181,2192 -0,01% -0,75% -0,68% -1,51%
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Table 1.14: Agricultural Employment results compared to Ref-R1 (% variation)
R1(Ref) R1(Sim) R2(Sim) R3(Sim) R4(Sim)
Argentina 21,9436 0,52% 2,92% 0,58% 3,05%
Brazil 20,8618 2,7% 5,23% 2,63% 5,45%
EU27 497,8910 -0,65% 1,04% -0,64% 1,04%
RoMercosur 3,4127 2,86% 3,66% 3,06% 3,84%
Venezuela 7,1982 -0,1% -0,22% -0,11% -0,62%
Table 1.15: Non-agricultural Employment results compared to Ref-R1 (% varia-
tion)
R1(Ref) R1(Sim) R2(Sim) R3(Sim) R4(Sim)
Argentina 164,9737 -0,07% -0,5% 0,06% -0,35%
Brazil 349,7492 -0,16% -0,74% 0,05% -0,53%
EU27 5412,3151 0,06% -0,48% 0,07% -0,44%
RoMercosur 9,8131 -1,01% -1,45% -0,87% -1,3%
Venezuela 44,3551 0,02% -0,85% -0,97% -1,78%
Table 1.16: Real Capital Return results compared to Ref-R1 (% variation)
R1(Ref) R1(Sim) R2(Sim) R3(Sim) R4(Sim)
Argentina 0,2299 -0,08% -0,52% 0,023% -0,37%
Brazil 0,1592 0,17% -0,32% 0,32% -0,1%
EU27 0,0629 0,01% -0,55% 0,02% -0,5%
RoMercosur 0,2504 0,08% -0,5% 0,13% -0,35%
Venezuela 0,1953 0,01% -0,83% -0,75% -1,59%
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Table 1.17: Real Land Return results compared to Ref-R1 (% variation)
R1(Ref) R1(Sim) R2(Sim) R3(Sim) R4(Sim)
Argentina 2,0589 0,19% 1,41% 0,21% 1,47%
Brazil 2,0110 3,03% 4,07% 2,97% 4,18%
EU27 1,8883 -0,73% -0,36% -0,74% -0,37%
RoMercosur 1,5792 1,86% 1,97% 1,92% 2,06%
Venezuela 1,2935 -0,12% -0,32% 0,27% -0,28%
Table 1.18: Real Natural Resources Return results compared to Ref-R1 (% vari-
ation)
R1(Ref) R1(Sim) R2(Sim) R3(Sim) R4(Sim)
Argentina 2,3589 -0,63% -0,96% -0,89% -1,15%
Brazil 2,2894 -3,57% -3,62% -3,81% -3,77%
EU27 2,9646 0,18% -0,6% 0,17% -0,57%
RoMercosur 2,4971 -1,8% -2,36% -1,55% -2,06%
Venezuela 1,3135 -0,08% 0,24% 0,51% 0,81%
Table 1.19: Real Skilled Labor Wages compared to Ref-R1 (% variation)
R1(Ref) R1(Sim) R2(Sim) R3(Sim) R4(Sim)
Argentina 1,9036 0,16% -0,32% 0,29% -0,16%
Brazil 2,1001 0,18% -0,55% 0,41% -0,33%
EU27 4,0598 0,19% -0,54% 0,19% -0,5%
RoMercosur 1,7908 0,76% 0,1% 0,88% 0,25%
Venezuela 0,8419 0,02% -1,02% -1,19% -2,29%
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Table 1.20: Real Unskilled Labor Wages compared to Ref-R1 (% variation)
R1(Ref) R1(Sim) R2(Sim) R3(Sim) R4(Sim)
Argentina 1,8879 0,17% -0,08% 0,29% 0,08%
Brazil 1,9120 0,29% -0,33% 0,5% -0,11%
EU27 2,6366 0,10% -0,52% 0,11% -0,48%
RoMercosur 1,6244 1,53% 1,04% 1,64% 1,19%
Venezuela 0,9576 0,01% -0,92% -0,91% -1,95%
Table 1.21: Total Exports results compared to Ref-R1 (% variation)
R1(Ref) R1(Sim) R2(Sim) R3(Sim) R4(Sim)
Argentina 72,1520 3,19% 4,61% 3,35% 4,78%
Brazil 152,9236 8,69% 10,23% 9,06% 10,65%
EU27 5525,3331 0,36% 0,30% 0,37% 0,35%
RoMercosur 11,1173 6,91% 7,38% 7,1% 7,59%
Venezuela 33,0780 -0,09% 1,36% 2,75% 3,95%
Table 1.22: Total Imports results compared to Ref-R1 (% variation)
R1(Ref) R1(Sim) R2(Sim) R3(Sim) R4(Sim)
Argentina 62,0254 3,83% 5,5% 4% 5,69%
Brazil 162,9034 9,03% 10,10% 9,39% 10,5%
EU27 5744,1483 0,33% 0,33% 0,35% 0,38%
RoMercosur 13,2191 6,0677 6,36% 6,23% 6,54%
Venezuela 27,3668 -0,10% 1,72% 3,33% 4,84%
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Table 1.23: Real Exchange Rate compared to Ref-R1 (% variation)
R1(Ref) R1(Sim) R2(Sim) R3(Sim) R4(Sim)
Argentina 1 0,10% 0,05% 0,12% 0,05%
Brazil 1 1,59% 1,36% 1,6% 1,36%
EU27 1 -0,09% -0,06% -0,08% -0,056%
RoMercosur 1 1,29% 1,13% 1,28% 1,13%
Venezuela 1 -0,01% -0,01% -0,16% -0,18%
Table 1.24: EU27 bilateral exports to Mercosur countries in FOB values (%
variation compared to Ref-R1)
R1(Ref) R1(Sim) R2(Sim) R3(Sim) R4(Sim)
Argentina 16,6602 21,22% 23,18% 20,93% 23,2%
Brazil 47,5740 25,53% 27,09% 25,18% 27,21%
EU27 3281,4675 -0,03% -1,19% -0,03% -1,15%
RoMercosur 2,5311 26,8% 26,55% 26,84% 26,55%
Venezuela 5,9471 0,44% 2,31% 23,26% 22,87%
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Table 1.25: EU27 bilateral imports from Mercosur countries in CIF values (%
variation compared to Ref-R1)
R1(Ref) R1(Sim) R2(Sim) R3(Sim) R4(Sim)
Argentina 13,1256 16,12% 17,22% 15,62% 17,05%
Brazil 38,5540 58,58% 61,82% 57,82% 61,93%
CairnsDvg 182,3771 -0,38% 0,34% -0,37% 0,39%
CairnsDvped 30,8362 -0,28% 8,74% -0,28% 7,66%
Chile 14,0448 -1% -2,64% -0,63% -2,11%
EU27 3351,0388 -0,03% -1,19% -0,04% -1,15%
Meditera 136,5151 -0,32% -2,31% -0,29% -2,39%
NAFTA 621,9022 -0,14% 0,94% -0,11% 1,04%
RestDvpd 526,1486 -0,11% 2,57% -0,1% 2,6%
RestDvping 710,9155 -0,19% 1,66% -0,18% 1,69%
RoMercosur 2,2942 55,49% 53,45% 54,58% 53,02%
SSA 63,7901 -1,28% -2,58% -1,24% -2,62%
SthAm 48,1938 -1,4% 4,89% -1,3% 4,89%
Venezuela 4,4122 -1,47% 1,06% 15,42% 14,79%
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Table 1.26: Argentina exports by sector (% variation compared to Ref-R1)
R1(Ref) R1(Sim) R2(Sim) R3(Sim) R4(Sim)
Agro 45,3596 3,95% 7,74% 4,04% 7,9%
Cereals 3,7608 8,07% 7,07% 8,23% 7,32%
Dairy 0,5907 50,28% 39,25% 50,22% 40,86%
Fishing 0,0273 6,22% 5,01% 6,47% 5,31%
Food 10,4637 9,2% 13,12% 9,7% 13,62%
IND 14,4794 4,16% -0,35% 5,03% 0,31%
MeatCattle 0,4540 28,51% 31,42% 28,71% 31,59%
Rice 0,2990 0,96% 22,38% 0,89% 22,83%
Ser 5,8899 -0,73% -1,05% -0,87% -1,1%
Sugar 0,1451 9,33% 3,27% 10,01% 4,49%
Wheat 5,6356 3,13% 25,2% 2,99% 25,08%
Table 1.27: Brazil exports by sector (% variation compared to Ref-R1)
R1(Ref) R1(Sim) R2(Sim) R3(Sim) R4(Sim)
Agro 74,5185 24,76% 28,27% 24,39% 28,33%
Beverages 0,1588 28,73% 28,23% 29,32% 28,47%
Cereals 2,4709 13,55% 13,02% 13,41% 12,95%
Dairy 0,1042 358,57% 274,28% 335,01% 268,72%
IND 53,1219 -7,62% -8,38% -5,81% -7,12%
MeatCattle 2,3204 214,65% 222,37% 213,64% 221,66%
MeatOther 16,0112 10,29% 17,33% 9,66% 16,67%
Rice 0,0390 130,34% 118,86% 128,58% 115,25%
Ser 9,4891 -4,49% -3,88% -5,08% -4,32%
Sugar 5,6669 208,82% 203,2% 208,17% 202,99%
VegFruits 1,8329 3,99% 2,06% 3,49% 1,68%
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Table 1.28: EU27 imports by sector (% variation compared to Ref-R1)
R1(Ref) R1(Sim) R2(Sim) R3(Sim) R4(Sim)
Agro 520,6417 3,63% 6,01% 3,68% 6,06%
Cereals 8,5860 6% 9,25% 6,01% 8,94%
Dairy 41,9161 1,1% 7,55% 1,26% 6,52%
IND 3776,9606 0,01% -0,11% 0,02% -0,06%
MeatCattle 21,2538 24,84% 29,28% 24,76% 29,26%
MeatOther 56,3062 2,75% 5,13% 2,76% 5,16%
Rice 3,0256 5,83% 17,1% 5,86% 17,03%
Ser 863,8724 -0,03% -0,76% -0,02% -0,7%
Sugar 4,5490 250,53% 251,33% 249,95% 251,1%
VegFruits 79,5769 -0,18% 1,93% 0,03% 2,14%
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Table 1.29: Rest of Mercosur (Uruguay and Paraguay) exports by sector (%
variation compared to Ref-R1)
R1(Ref) R1(Sim) R2(Sim) R3(Sim) R4(Sim)
Agro 4,8577 21,01% 22,91% 21,34% 23,25%
Beverages 0,1542 2,22% 1,97% 2,35% 2,14%
Cereals 0,1554 28,51% 28,84% 28,5% 28,98%
Dairy 0,1669 77,26% 66,22% 81,99% 69,58%
IND 1,3892 -6,25% -9,35% -5,68% -8,81%
MeatCattle 0,8645 65,3% 69,76% 65,15% 69,59%
Rice 0,6343 36,4% 43,07% 36,21% 43,14%
Ser 4,3560 -3,01% -2,97% -3,16% -3,08%
Sugar 0,0157 976,62% 1033,51% 980,99% 1037,82%
Wheat 0,0214 24,46% 41,03% 23,78% 40,55%
Table 1.30: Venezuela exports by sector (% variation compared to Ref-R1)
R1(Ref) R1(Sim) R2(Sim) R3(Sim) R4(Sim)
Agro 1,8628 -2,29% 3,15% 26,12% 25,37%
Dairy 0,0113 -7,28% 162,75% 1228,65% 987,24%
EnergyPdts 19,2023 -0,04% 0,92% 1,47% 2,4%
IND 6,9394 0,45% 2,65% 0,61% 3,17%
Primary 2,4242 -0,27% 0,33% 0,78% 1,6
Ser 2,5693 -0,09% 0,91% 3,13% 4,5%
VegFruits 0,1328 -0,46% 46,82% 274,77% 266,2%
Wheat 0,0003 -1,24% 25,1% 13,16% 44,6%
Wool 0,0000 -0,19% 26,14% 13,33% 45,14%
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Appendix
The MIRAGE Model
The following equations are detailed and commented in Decreux and Valin (2007).
Notations
The i and j indices refer to sectors, r and s refer to regions, t to periods.
Superscripts for prices P refer to the related variable.
U(s) is the subset of countries in the same development level as region s and V (s)
is the subset of countries with a different level of development.
Agri(i) is the subset of sectors from agriculture.
iTrT refers to transport sectors and rEU refers to the European Union regions.
The reference year is indexed with t0.
Parameters definition
σARM i , σIMP i , σVARi ,
σVAj , σCAPj , σC ,
σIC , σKG , σGEOi ,
Substitution elasticities of factors and goods demand
cmin i,r Minimal consumption of good i in the final demand of
region r
epar Saving rate in region r
µi,r,s Transport demand per volume of good
θr Value share of region r transport sector in the world
production of transport
DD i,r,s,t Ad-valorem tariff rate applied by regions s on its im-
ports from region r
MaxExpSubi,r,t Maximum level of subsidized exports authorized by
WTO
taxpi,r, taxcci,s,
taxicci,s, taxkgci,s
Tax rate applied on production, final consumption, in-
termediate consumption and capital good
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taxAMF i,r,s Export tax rate equivalent to the Multifiber Arrange-
ment
TsubK i,r Subsidy rate on capital
TsubTE i,r Subsidy rate on land
cf j,r Fixed cost per unit of output in imperfectly competi-
tive sectors
mmoy i,r Mark-up average
Quota i,r,t Maximum production in sectors where quotas hold
α Elasticity of investment to capital return rate
γLi,r, γ
Q
i,r, γ
TE
i,r , γ
RN
i,r Value share of factors in value added (Cobb-douglas)
δ Depreciation of capital
ρr,t Population growth rate of region r (World Bank data)
aXXX Various share and scale coefficients in CES or Cobb-
Douglas functions
PGF r,t Total factor productivity
Variables definition
Production
Yi,r,t Output of sector i firms
VAi,r,t Value added
CNTERi,r,t Aggregate intermediate consumption
Factors
Qi,r,t Aggregate of human capital and physical capital
Li,r,t Unskilled labor
LAgrii,r,t Total Unskilled labor in agriculture
LnotAgrii,r,t Total Unskilled labor in sectors other than agriculture
TE i,r,t Land
RN i,r,t Natural resources
Hi,r,t Skilled labor
APPENDIX 82
Ki,r,s,t Capital stock from region r to region s in sector i
KTOT i,r,t Total capital stock in sector i and region r
Lr,t Total supply of unskilled labor
TE r,t Total supply of land
H r,t Total supply of skilled labor
K r,t Total supply of capital
Demand
BUDC r,t Budget allocated to consumption
UT r,t Utility
Pr,t Price of utility
Ci,r,t Aggregated consumption
IC i,j,r,t Intermediate consumption of good i used in the produc-
tion of sector j
INVTOT r,t Total investment in region r
INV i,r,s,t Investment from region r to sector i in region s
Br,t Investment scale coefficient
KG i,r,t Capital good demand of sector i in region r
DEMTOT i,r,t Total demand
DEMU i,r,t Total demand, in region r, of good originating from re-
gions with the same development level than region r
(including local demand in region r)
DEMV i,r,t Total demand, in region r, of good originating from re-
gions with a different development level than region r
Di,r,t Domestic demand of good i
DVARi,r,t Domestic demand of good i produced by each firm of
region r
Mi,r,t Total demand, in region r, of good i originating from
regions with the same development level than region r
other than region r
DEM i,r,s,t Demand, in region s, of good i originating from region r
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DEMVARi,r,s,t Demand of good i produced by each firm of region r
Transportation
sector
TRADE i,r,s,t Exports to region s of industry i in region r
TRi,r,s,t Transport demand
MONDTRt Transport aggregate
P Tt Transport of commodities price
TRM i,r,t Supply of international transportation sector i in region
r
Monopolistic
competition
EP i,r,s,t Perceived price elasticity of total demand
EPD i,r,t Perceived price elasticity of domestic demand
NB i,r,t Number of varieties in imperfectly competitive sectors
SDU i,s,t Market share of domestic demand in demand of regions
with the same level of development than region r
SDT i,s,t Market share of domestic demand in total demand
SE i,r,s,t Market share of imports from region r in imports of
region s originating from regions with the same level of
development
SU i,r,s,t Market share of imports from region r in demand of
region s for goods from regions with the same level of
development
SV i,r,s,t Market share of imports from region r in imports of
region s originating from regions with a different level
of development
ST i,r,s,t Market share of imports from region r in demand of
region s
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Tax revenue
RECPROD i,r,t Revenue of production tax
RECDD i,r,t Revenue of tariff
RECCONS i,r,t Revenue of consumption tax
RECEXP i,r,t Revenue of exports tax
RECTAX r,t Total tax revenue
RQUOTAi,r,s,t Implicit transfers due to quotas
REV r,t Regional revenue
SOLDr,t Current account balance
PIBMVALt Total GDP in value
GDPVOLr,t Regional GDP
Prices
and taxes
PXXX Generic notation to indicate the price of the variable
XXX
PCIFi,r,s,t CIF price
P Inti,t Intervention price (European Union only)
WKr,t Capital return rate in region r
WKi,r,t Capital return paid to the investor
WTEr,t Land return rate in region r
WTEi,r,t Land return rate paid to the owner
TAXEXP i,r,s,t Export tax rate
TAXREF i,r,s,t Auxiliary variable to adjust TAXMOY to its proper level
while keeping unchanged the distribution across destina-
tions
TAXMOY i,r,t Average export tax rate across the various destinations
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Equations of the model
Supply
Determination of supply results from the following optimization programs:
Leontieff relation between value added and intermediate consumption:
Imperfect competition
minNB i,r,tP
Y
i,r,t(Yi,r,t + cf i,r) = P
VA
i,r,tVAi,r,t + P
CNTER
i,r,t CNTERi ,r ,t (1.1)
s.t. NB i,r,t(Yi,r,t + cf i,r) = a
VA
i,r VAi,r,t = a
CNTER
i,r CNTERi,r,t (1.2)
Perfect competition
minP Yi,r,tYi,r,t = P
VA
i,r,tVAi,r,t + P
CNTER
i,r,t CNTERi,r,t + P
Quota
i,r,t Quota i,r,t
(1.3)
s.t. Yi,r,t = a
VA
i,r VAi,r,t = a
CNTER
i,r CNTERi,r,t (1.4)
For sectors where quotas hold (perfect competition only):
Yi,r,t = Quota i,r,t (1.5)
Factor demand
minPVAi,r,tVAi,r,t = P
L
i,r,tLi,r,t + P
Q
i,r,tQi,r,t + P
TE
i,r,tTE i,r,t + P
RN
i,r,tRN i,r,t (1.6)
s.t. (CES option)
(
VAi,r,t
PGF r,t
)1− 1
σVAi
= aLi,rL
1− 1
σVAi
i,r,t + a
Q
i,rQ
1− 1
σVAi
i,r,t + a
RN
i,r RN
1− 1
σVAi
i,r,t + a
TE
i,r TE
1− 1
σVAi
i,r,t
(1.7)
or s.t. (Cobb-Douglas option)
VAi,r,t = Ai,rPGF r,tLi,r,t
γLi,rQi,r,t
γQi,rTE i,r,t
γTEi,r RN i,r,t
γRNi,r (7’)
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and
minPQi,r,tQi,r,t = P
K
i,r,tKTOT i,r,t + P
H
i,r,tHi,r,t (1.8)
s.t. Q
1− 1
σCAPi
i,r,t = a
K
i,rKTOT
1− 1
σCAPi
i,r,t + a
H
i,rH
1− 1
σCAPi
i,r,t (1.9)
The capital stock in region s is described by:
KTOT i,s,t =
∑
r
Ki,r,s,t (1.10)
Comment: in this model, production quotas have been introduced. For the asso-
ciated sectors, production is equal to the quota and an additional income, equal
to PQuotai,r,t Quota i,r,t, is drawn from the quota.
Demand
Determination of demand results from the following optimization programs:
LES-CES (first stage)
minPr,tUT r,t =
∑
i
PCi,r,t(Ci,r,t − cmin i,r) (1.11)
s.t. UT r,t
1− 1
σC =
∑
i
aCi,r(Ci,r,t − cmin i,r)
1− 1
σC (1.12)
BUDC r,t =
∑
i
PCi,r,tCi,r,t (1.13)
PCi,r,t = P
DEMTOT
i,r,t (1 + taxcci,r) (1.14)
PKGi,r,t = P
DEMTOT
i,r,t (1 + taxkgci,r) (1.15)
DEMTOT i,r,t = Ci,r,t +
∑
j
IC i,j,r,t +KG i,r,t (1.16)
Groups of regions (second stage)
minPDEMTOTi,r,t DEMTOT i,r,t = P
DEMU
i,r,t DEMU i,r,t + P
DEMV
i,r,t DEMV i,r,t (1.17)
s.t. DEMTOT
1− 1
σGEOi
i,r,t = a
DEMU
i,r DEMU
1− 1
σGEOi
i,r,t + a
DEMV
i,r DEMV
1− 1
σGEOi
i,r,t (1.18)
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Armington (third stage)
minPDEMUi,r,t DEMU i,r,t = P
D
i,r,tDi,r,t + P
M
i,r,tMi,r,t (1.19)
s.t. DEMU
1− 1
σARM i
i,r,t = a
DEM
i,r D
1− 1
σARM i
i,r,t + a
M
i,rM
1− 1
σARM i
i,r,t (1.20)
Regions (fourth stage)
For foreign regions with the same level of development:
minPMi,s,tMi,s,t =
∑
r∈U(s)
PDEMi,r,s,t DEM i,r,s,t (1.21)
s.t. M
1− 1
σIMPi
i,s,t =
∑
r∈U(s)
aIMPi,r,s DEM
1− 1
σIMPi
i,r,s,t (1.22)
For foreign regions with different levels of development:
minPDEMVi,s,t DEMV i,s,t =
∑
r∈V (s)
PDEMi,r,s,t DEM i,r,s,t (1.23)
s.t. DEMV
1− 1
σIMPi
i,s,t =
∑
r∈V (s)
aIMPi,r,s DEM
1− 1
σIMPi
i,r,s,t (1.24)
Varieties (fifth stage)
DEMVARi,r,s,t = DEM i,r,s,tNB
1− 1
σVARi
i,r,t (1.25)
PDEMi,r,s,t = P
DEMVAR
i,r,s,t NB
1− 1
σVARi
i,r,t (1.26)
DVARi,s,t = Di,s,tNB
1− 1
σVARi
i,s,t (1.27)
PDi,s,t = P
DVAR
i,r,t NB
1− 1
σVARi
i,s,t (1.28)
Intermediate consumption
P ICi,j,r,t = P
DEMTOT
i,r,t (1 + taxicci,j,r) (1.29)
minPCNTERj,r,t CNTERj,r,t =
∑
i
P ICi,j,r,tIC i,j,r,t (1.30)
s.t. CNTER
1− 1
σIC
j,r,t =
∑
i
aICi,j,rIC
1− 1
σIC
i,j,r,t (1.31)
Capital good
minP INVTOTr,t INVTOT r,t =
∑
i
PKGi,r,tKG i,r,t (1.32)
s.t. INVTOT
1− 1
σKG
r,t =
∑
i
aKGi,r KG
1− 1
σKG
i,r,t (1.33)
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Commodity market equilibrium
Imperfect competition
Yi,r,t = DVARi,r,t +
∑
s
DEMVARi,r,s,t (1.34)
TRADE i,r,s,t = NB i,r,tDEMVARi,r,s,t (1.35)
Perfect competition
Yi,r,t = Di,r,t +
∑
s
DEM i,r,s,t (i /∈ TrT ) (1.36)
YiTrT ,r,t = DiTrT ,r,t +
∑
s
DEM iTrT ,r,s,t + TRM iTrT ,r,t (1.37)
TRADE i,r,s,t = DEM i,r,s,t (1.38)
Transport sector
Transport demand
TRi,r,s,t = µi,r,sTRADE i,r,s,t (1.39)
MONDTRt =
∑
i,r,s
TRi,r,s,t (1.40)
Transport supply
P YiTrT ,r,t(1 + taxpiTrT ,r)TRM iTrT ,r,t = θiTrT ,rP
T
t MONDTRt (1.41)
MONDTRt = a
T
∏
r
TRM iTrT ,r,t
θiTrT ,r (1.42)
Factor market
25
25In this paper we consider the standard version of the MIRAGE model; however in its
agricultural version:
• we distinguish between two types of unskilled labor: agricultural labor and non agricul-
tural labor. A partial mobility between these two types of labors is allowed through a
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Land market
WTEi,r,t = P
TE
r,t + Pr,tTsubTE i,r,t (1.43)
Land supply
WTEr,t TE r,t =
∑
i
WTEi,r,tTE i,r,t (1.44)
TE r,t = TE r,t0
(
WTEr,t
)σ
TE
(NB :WTEr,t0 = 1) (1.45)
Land allocation
TE i,r,t = b
TE
i,r TE r,t
(
WTEi,r,t
WTEr,t
)σTE
(1.46)
Full use of factor endowments
Lr,t =
∑
j
Lj,r,t (1.47)
TE r,t =
∑
j
TE j,r,t (1.48)
H r,t =
∑
j
Hj,r,t (1.49)
Constant Elasticity of Transformation supply function. Within each category, labor is
perfectly mobile.
• a duality of labor has been assumed in developing countries: an efficiency wage scheme
determines the level of wages in non agricultural sectors and the corresponding labor
demand, and labor supply in agricultural sectors is computed as a residual. The efficiency
wage is set such that the purchasing power of non agricultural wages, including tax
receipts so that fiscal policy do not affect the results, remains unchanged after the shock.
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Revenues
For imperfectly competitive sectors:
0 =P Yi,r,t
(
NB i,r,t
∑
s
DEMVARi,r,s,t
1 + EPi,r,s,t
+
NB i,r,tDVARi,r,t
1 + EPD i,r,t
)
− (PVAi,r,tVAi,r,t + P
CNTER
i,r,t CNTERi,r,t) (1.50)
Comment: this corresponds to the zero profit condition allowing to compute the
number of firms.
Tax revenue from imperfectly competitive sectors
RECPROD i,r,t = taxpi,rP
Y
i,r,t
(
NB i,r,t
∑
s
DEMVARi,r,s,t
1 + EPi,r,s,t
+
NB i,r,tDVARi,r,t
1 + EPD i,r,t
)
RECEXP i,r,t = (1 + taxpi,r)P
Y
i,r,tNB i,r,t (1.51)
∗
∑
s
(TAXEXP i,r,s,t + taxAMF i,r,s,t)
DEMVARi,r,s,t
1 + EPi,r,s,t
(1.52)
Tax revenue from perfectly competitive sectors
RECPROD i,r,t = taxpi,rP
Y
i,r,tYi,r,t (1.53)
RECEXP i,r,t = (1 + taxpi,r)P
Y
i,r,t
∗
∑
s
(TAXEXP i,r,s,t + taxAMF i,r,s,t)TRADE i,r,s,t (1.54)
For both sectors
RECDD i,r,t =
∑
r
DD i,r,s,tP
CIF
i,r,s,tTRADE i,r,s,t (1.55)
RQUOTAr,s,t =
∑
i∈TQUOTAO
TQUOTAi,r,s,tP
CIF
i,r,s,tTRADE i,r,s,t (1.56)
RECCONS i,s,t = P
DEMTOT
i,s,t (taxcci,sCi,s,t + taxkgci ,sKG i,s,t
+
∑
j
taxicci,j,s,tIC i,j,s,t) (1.57)
RECTAX r,t =
∑
i
RECPROD i,r,t + RECEXP i,r,t
+ RECDD i,r,t + RECCONS i,r,t (1.58)
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Savings
BUDC r,t = (1− epar)REV r,t (1.59)
Factor mobility
P Li,r,t = P
L
r,t (1.60)
PTEi,r,t = P
TE
r,t (1.61)
PHi,r,t = P
H
r,t (1.62)
Prices definition
Sale price (imperfect competition)
PDEMVARi,r,s,t = P
CIF
i,r,s,t(1 +DD i,r,s,t) (1.63)
PDVARi,r,t =
P Yi,r,t(1 + taxpi,r)
1 + EPD i,r,t
(1.64)
CIF price (imperfect competition)
PCIFi,r,s,t = (1 + taxpi,r)(1 + TAXEXP i,r,s,t + taxAMF i,r,s,t)
P Yi,r,t
1 + EP i,r,s,t
+ µi,r,sP
T
t
(1.65)
Sale price (perfect competition)
PDEMi,r,s,t = P
CIF
i,r,s,t(1 +DD i,r,s,t) (1.66)
PDi,r,t = P
Y
i,r,t(1 + taxpi,r) (1.67)
CIF price (perfect competition)
PCIFi,r,s,t = (1 + taxpi,r)(1 + TAXEXP i,r,s,t + taxAMF i,r,s,t)P
Y
i,r,t + µi,r,sP
T
t (1.68)
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Imperfect competition
Determination of market shares
SDU i,s,t =
PDi,s,tDi,s,t
PDEMUi,s,t DEMU i,s,t
(1.69)
SDT i,s,t =
PDi,s,tDi,s,t
PDEMTOTi,s,t DEMTOT i,s,t
(1.70)
SE i,r,s,t =
PDEMi,r,s,t DEM i,r,s,t
PMi,s,tMi,s,t
(1.71)
SU i,r,s,t =
PDEMi,r,s,t DEM i,r,s,t
PDEMUi,s,t DEMU i,s,t
(1.72)
SV i,r,s,t =
PDEMi,r,s,t DEM i,r,s,t
PDEMVi,s,t DEMV i,s,t
(1.73)
Sh i,r,s,t =
PDEMi,r,s,t DEM i,r,s,t
PDEMTOTi,s,t DEMTOT i,s,t
(1.74)
Mark-up in domestic markets
NB i,r,t(EPD i,r,t +
1
σVARi
) =
[
1
σVARi
−
1
σARM i
]
+
[
1
σARM i
−
1
σGEOi
]
SDU i,r,t
+
[
1
σGEOi
−
1
σCi
]
SDT i,r,t (1.75)
Mark-up in foreign markets in countries with the same level of development
NB i,r,t(EP i,r,s,t +
1
σVARi
) =
[
1
σVARi
−
1
σARM i
]
+
[
1
σIMP i
−
1
σARM i
]
SE i,r,s,t
+
[
1
σARM i
−
1
σGEOi
]
SU i,r,s,t +
[
1
σGEOi
−
1
σCi
]
Sh i,r,s,t
(1.76)
Mark-up in foreign markets in countries with different levels of development
NB i,r,t(EP i,r,s,t +
1
σVARi
) =
[
1
σVARi
−
1
σARM i
]
+
[
1
σIMP i
−
1
σGEOi
]
SV i,r,s,t
+
[
1
σGEOi
−
1
σCi
]
Sh i,r,s,t (1.77)
In the agricultural version of the MIRAGE model we also consider an inter-
vention price scheme for the European Union.26
26The intervention price scheme in the EU is modeled as follows: as soon as the internal price
becomes lower than the intervention price, the EU subsidies exports so as to raise the internal
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Investment
INV i,r,s,t = ai,r,sBr,tKTOT i,s,t e
αWKi,s,t (1.78)
WKi,r,t = P
K
i,r,t + Pr,tTsubK i,r,t (1.79)
INVTOT s,t =
∑
i,r
INV i,r,s,t (1.80)
price to the level of the intervention price. In actual facts, the EU also increases inventories
but inventories are not accounted for Mirage.
In practice, the price scheme is divided into 4 possible modes:
• For countries other than the EU or sectors not concerned by intervention prices, the
subsidy rate is exogenous.
• When the intervention price is lower than the internal price, there is no export subsidy.
• When the intervention price would be higher than the internal price, the export subsidy
rate is endogenous. The distribution across importers is the same as in the baseline. If
there was no subsidy in the baseline, this distribution is homogenous.
• The subsidization of exports is limited by a maximum of subsidized exports from the
WTO. If this limit is reached, then this constraint replaces the price constraint.
When a simulation is complete, the model checks if the constraints defining a mode still hold.
If they do not, then the mode is changed automatically until there is no more necessary change.
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Regional equilibrium
GDPVOLr,t ∗ P
CIndex
r,t =REV r,t + PIBMVALt ∗ SOLD r,t (1.81)
with PCIndexr,t =
∏
i
(
PCi,r,t
PCi,r,t0
) PCi,r,t0Ci,r,t0∑
j
PC
j,r,t0
Cj,r,t0
(1.82)
GDPVOLr,t ∗ P
CIndex
r,t =
∑
s
(RQUOTAr,s,t − RQUOTAs,r,t)
+ RECTAX r,t +
∑
i
PRNi,r,tRN i,r,t +
∑
i,s
(PKi,r,s,tKi,r,s,t)
+ Lr,tP
Lr,t + TE r,tP
TE
r,t +Hr,tP
H
r,t (1.83)
eparREV r,t =
∑
i,s
P INVTOTs,t INV i,r,s,t (1.84)
PIBMVALt =
∑
i,r
PVAi,r,tVAi,r,t (1.85)
Dynamics
Ki,r,s,t = Ki,r,s,t−1(1− δ) + INV i,r,s,t (1.86)
Lr,t = ρrLr,t−1 (1.87)
H r,t = ρrH r,t−1 (1.88)
Chapter 2
How does Tariff-rate quota
modeling affect CGE results? an
application for MIRAGE
1
1This work has benefited from Yvan Decreux cooperation from CEPII and the World Bank.
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2.1 INTRODUCTION
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) introduces tariff-rate
quotas (TRQs) in order to improve market access of commodities that were sub-
ject to prohibite tariffs or Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) such as simple quotas. The
purpose of implementing TRQs on highly protected agricultural products was to
guarantee a minimum level of market access (established first at 3% of domes-
tic consumption, then expanded to 5%), to safeguard current levels of access
(“current-access quotas”). In addition, another reason for implementing TRQs
was to maintain existing market access conditions, in particular those granted to
developing by developed countries, such as the European Union, Japan and the
United States, for historical reasons.
This policy instrument is defined as followed: “Tariff-rate quotas are two-level
tariffs, with a limited volume of imports permitted at the lower in-quota tariff
and all subsequent imports charged the (often much) higher out-of-quota tariff”
(Ingco, 1996; Diakosavvas, 2001; De Gorter and Kliauga, 2006). This instru-
ment combines tariff (tariffs in and over the quota) and non-tariff (quota volume)
measures which determines three possibles regimes: the in-quota regime (quota
unfilled and the in-quota tariff applied to imports), the at-quota regime (quota
just filled and the equilibrium price includes a prime over the in-quota tariff)
and the out-of-quota regime (imports exceed the quota and the applied tariff is
the out-of-quota tariff). Most bilateral TRQs display “in-quota” and “at-quota”
regimes because most out-of-quota tariffs are prohibitive. Nevertheless, some ex-
ceptions appear according to the economic conjuncture (i.e. beef TRQs allocated
to Mercosur countries have been consistently exceeded over the last period in
spite of the very high specific component of the out-of-quota tariff). The TRQ
equilibrium regime depends on tariff and quota levels as well as import demand
and export supply functions, but also on the TRQ administration methods, which
affect the volume of trade and the distribution of the TRQ rent between importers
and exporters. De Gorter and Kliauga (2006) introduce other intermediate TRQ
regimes that may appear in the case of WTO TRQs. However, these regimes are
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not considered in this paper because we focus here on bilateral TRQs based on
data from the MAcMapHS6 database.
Most Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models have tried to introduce
TRQ modeling, but they remain far from the true market behavior when markets
are affected by TRQs. The standard version of the MIRAGE model only considers
exogenous TRQ rents and their reduction under different liberalization scenarios
(Decreux and Valin, 2007). Even if the TRQ rents are defined at the HS6 level,
this way of modeling is quite limited, because it does not give the possibility
to shift from one TRQ regime to another as a consequence of an external shock.
Moreover, the assumption that the whole TRQ rent is allocated to exporters is not
always accurate as such allocation depends on the TRQ administration method,
the market power of traders, etc. The GTAP model (Elbehri and Pearson, 2000;
Berrettoni and Cicowiez, 2002) and the LINKAGE model (van der Mensbrugghe,
2001; Van der Mensbrugghe et al., 2003) also introduce TRQ modeling at an
aggregate level. The advantage of their modeling is a distribution of quota-rents
between importers and exporters, based on information about quota allocation
or TRQ administration methods. However, they still have some limitations as
TRQs are assumed to concern entire GTAP sectors, adding up imports under
TRQ regimes and imports under ordinary tariffs (introducing a possible bias due
to data aggregation). Furthermore, no distinction is made between multilateral
TRQs (where allocation is not always explicit) and preferential TRQs granted
under preferential trade agreements (PTA) (where allocation is known); all of
them are treated as bilateral TRQs. This paper does not provide any improvement
on this second point.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the implications of different TRQ
modelings for macroeconomic and trade indicators. We compare different versions
of the MIRAGE model:
(i) without any consideration of TRQs,
(ii) with exogenous TRQ rent and
(iii) with explicit TRQ modeling at a very detailed level.
Section 2.2 discusses the literature about the economics of TRQs and TRQ
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modeling in partial and general equilibrium frameworks. Section 2.3 presents the
new specification of TRQ modeling in the MIRAGE model. Section 2.4 presents
an application case (EU-Mercosur PTA) in order to compare the results of the
different MIRAGE versions. The EU-Mercosur PTA example has been chosen
because TRQs are the most useful and controversial trade policy instrument in
agriculture liberalization between these economic blocs. The final Section con-
cludes about the relevance of TRQ modeling in a CGE framework and also some
forthcoming extensions in TRQ modeling.
2.2 Tariff-Rate Quotas: Economics and model-
ing
The impact of a quota-volume expansion critically depends on the initial effective
protection, the import elasticity and the TRQ administration methods. First, the
TRQ equilibrium regime determines the TRQ component (tariff or quota) that
constrains imports. In this model we distinguish three basic regimes: the in-
quota regime (the quota is not filled and the tariff is the in-quota tariff, τin);
the at-quota regime (the quota is binding and the applied tariff-equivalent, τm,
is endogenously determined, with τin ≤ τm ≤ τout); and the out-of-quota regime
(imports exceed the quota level and the out-of-quota tariff, τout, is the effective
trade policy instrument).
Second, the import elasticity determines how quickly one regime shifts to
another when trade policy changes.
Finally, TRQ administration methods also affect the quota fill. They not
only affect the volume and distribution of trade between partners, but they also
have a considerable impact on the distribution of TRQ rents. The WTO iden-
tifies seven methods of TRQ administration: Applied-tariff, License-on-demand,
First-come/First-serve, Historical, Auction, State-trader/Producer-group and a
combination of the six previous methods. The Applied-tariff method is the most
common form and is applied on almost half of TRQs, but the License-on-demand
(allowing the possibility to resale licenses) and Auction methods are the most ef-
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ficient ones because they reduce allocative inefficiencies in products markets and
political discretion (and thus rents) in trade allocation (Abbott, 2002; Bureau
and Tangermann, 2000; Skully, 1999).
The capture of the TRQ rent is also explained by the presence of an im-
porter (or exporter)’s market power (Olarreaga and Ozden, 2005). The quality
composition of exports, the changes in world prices (or import prices) after the
agreement, and the differentiation of imports across origins also explain who cap-
tures the TRQ rent. This aspect of TRQs is an important question by its welfare
and trade implications, and it deserves to be addressed in detail; however, it is
not the purpose of this paper.
The modeling of TRQs in a CGE framework has been implemented by several
authors. Elbehri and Pearson (2000) have introduced them in the GTAP model
(Hertel, 1997) using the GEMPACK code from Harrison and Pearson (1996) and
they use it to study bilateral TRQs in the sugar sector. Berrettoni and Cicowiez
(2002) from the Centro de Economia International (CEI) run the GTAP model
to simulate the EU-Mercosur PTA by comparing two different scenarios: a quota
enlargement and a reduction in the out-of-quota tariff. All scenarios are welfare-
improving for both regions but gains come from different sources depending on
the scenario (i.e. in the case of Argentina, a quota enlargement leads to a greater
quota rent while an out-of-quota tariff reduction increases trade, therefore reduc-
ing quota rents.)
The LINKAGE CGE model from the World Bank relies on the Mixed Com-
plementarity Problem (MPC) methodology to implement TRQs (van der Mens-
brugghe, 2001). MCP is based on orthogonality conditions. The first one states
that in-quota imports cannot exceed the quota level. It is associated with a con-
straint on the quota premium-rate, which lower bound is zero. Two regimes,
in-quota and at-quota, may be deduced from this condition. The second orthog-
onality condition states that the quota premium-rate is capped at the difference
between the out-of-quota and the in-quota tariffs and it is associated with a lower
bound for the out-of-quota imports (also equal to zero). Van der Mensbrugghe et
al. (2003) test the LINKAGE TRQ modeling in the case of TRQ reforms in the
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sugar market by the most important OECD countries, such as the EU, the Unites
States and Japan. Their conclusions highlight the trade-diversion effects induced
by TRQs as well as welfare gains for countries benefiting from TRQ bilateral
allocations (least-developed countries).
The originality of these previous models is the consideration of the TRQ rent-
sharing between importers (government) and exporters,2 which is crucial for wel-
fare implications and export incentives. Their disadvantage lies in the fact that
entire sectors, such as Meat or Sugar (identified in the GTAP database), are as-
sumed to be under TRQ regimes which is not necessarily true.3 Using aggregated
data at the GTAP sector level may lead to biased results. Our proposed TRQ
modeling aims at minimizing these aggregation biases.
When all individual quotas are aggregated into large quotas at the sector level,
several possibilities appear to compute their parameters and to define the equi-
librium regimes. Van der Mensbrugghe et al. (2003) assume that the aggregate
sector is in an at-quota regime as soon as some individual quotas are binding.
Therefore the size of the quota has to be equal to actual trade, while the premium
is computed based on individual rents. By contrast, Lips and Rieder (2002) as-
sume that a sector is in an out-of-quota regime as soon as one product exceeds
its quota. It allows them to keep the actual size of the quota, but then, several
options appear to compute inside and outside tariffs. They analyze two different
methods for the GTAP model. The first method is based on the aggregation of in
and out-of-quota tariffs using trade as a weighting scheme (the second one being
provided by the GTAP database); the second method starts from the actual quota
rent as the sum of all individual rents and from a trade-weighted outside tariff,
which leads to the endogenous determination of the inside average tariff. When
2Van der Mensbrugghe et al. (2003) assume that the quota rents are shared in exogenous
proportions that depend on importers and exporters, while Elbehri and Pearson (2000) and
Berrettoni and Cicowiez (2002) assume them to be allocated equally between importers and
exporters.
3Elbehri and Pearson (2000) and Berrettoni and Cicowiez (2002) aggregate in-quota and
out-of-quota tariffs, weighting them by trade, and the fill-rate helps to determine the initial
TRQ regime for each GTAP sector.
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the sector is in-quota and out-of-quota regime but some individual quotas are
not, tariff aggregation leads to an overestimation of the quota rent at the GTAP
sector level, while keeping the actual rent as the base for the tariff gap leads to
an overestimation of the inside tariff. They use both methods as a sensitivity
analysis for their estimations.
2.3 Modeling Tariff-Rate Quotas in MIRAGE
2.3.1 The MIRAGE model
The MIRAGE model from CEPII is multi-sectoral and multi-regional CGE model
(Bchir et al., 2002). It is a dynamic model fitted with imperfect competition in
the manufacturing and service sectors, in order to give a more realistic represen-
tation of the world economy. MIRAGE describes imperfect competition in an
oligopolistic framework “a` la Cournot”.
The demand side is modeled in each region through the representative agent
assumption. Firstly, domestic products are assumed to be less substitutable to
foreign products than foreign products are to each other. Secondly, products orig-
inating in developing countries and in developed countries are assumed to belong
to different quality ranges. This assumption is based on empirical evidence of
quality differences even at the most detailed level of product classification, and
on the idea that the composition of identical aggregate sectors may be actually
quite different between a developing country and an industrialized one. This
assumption is likely to have direct consequences on the transmission of liberaliza-
tion shocks, as the elasticity of substitution is lower across different qualities than
across products within a given quality. Hence, the competition between products
of different qualities is less substantial than between products of a similar quality.
In the absence of systematic information suitable for the incorporation of vertical
differentiation in a worldwide modeling exercise, such as the one undertaken here,
differentiation is modeled in an ad hoc fashion: developed countries and devel-
oping countries are assumed to produce goods belonging to two different quality
ranges; substitutability is assumed to be weaker across these two quality ranges
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than between products belonging to the same quality range.
Regarding the supply side of the model, producers use five factors: capi-
tal, labour (skilled and unskilled), land and natural resources. The structure of
the value-added production function is intended to take into account the well-
documented relative skill-capital complementarity. These two factors are thus
bundled separately, with a lower elasticity of substitution, while a higher substi-
tutability is assumed between this bundle and other factors.
The production function assumes perfect complementarity between value-
added and intermediate consumption. The sectoral composition of the intermedi-
ate consumption aggregate stems from a CES function. For each sector of origin,
the nesting is the same as for final consumption, meaning that the sector-bundle
has the same structure for final and intermediate consumption.
Constant returns to scale and perfect competition are assumed to prevail in
agricultural sectors. In contrast, firms are assumed to face increasing returns
to scale in the industrial and service sectors (through a constant marginal cost
and a fixed cost, expressed in output units). In those sectors, competition is
imperfect. This modeling allows the pro-competitive effect of trade liberalization
to be captured.
Capital good has the same composition regardless of the sector; it cannot
change its sector affectation once it has been installed, thus introducing a rigidity
in the economy suggested by empirical evidence. Capital is accumulated every
year as the result of investments in the most profitable sectors. Natural resources
are considered to be perfectly immobile and may not be accumulated. Both
types of labor (skilled and unskilled) are assumed to be perfectly mobile across
sectors, whereas imperfect land mobility is modeled with a constant elasticity of
transformation function. Production factors are assumed to be fully employed;
accordingly, negative shocks are absorbed by changes in prices (factor rewards)
rather than in quantities. All production factors are internationally immobile.
With respect to macroeconomic closure, the current balance is assumed to be
exogenous (and equal to its initial value in real terms), while real exchange rates
are endogenous.
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The calculation of the dynamic baseline has been recently improved in order to
have an endogenous total factor productivity (TFP). This improvement is based
on a more elaborate demographic and macroeconomic forecast in which the labor
and GDP growth rates until 2015 are taken from the World Bank database. In
the baseline, TFP is determined endogenously but under the simulation scenarios
it becomes fixed, while GDP is calculated endogenously.
The model uses the GTAP database 6.1. However, instead of relying on
modeling tariff cuts at the sector level, we use a detailed database (MAcMapHS6)
at the HS6 level (5,113 products) for border protection. TRQ data (in, at and
out-of-quota tariffs, quota levels and imports under TRQs) are also provided at
the HS6 level. This allows analysis to be based on actual applied tariffs, including
preferential provisions (e.g. GSP, FTAs, etc.), and to build scenarios based on
the sensitivity of products as revealed by actual trade policy. In the simulation
presented later, tariff databases used to describe the initial situation and construct
scenarios of trade liberalization are MAcMapHS6-v2, corresponding to year 2004,
for TRQs applied by the EU to Mercosur, and MAcMapHS6-v1, which describes
market access in 2001, for the remaining information (Boue¨t et al., 2004).
2.3.2 TRQ modeling in MIRAGE
Our improvement of TRQ modeling for MIRAGE aims at avoiding aggregation
biases discussed above, and thus TRQs are introduced at a more detailed level
(bilateral TRQs at the HS6 level) than GTAP data. This implies to modify the
demand tree and include new branches (see Figure 2.1). A further CES nesting
level is added to the sub-utility function in order to distinguish between imports
under TRQs and imports under ordinary tariffs.
[INSERT Figure 2.1]
For imports under TRQs the information is disaggregated (bilateral TRQs at
the HS6 level) and each GTAP sector may contain one or more TRQs (Equations
2.1 and 2.3); however, for non-TRQ imports, data remains aggregated at the
GTAP-sector level (Equations 2.2 and 2.4).
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)
(2.3)
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(
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)
(2.4)
Within a sector containing TRQs, individual products are assumed to be
imperfectly substitutable to each other. The elasticity has been assumed to be
the same as the elasticity between products originating from different countries
belonging to the same quality group.
The import price for GTAP sectors containing TRQs is a CES index price
composed by TRQ and Non-TRQ prices (Equation 2.5). It depends on non-TRQ
tariffs and TRQ-regimes changes.
PDEMi,r,s,t,simDEMi,r,s,t,sim =
∑
id$(id,i,r,s)
P TRQid,i,r,s,t,simTRQid,i,r,s,t,sim +
+ PNTRQi,r,s,t,simNTRQi,r,s,t,sim (2.5)
In order to model the possibility of TRQ-regime changes, we need to introduce
some extra conditions. We define three TRQ-regimes: in-quota, at-quota and out-
of-quota regimes.
In-quota regime if TRQid,i,r,s,t,sim < Q¯id,i,r,s,t,sim τ
TRQ
id,i,r,s,t,sim = τ
in
id,i,r,s,t,sim
At-quota regime if TRQid,i,r,s,t,sim = Q¯id,i,r,s,t,sim τ
in
id,i,r,s,t,sim < τ
TRQ
id,i,r,s,t,sim < τ
out
id,i,r,s,t,sim
Out-of-quota regime if TRQid,i,r,s,t,sim > Q¯id,i,r,s,t,sim τ
TRQ
id,i,r,s,t,sim = τ
out
id,i,r,s,t,sim
The equilibrium under the first regime is characterized by imports lower than
the quota level, the in-quota tariff being the effective protection. Under the
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second regime, the quota is binding and the prime over the in-quota tariff is
endogenously determined. The out-of-quota regime considers an equilibrium in
which the out-of-quota tariff is the effective protection because imports exceed
the quota level.
[INSERT Figure 2.2]
The conditions which lead to TRQ-regime shifting (Table 2.1) are the follow-
ing: if a TRQ is initially under the in-quota regime but imports exceed the quota
level, then the TRQ-regime shifts to the at-quota regime. Conversely, if a TRQ is
under an at-quota regime and the endogenous tariff-equivalent is lower than the
in-quota tariff, then the TRQ-regime shifts to the in-quota regime. For all other
TRQ-regime changes the mechanisms are similar.
[INSERT Table 2.1]
TRQ rents depend on the premium-rate over the in-quota tariff and the quota
volume, as described in Equation 2.6. All TRQ rents at the detailed level are
added to obtain the rent at the GTAP sector level. These rents increase exporters’
revenues and may become an important source of welfare gain, as it is assumed
in the standard version of MIRAGE: the full rent is captured by exporters.
QRid,i,r,s,t,sim = (τ
TRQ
id,i,r,s,t,sim − τ
in
id,i,r,s,t,sim)Q¯id,i,r,s,t,sim (2.6)
In order to match TRQ information at the HS6 level and GTAP data, a
multi-dimension mapping has been defined to show which TRQ (bilateral and at
the HS6 level) belongs to each particular import demand (bilateral trade and at
GTAP-sector aggregation).
As we have seen in the TRQ literature this way of modeling is supposed
to avoid some aggregation biases affecting welfare and trade results; however,
computational difficulties are likely to emerge at high levels of region and sector
disaggregation. Forthcoming researches about TRQ modeling in MIRAGE will
examine an aggregated TRQ model (minimizing aggregation biases) to address
this difficulty.
2.4. THE EU-MERCOSUR PTA: AN EXAMPLE OF TRQ MODELING 106
2.4 The EU-Mercosur PTA: an example of TRQ
modeling
Mercosur (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela) is the most im-
portant EU partner in Latin America (50% of EU exports to the region) and
inversely the EU is the destination market of more than 30% of Mercosur agri-
cultural and food exports.
Mercosur countries are developing countries, which are therefore eligible for
the EU Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), and some of them, such as
Venezuela, benefit from the GSP+ with a duty exemption over approximately
85% of their exports. However, their access to the EU market is constrained by
the limited GSP coverage for agricultural products and by the GSP graduation
for the largest Mercosur countries (Argentina and Brazil).
TRQs defined under the Uruguay Round Agriculture Agreement (URAA)
allow Mercosur countries to benefit from preferential tariffs for some of their agri-
cultural exports. These are either current-access TRQs, opened to ensure per-
sistence of historical preferential trade flows, or minimum-access TRQs, granted
to open 5% of the domestic consumption to international competition (all WTO
members).
The EU has opened more than 80 TRQs on agricultural products under ei-
ther current or minimum access. Most of them are administered according to
the License-on-Demand, Historical-trade and First-come/First-served methods.
Mercosur benefits from a preferential market access through TRQs for cereals
(corn, wheat), meats (beef, swine and poultry), fruits and vegetables, rice, dairy
products and other food products. Argentina and Brazil benefit from large quotas
of food (Argentina) and meat (Brazil and Argentina), and fruits and vegetables
(Brazil), while Uruguay and Paraguay only have a smaller (bovine) meat quota
and a tiny quota for dairy products (Uruguay). Venezuela does not use TRQs
because it faces more duty free tariff lines given by the GSP+.
Under the EU current-access TRQs, Argentina and Uruguay benefit from
a preferential access with a limit of 23,000 tons and 5,800 tons for sheep and
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goat respectively, and under minimum access these counties benefit from TRQs
for beef and nutritional remainders (Argentina). Argentina also benefits from a
WTO quota for garlic, which is not fulfilled as is the case for beef TRQs (Bureau
et al., 2006).
Mercosur countries also benefit from the“Hilton”TRQ for (fresh) meat (28,000
tons for Argentina, 6,300 tons for Uruguay, 5,000 tons for Brazil and 1,000 tons
for Paraguay), whose licenses are managed by the exporter countries. This aspect
explains Mercosur’s producers interests in keeping TRQs instead of negotiating
MFN tariff reductions. The only country that does not fulfill its quota is Paraguay
due to sanitary problems. The Hilton in-quota tariff is 20% and the out-of-quota
tariff is a mixed tariff (12.8% plus a specific tariff between 140 and 300 Cper 100kg
depending to the HS tariff line). In spite of the high out-of-quota tariff, Mercosur
countries manage to fulfill their quotas and even to export small volumes out-of-
quota. In the beef case, there is also a 66,000-ton frozen beef WTO TRQ (for
the meat industry) of which Brazil is the main beneficiary (as it is not allocated
to any specific country). For instance in 2003, Brazil exported out of quota some
80,000 tons of frozen meat and 41,000 tons of Hilton meat. In this last case,
outside exports represented eight times Brazil’s quota. Brazil also benefits from
the TRQs opened under minimum-access for poultry (not allocated to a particular
country) and fills half of the 15,500-ton poultry TRQ. Despite EU tariffs, Brazil
manages to ship large quantities of poultry to the EU outside quotas (Bureau et
al., 2006; Ramos et al., 2006).
The accession of some EU members also leads to improve Mercosur access
to the European market. Since the adhesion of Spain and Portugal to the EU,
Mercosur countries have also benefited from a corn TRQ (2,5 million tons). This
quota no longer exist because the tariff for seeds is duty-free and non-tariff barriers
(OGM restrictions) protect the EU market from Mercosur’s maize. Since 2006
and for a few tariff lines, the EU has opened a 244,000-ton WTO TRQ for flint
maize from which Argentina and Brazil benefit. Brazil also benefited from a
82,000-ton sugar TRQ granted by Finland before it became an EU member, but
recently Brazil’s possibilities to export sugar to the EU have been enlarged (see
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Table 1.1 in Chapter 1).
In order to improve the EU-Mercosur relations, in 1995 both regions agreed on
the negotiations’ take-off; however, after more than 10 years and several negotia-
tion rounds, no agreement was signed. According to the proposals exchanged, the
EU would only open its agricultural market to Mercosur through the enlargement
of the present TRQs and the opening of some new quotas for specific products
(sugar, tobacco and ethanol).
The predominance of TRQs as proposed measures in the EU-Mercosur nego-
tiation has motivated our decision to take it as an illustration of some different
TRQ modeling possibilities in a CGE framework.
2.4.1 TRQ Data description
According to the new TRQ database from MAcMapHS6-v2, 32 countries have
opened TRQs under the rules of the WTO as well as under some PTAs. All WTO
members benefit from these TRQs but they are not equally allocated between
partners. The allocation is sometimes determined by importers. Agricultural
products are most affected by this trade policy instrument, since more than 450
agricultural products and only 24 non-agricultural products are constrained by
TRQs. Among agricultural products, bovine meat (chapter 02), roots and tubers
(chapter 07), animal and vegetable oils (chapter 15) and some preparation from
fruits and vegetables (chapter 20) are more frequently limited by TRQs. Countries
such as Japan, the United States, Korea and the EU generate the greatest rents
with their TRQs, while the most concerned products are meat (chapter 02),
cereals (chapter 10), oilseeds (chapter 12) and beverages and tobacco (chapter
24). Because most of these TRQs are allocated to a few partners and TRQ rents
are assumed to be entirely captured by exporters (MIRAGE model assumption),
rents would be concentrated on a few countries (i.e. the United States, Brazil,
Australia, Argentina and the European Union). This geographical distribution of
quota rents is also the consequence of the choice of sensitive products by major
importers, combined to the sectoral specialization of major exporters.
For the EU-Mercosur PTA example, we only consider EU TRQs. Large num-
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ber of TRQs have been opened by the EU for particular sectors, such as Food
products, Dairy products, Meat and Meat products, and Vegetables and Fruits.
For some of these sectors (Dairy products, Meat, Cattle, and Fruits and Vegeta-
bles) more than 20% of EU imports enters under TRQ regimes, this is particularly
true for imports originating in Mercosur. For instance, more than 60% of dairy
imported products and almost 30% of imported meat coming from Argentina
enter in th European market under TRQ regimes (Figure 2.3).
[INSERT Figure 2.3]
Concerning this model and the GTAP data, we have defined a specific ag-
gregation in 7 regions and 25 sectors, using all the sectoral detail available in
the GTAP database for agricultural products (see Table 2.2). For sectoral ag-
gregation we have decided to keep all agricultural sectors in their original GTAP
nomenclature because we are especially interested on the TRQ impact in these
particular sectors, and to aggregate manufactures, services and primary products.
Since our application focuses on the EU-Mercosur preferential trade agreement,
we disaggregate all partners of this PTA (EU27, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and
Venezuela) and in order to differentiate the effects according to the developing
degree of the rest of the world, we differentiate developing and developed coun-
tries.
[INSERT Table 2.2]
2.4.2 Pre-experiment
Before simulating the bi-regional agreement scenario, we carried out a traditional
pre-experiment in MIRAGE which takes into account the end of the Multi-Fibers
agreement, the United States’ farm bill and China as a WTO member. In addi-
tion, we added some assumptions specific to this paper.
For this particular simulation, we consider Venezuela as a Mercosur mem-
ber since 2006, and thus we have replaced Venezuela’s tariff by those of Ar-
gentina. In order to modify Venezuela’s tariffs, we distinguish two cases: if
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Venezuela’s tariffs are higher than those of Argentina, they are replaced by the
latter, but if Venezuela’s tariffs are lower than Argentina’s tariffs, we keep the
original Venezuela’s tariff to acknowledge the bilateral trade agreements between
Venezuela and other countries or regions. For instance, as a preferential part-
ner of the Andean Community, Venezuela applies lower (generally zero) tariffs to
the members of this customs union than the Mercosur Common External Tariffs
(CET).
In computing the baseline, we assume that the Doha Round will be success-
ful. Therefore industrialized countries will reduce agricultural products’ tariffs
according to the following schedule based on the initial level of the Bound ad
valorem Tariff Equivalent (BTE).
• BTE ≤ 20% => 40% reduction
• 20% < BTE ≤ 50% => 45% reduction
• 50% < BTE ≤ 75% => 50% reduction
• BTE > 75% => 60% reduction, with a tariff cap at 100%
The BTE is reduced by a Swiss formula with a coefficient of 10 in non-
agricultural products.
For developing countries tariffs in agricultural sectors are cut according to the
following schedule based on the initial level of the BTE:
• BTE ≤ 30% => 25% reduction
• 30% < BTE ≤ 80% => 30% reduction
• 80% < BTE ≤ 130% => 35% reduction
• BTE > 130% => 40% reduction, with a tariff cap at 150%
For non-agricultural products, bound tariffs are reduced according to a Swiss
formula with a coefficient of 18. We also consider the possibility of non-agricultural
sensitive products for developing countries by allowing them to implement a tariff
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cut corresponding to only half of what it should be according to the formula, for
10% of the total number of HS6 lines in industrial sectors. The tariff lines are
chosen within some specific sectors. The automobile sector is considered totally
sensitive for all countries. The remaining HS6 sensitive lines are spread among
some sensitive sectors so as to represent an identical share of each of them. The
list of sensitive sectors varies with developing country.
For industrialized and developing countries we also consider sensitive products
with reduction rates halved, cap unchanged, accounting for 5% of the tariff lines
spread equally among the tiers (except if the highest ones are empty; unused
sensitive lines are then used in the next tier), and selected so as to reduce tariff
rates as little as possible. This pre-experiment also considers a linear dismantling
of export subsidies between 2007 and 2013.
The horizon of tariff cuts for industrialized countries is 3 years while it is 6
years for developing countries.
No commitment is taken into account for the least-developed countries.
Multilateral liberalization at the WTO is computed based on bound tariffs,
whereas the bilateral agreement described later in the paper, will cut bilateral
applied tariffs.
2.4.3 Bilateral liberalization scenario
The accomplishment of the EU-Mercosur trade agreement is subordinated to
the multilateral negotiations at the WTO. This is the reason why in our pre-
experiment scenario, we assume a successful multilateral trade agreement before
the signature of the bi-regional EU-Mercosur agreement. This assumption also
affects the choice of sensitive products for the bilateral negotiation, this is the
second reason which justifies our scenario and pre-experiments.
The criterion to determine sensitive products for both regions is the level of
protection. For the EU, sensitive products concern tariff lines for which applied
tariffs exceed 40% as well as tariff lines where TRQs have been opened. In the
case of Mercosur sensitive products, we consider all tariff lines which level of
applied protection exceeds 15%. Otherwise, products are not sensitive and they
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will be immediately liberalized. EU sensitive-products’ list is mainly composed
by agricultural and food products while Mercosur sensitive products are mostly
manufactured goods. Since October 2004 there has been no new proposal ex-
changed. Therefore we simulate an agreement that correspond to the average
between EU and Mercosur October 2004 proposals, also including some new EU
TRQs for some particular products. For Mercosur sensitive products, tariffs are
cut 5 years after the beginning of the agreement whereas for the EU sensitive
products, no tariff cut is assumed but quotas will be expanded (i.e. meat, ce-
reals, dairy products and food) and some new TRQs will be created (i.e. some
sugar products, ethanol, cacao and tobacco).
For products under WTO TRQs we simulate a quota enlargement without
any change in tariffs (in-quota and out-of-quota). From the initial volume as
measured by the present utilization of the WTO TRQs by Mercosur countries,
an increase of the TRQ volumes is implemented based on the average between
the EU and Mercosur proposals (see Table 2.3).
[INSERT Table 2.3]
As for new bilateral TRQs opened for Mercosur countries, we consider two
cases. For some products we follow the EU proposal in which new quotas are
only opened for some particular tariff lines at the 6-digit and 8-digit levels. The
new TRQ for Ethanol would concern only 4 product lines (22071000, 22072000,
22089091, 22089099), for Sugar only 7 products (17025050, ex17499099 -17499080-
, 18061090, ex18062080 -18069080-, ex18062095 -18069080-, ex18069090 -18061980-
, ex18069090 -18069980-), for Cocoa and Tobacco all products under the following
HS4 codes: 1803, 1804, 1805 for Cocoa, and 2402, 2403 for Tobacco. For the other
sensitive products, new TRQ volumes correspond to 150% of the current observed
imports of the EU from Mercosur countries.
All scenarios of trade liberalization (the WTO agreement in the baseline
and the EU-Mercosur agreement in the simulation) were constructed using the
MAcMapHS6 database at the product level (HS6 level) before aggregating the
data toward the sectors used in the CGE model. The advantage of such a strat-
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egy is to take into account exceptions and the non-linearity of the applied tariff
reduction formula, such as the Swiss formula for the pre-experiment scenario.
The EU-Mercosur agreement assumed in the liberalization scenario starts after
the beginning of the implementation of the WTO agreement (most ambitious
proposal) in 2007, and is assumed to be completely achieved by 2014.
This EU-Mercosur PTA scenario is run under different TRQ modeling hy-
potheses. The first version (V1) of the model does not consider any TRQ treat-
ment so that only tariff reductions are implemented. The second version (V2) of
MIRAGE introduces exogenous TRQ-rents, calculated according to the PTA sce-
nario using the MAcMapHS6-v2 database. The third version (V3) of the model
displays an explicit modeling of TRQ (HS6, partner, reporter) allowing TRQ-
regimes shifting. Finally, we use the same disaggregated variant of Mirage as the
one used for V3 but without any TRQ changes (V3nq standing for V3 no quota).
The aim of this example is to highlight modeling biases linked to data ag-
gregation and the lack of TRQ modeling with TRQ-regime shifting. In order to
isolate data aggregation biases, we will compare V1 and V3nq. No TRQ shocks
are assumed in these versions and they only differ in terms of the degree of data
aggregation (V1 at GTAP sectors/regions aggregation and V3nq at the HS6 level
for some trade and protection data). As tariffs may vary strongly within those
sensitive sectors, the aggregation bias may be not negligible, and should not be
confused with the impact of modeling quotas at the detailed level with the pos-
sibility of regime changes. Therefore, what matters is the difference brought by
V2 as compared to V1, which is compared to the difference of V3 as compared
to V3nq. The first difference tells what quota changes imply in an aggregated
framework with no regime change, while the second difference tells us the same
thing in the disaggregated version with regime changes. All results are detailed
in the following subsection.
2.4.4 Simulation results
• Welfare, welfare decomposition and other macroeconomic impacts:
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In this subsection we will analyze the impact of the EU-Mercosur PTA
in terms of welfare and other macroeconomic indicators. The idea is to
elucidate the relevance of the TRQ modeling in welfare and macroeconomic
results, isolating them from data aggregation biases.
Looking at welfare and GDP at world level, we find that data aggregation
(V1 vs. V3nq) does not introduce any bias in the results; however, major
differences appear when we compare V2 to V3. TRQ modeling in V3 per-
mits a market access improvement, leading to a greater GDP and thus a
greater welfare at the world level. By contrast, the simplification of just in-
creasing rents based on exogenous TRQ rents from MAcMapHS6-v2 in V2
does not lead to these gains and thus underestimates welfare improvement
at the world level.
Focusing on countries’ welfare and their welfare decomposition gains, we
also find that there is no bias explained by data aggregation. Welfare varia-
tions between V1 and V3nq do not differ for any country; however, welfare
decomposition shows that allocation efficiency gains are greater when us-
ing disaggregated data (V3nq) rather than using all data at the GTAP
level (V1). Protection data at a more detailed level leads to attribute an
important part of welfare gains to the improvement of resource allocation.
The biases in countries’ welfare are, however, explained by TRQ modeling.
We find that the TRQ simplification through exogenous TRQ rents over-
estimates welfare gains, because no TRQ regime change is allowed. The
lack of TRQ modeling do not consider the possibility that a quota expan-
sion may reduce the marginal tariff leading to smaller (or even zero) rents.
This fact is observed in the case of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay wel-
fare. Conversely, for the other regions, V2 displays welfare losses that are
not confirmed by V3 results. Liberalizing trade through TRQs also lead
to increased welfare for the rest of the world and for the EU25 according
to V3, as compared to the baseline scenario. The EU benefits from a bet-
ter allocation of resources since market access has been improved instead
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of just creating rents for Mercosur countries as in V2. As for the rest of
the world, they actually benefit from the increase in agricultural exports
by Mercosur countries, which leads them into specializing more in industri-
alized sectors, characterized by increasing returns to scale at the industry
level through the imperfect competition mechanism. By contrast, welfare
loss for the rest of the World in the V2 simulation is the logical consequence
of the trade diversion implied by the bilateral agreement between Mercosur
and the EU, without any positive mechanism to compensate it like the one
mentioned. The overestimation of Mercosur gains under V2 is due to the
opposite mechanism. While Mercosur countries benefit from rent increases,
they still do not export more agricultural products, so that they continue
to benefit from economies of scale in the industrial sectors.
Welfare gain composition is also affected by the TRQ modeling. Under
V3, most welfare gains are explained by mechanisms other than TRQ rent
increases (more efficient allocation of resources, capital accumulation and
terms of trade improvement), while unsurprisingly under V2 they are mainly
composed by capital accumulation and the exogenous strong increase of
TRQ rents.
Regarding other macroeconomic indicators at the country level, such as
employment (agricultural and non-agricultural), real wages and GDP, the
consequences on most of them (especially on GDP) does not differ between
V1 and V3nq. However, taking into account only exogenous TRQ-rents
leads to some biases. Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay GDP growths are
overestimated, while GDP is reduced in the rest of the world.
Employment and reals wages display the same trend. Agricultural em-
ployment is slightly affected by data aggregation (only for Argentina and
Brazil) but TRQ modeling is more relevant to explain differences in results.
TRQ modeling leads to greater variations in agricultural employment for
most developing countries (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Dping) but at the
same time, it shows that the rest of the world, especially the EU25, would
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be more affected by the agricultural unemployment. For non-agricultural
employment, data aggregation does not seems to have any consequence as
dramatic as those which result from the specification of TRQs into the
model. Unemployment is greater for developing counties while employment
increases for developed countries under V3. However, their differences under
V2 and V3 are not as large as for agricultural employment.
Variations in real returns for factors are also mainly affected by the TRQ
modeling. Variation between the results of V1 and V3nq is negligible but
differences between V2 and V3 are crucial. The increase in real wages is
underestimated for unskilled agricultural labor when we consider exogenous
TRQ-rents, and vice versa for unskilled non-agricultural labor. In the case
of capital and land returns, the TRQ-regime shifting leads to higher returns
in some countries, such as Argentina and Brazil, but to more dramatic
decreases in their returns for the rest of the world.
In short, we can say that data aggregation marginally affects macroeconomic
results compared to the influence of TRQ modeling. The possibility to
switch from one TRQ regime to another allows to greater welfare gains,
mainly explained by other sources than TRQ gains (overestimated in V2),
such as allocative efficiencies, terms of trade or capital accumulation. All
other macroeconomic indicators, such as GDP, employment and factor’s
returns follow the same trend as countries’ welfare.
• Trade impact:
Trade indicators are sensitive to both data aggregation and TRQ modeling;
however, the latter always remains more significant to explain differences
between results. World trade displays slight differences between V1 and
V3nq while the largest part of world trade increase is due to the TRQ
modeling. The simplification assumption of using exogenous TRQ-rents,
instead of modeling TRQ mechanisms, does not allow to improve market
access for sensitive products, and thus trade gains are lower. When quotas
are expanded, TRQ-regimes may shift, and thus the effective protection
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decreases leading to an increase for trade.
The previous result is confirmed when we consider individual countries’
trade. Total trade variations do not differ much from V1 to V3nq; however,
TRQ modeling becomes crucial for trade results. The consideration of V3
to simulate the EU-Mercosur PTA allows to increase the overall trade of
Mercosur countries and the EU25.
At a more detailed level, such as bilateral trade, data aggregation matters
more than in the previous cases. Nevertheless, once more TRQ modeling is
the source of results’ differences between versions. More dramatic bilateral
trade variations are observed under V3. This result is clearer for bilateral
trade between Mercosur countries and the EU25, in which TRQs are really
important. Looking at the scenario impact, the bilateral trade between the
EU25 and each Mercosur country increases much more under V3, especially
for Brazilian (27.7% under V3, 5.5% under V2 and 7% under V3nq) and
Uruguayan (20.6% under V3, 4.4% under V2 and 5.4% under V3nq) exports
to the EU, than under V2.
Decomposing trade in agricultural and non-agricultural trade, we find that
the largest part of trade gains for Mercosur countries is found in agricultural
sectors. As we explained in the scenario description, most of this products
are sensitive and liberalized only through TRQs. By comparing V1 and
V3nq, there is small differences due to data aggregation and thus the in-
crease in agricultural trade is mostly explained by TRQ modeling. Looking
at V3 results, the increase in exports for Argentina is mainly explained by
Meat (37%) and Paddyrice (2.6%) exports, remembering that both sectors
are under TRQs. In the case of Brazil 10% of the agricultural exports in-
crease is also explained by Meat (121%) exports.4 The explanation of the
increase in the Uruguay agricultural exports (7.9%) is deversified among
the following sectors: Cattle (7.9%), Cereals (1.4%), Diary products (8.6%)
and Meat (19.8%) exports. European imports also increase for agricultural
4For other sensitive sectors, like Sugar, a small quota expansion is not enough to increase
trade and an out-of-quota tariff reduction would be surely preferred.
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products, especially for Meat (217%) and Meat products (2.2%) which are
both under TRQs.
In short, we can say that TRQ modeling matters more than data aggrega-
tion to explain biases in trade results. In addition, TRQ modeling leads to
more dramatic trade variations (negative and positive) compared to the use
of exogenous TRQ-rents, which does not allow to trade increases. TRQs are
the source of agricultural market access improvement, especially for sectors
which benefit from larger quota increase (Meat). However, in other sectors,
for which out-of-quota tariffs remain prohibitive, a small quota increase is
not enough to change the TRQ-regime, and thus protection (out of quota)
remains unchanged.
2.5 CONCLUSION and EXTENSIONS
Tariff-rate quotas have become a very significant trade policy instrument in agri-
cultural liberalization, especially in sensitive sectors where industrialized coun-
tries want to keep a close control on trade. In these sectors, TRQs are presently
the main way offered to developing countries like Mercosur to increase their ex-
ports to developed countries (notably the EU).
In this paper, we highlight the need for a proper TRQ modeling in a CGE
framework. To do so we compare three versions of the Mirage GCE model (with-
out TRQs, with exogenous TRQ-rents and with TRQ modeling). By isolating
an aggregation biases from bias induced by a lack of actual TRQ modeling, we
find that data aggregation is not the most important part; on the contrary, most
differences between results come from the TRQ modeling.
The simple assumption to use exogenous TRQ-rents5 distort welfare and trade
gains. The impossibility to shift from one TRQ-regime to another explains these
results by two non-negligible reasons. The first important aspect, which affects
essentially welfare results, is the overestimation of TRQ rents because under this
assumption any quota expansion automatically increases rents. In fact, actual
5Exogenous TRQ-rents are pre-calculated using MAcMapHS6-v2 for each scenario
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TRQs do not necessarily lead to greater rents when quota volumes are expanded
(except when the initial equilibrium is out of quota and remains out-of-quota after
the expansion). The second reason is that the protection level for products under
TRQs is not reduced when only rents are accounted for. This suppresses the
possibility for a market access improvement, and thus for trade volume increases.
Concerning welfare composition, a market access improvement also affects terms
of trade, becoming one of the most important sources of welfare gain (along with
allocative efficiency gains) in our example.
Using what we consider as the best specification, the V3 model, we obtain
that the EU-Mercosur PTA simulated in this paper would be welfare-improving
for all concerned partners; secondly, trade gains for Mercosur countries occur in
agro-food sectors (particularly in the Meat sector); and finally, the openness of
the European agricultural markets through TRQs lead to welfare gains for other
countries as a result of their eviction from the European agricultural market,
with a reallocation of their resources towards industrial sectors. For some poor
developing countries, this mechanism remains unsure however, as their capacity
to reallocate resources is questionable.
The literature on TRQ modeling in a CGE framework is quite recent, and a
lot of modeling improvements have to be done.
The next extension to this work is to find the way of modeling TRQs in an
aggregate way (at GTAP sectors and regions levels) while minimizing data ag-
gregation biases. Working with TRQ modeling at an aggregate level is necessary
when models become too large (many sectors and many regions). Several ways
of doing it have already been proposed in the literature for some specific sectors,
which have relied on a single quota for each sector containing quotas.
Another possible extension to this work is the distinction of multilateral and
preferential TRQs. Licenses allocation is different in multilateral TRQs, and the
possibility of a reallocation between partners should be explicitly modeled. An-
other interesting question would be to model each TRQ by taking into account its
TRQ administration method, and eventually by considering importer or exporter
market powers and their consequences.
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De Gorter and Kliauga (2006) have introduced intermediate TRQ regimes in
the case of multilateral TRQs. For instance, when one of the importers fills its
quota-part of the multilateral quota, but the rest of partners do not without any
possibility to resale licenses, the prime over the in-quota tariff could be positive
even if the quota is unfilled. The empirical evidence also highlights the possibil-
ity that TRQs remain unfilled when they are restricted to some particular HS6
products.
Some of previous TRQ specifications merit to be addressed in detail in order
to improve the modeling of agricultural markets’ behavior.
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Figure 2.3: TRQ-imports’ shares for agricultural sectors in the EU25
Source: MAcMapHS6-v2 database, CEPII
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Table 2.1: TRQ-regime shifting
IF AND THEN
in-quota regime TRQ > Q¯ at-quota regime
at-quota regime τTRQ > τ out out-of-quota regime
out-of-quota regime τTRQ < τ out at-quota regime
at-quota regime TRQ < Q¯ in-quota regime
Table 2.2: Sectoral and geographical data aggregation
Regions Sectors
EU25 Animalprod Plantsbf
Argentina Bevandtob Procrice
Brazil Cattle Rawmilk
Uruguay Cereal Sugar
Venezuela Crops Sugarcb
Dped Dairyprod VegFruit
Dping Fishing Vegoils
Foodprod Wheat
Forestry Woolsilk
Meat Primary
Meatprod Manuf
Oilseeds Services
Paddyrice
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Table 2.3: TRQ enlargement scenario for the EU-Mercosur agreement
Products EU proposal (TN) Mercosur proposal (TN) Average Scenario (TN)
Bovine meat 160000 315000 237500
Poultry meat 27500 250000 138750
Swine meat 15000 40000 27500
Wheat 200000 1000000 600000
Corn 200000 4000000 2100000
Cheese 20000 60000 40000
Milk 13000 34000 23500
Butter 4000 10000 7000
Table 2.4: World Results (% variation)
Variable V1 V2 V3 V3nq
Exports (val) 0.06 0.05 0.20 0.06
Exports (vol) 0.05 0.05 0.20 0.06
Imports (val) 0.06 0.06 0.20 0.06
Imports (vol) 0.05 0.06 0.21 0.06
World GDP (volume) 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00
World Welfare 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00
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Table 2.5: Welfare Results by Region (% variation)
Region V1 V2 V3 V3nq
Argentina 0.05 0.19 0.08 0.05
Brazil -0.00 0.39 0.08 0.00
Dped -0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.00
Dping -0.01 -0.00 0.04 -0.01
EU25 0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.01
Uruguay -0.01 0.84 0.12 -0.01
Venezuela -0.10 -0.07 -0.08 -0.10
Table 2.6: Welfare decomposition for large Mercosur countries (% variation)
Argentina Brazil
Variable V1 V2 V3 V3nq V1 V2 V3 V3nq
Allocation efficiency gains -0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.00 -0.02 0.04 0.02
Capital accumulation gains 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.11 0.04 0.01
Land supply gains 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00
Other gains 0.02 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.00 0.05 -0.10 -0.02
Tariff-quota gains 0.00 0.08 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.24 -0.03 0.00
Terms of trade gains 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.10 -0.01
Welfare 0.05 0.19 0.08 0.05 -0.00 0.39 0.08 0.00
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Table 2.7: Welfare decomposition for small Mercosur countries (% variation)
Uruguay Venezuela
Variable V1 V2 V3 V3nq V1 V2 V3 V3nq
Allocation efficiency gains 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Capital accumulation gains 0.01 0.26 0.07 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03
Land supply gains 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
Other gains -0.01 0.05 -0.08 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
Tariff-quota gains 0.00 0.44 -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
Terms of trade gains -0.02 0.04 0.09 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04
Welfare -0.01 0.84 0.12 -0.01 -0.10 -0.07 -0.08 -0.10
Table 2.8: Welfare decomposition for the EU (% variation)
Variable V1 V2 V3 V3nq
Allocation efficiency gains 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00
Capital accumulation gains 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 0.00
Land supply gains -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
Other gains 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01
Tariff-quota gains 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00
Terms of trade gains 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01
Welfare 0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.01
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Table 2.9: GDP results in % variation
Region V1 V2 V3 V3nq
Argentina 0.04 0.16 0.05 0.04
Brazil 0.03 0.40 0.03 0.03
Dped -0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.00
Dping -0.00 -0.00 0.03 -0.00
EU25 0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.01
Uruguay 0.02 0.88 0.10 0.02
Venezuela -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04
Table 2.10: Agricultural Employment (% variation)
Region V1 V2 V3 V3nq
Argentina 0.78 0.68 0.96 0.79
Brazil 0.46 0.25 2.86 0.58
Dped -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01
Dping -0.01 -0.00 0.10 -0.01
EU25 -0.12 -0.11 -0.89 -0.13
Uruguay 0.33 0.25 1.27 0.33
Venezuela -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
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Table 2.11: Non-Agricultural Employment (% variation)
Region V1 V2 V3 V3nq
Argentina -0.13 -0.11 -0.16 -0.13
Brazil -0.04 -0.02 -0.26 -0.05
Dped 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Dping 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.00
EU25 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.01
Uruguay -0.15 -0.11 -0.56 -0.15
Venezuela 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 2.12: Unkilled Real Wages in Agriculture (% variation)
Region V1 V2 V3 V3nq
Argentina 0.47 0.49 0.64 0.49
Brazil 0.19 0.27 1.44 0.25
Dped -0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.01
Dping -0.01 -0.01 0.11 -0.01
EU25 -0.04 -0.05 -0.45 -0.05
Uruguay 0.19 0.58 1.09 0.19
Venezuela -0.21 -0.18 -0.18 -0.21
FIGURES AND TABLES 129
Table 2.13: Unkilled Real Wages in Non-Agriculture (% variation)
Region V1 V2 V3 V3nq
Argentina 0.02 0.10 0.08 0.02
Brazil -0.06 0.13 -0.11 -0.06
Dped -0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.00
Dping -0.01 -0.00 0.04 -0.01
EU25 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02
Uruguay -0.05 0.40 0.17 -0.05
Venezuela -0.20 -0.18 -0.17 -0.20
Table 2.14: Imports Values (% variation)
Region V1 V2 V3 V3nq
Argentina 3.12 3.55 3.48 3.16
Brazil 2.14 3.11 4.44 2.25
Dped -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04
Dping -0.03 -0.04 0.17 -0.04
EU25 0.24 0.17 0.75 0.25
Uruguay 0.69 1.87 1.88 0.69
Venezuela 1.64 1.70 1.67 1.64
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Table 2.15: Exports Values (% variation)
Region V1 V2 V3 V3nq
Argentina 2.70 2.41 3.13 2.74
Brazil 2.32 1.42 5.02 2.44
Dped -0.05 -0.06 -0.08 -0.05
Dping -0.03 -0.03 0.15 -0.04
EU25 0.24 0.32 0.73 0.25
Uruguay 0.99 -0.05 2.99 0.99
Venezuela 1.39 1.35 1.41 1.39
Table 2.16: EU25 Exports in volume (% variation)
Importer V1 V2 V3 V3nq
Argentina 7.45 8.05 8.56 7.53
Brazil 12.14 13.25 14.81 12.26
Dped -0.12 -0.07 0.21 -0.12
Dping -0.10 -0.05 0.43 -0.10
EU25 -0.02 -0.03 -0.10 -0.02
Uruguay 9.90 11.36 11.84 9.94
Venezuela 26.94 27.12 27.54 26.94
FIGURES AND TABLES 131
Table 2.17: Argentina Exports in volume (% variation)
Importer V1 V2 V3 V3nq
Argentina -1.30 -1.25 -0.84 -1.01
Brazil 6.09 6.52 8.18 6.23
Dped -0.95 -1.51 -1.74 -1.03
Dping -0.93 -1.33 -1.31 -1.00
EU25 15.11 14.61 17.62 15.62
Uruguay -1.80 -0.85 -0.50 -1.85
Venezuela -3.35 -3.84 -4.03 -3.44
Table 2.18: Brazil Exports in volume (% variation)
Importer V1 V2 V3 V3nq
Argentina 11.52 11.06 8.86 11.44
Brazil -0.54 -0.60 0.12 -0.81
Dped 0.34 -0.81 -3.35 0.16
Dping 0.20 -0.61 -3.08 0.04
EU25 6.45 5.49 27.71 7.06
Uruguay -0.74 -0.27 -2.14 -0.88
Venezuela -1.95 -3.05 -5.49 -2.13
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Table 2.19: Uruguay Exports in volume (% variation)
Importer V1 V2 V3 V3nq
Argentina -0.49 -1.27 -1.96 -0.38
Brazil -1.70 -1.91 0.12 -1.47
Dped 0.26 -0.92 -1.97 0.25
Dping 0.19 -1.06 -2.10 0.16
EU25 5.57 4.38 20.64 5.43
Uruguay -0.39 -0.44 -0.77 -0.46
Venezuela -2.02 -3.36 -4.94 -2.05
Table 2.20: Venezuela Exports in volume (% variation)
Importer V1 V2 V3 V3nq
Argentina 0.72 1.40 1.97 0.83
Brazil 0.05 1.02 2.50 0.17
Dped 1.36 1.28 1.27 1.36
Dping 1.32 1.26 1.36 1.32
EU25 2.38 2.28 2.15 2.32
Uruguay -1.32 -0.75 -1.26 -1.29
Venezuela -0.63 -0.59 -0.62 -0.74
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Table 2.21: EU25 Imports by sector (% variation)
Sector V1 V2 V3 V3nq
1 Agro-food 1.67 1.52 13.88 1.79
2 Oth 0.16 0.08 -0.19 0.15
Meat 0.14 -0.19 217.35 0.48
Meatprod 1.27 1.00 2.19 2.42
Paddyrice 0.01 -0.00 1.67 -0.02
Primary 0.18 0.18 0.23 0.18
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Table 2.22: Argentina Exports by sector (% variation)
Sector V1 V2 V3 V3nq
1 Agro-food 2.93 2.59 3.52 3.00
2 Oth 1.75 1.23 1.37 1.69
Meat -1.70 -2.31 37.79 -0.08
Paddyrice -1.84 -1.11 2.56 -1.34
Table 2.23: Brazil Exports by sector (% variation)
Sector V1 V2 V3 V3nq
1 Agro-food 2.06 1.30 10.78 2.49
2 Oth 2.66 1.26 -1.24 2.47
Meat 0.32 -0.69 121.53 0.49
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Table 2.24: Uruguay Exports by sector (% variation)
Sector V1 V2 V3 V3nq
1 Agro-food 2.14 0.82 7.99 2.13
2 Oth 0.23 -1.15 -1.91 0.22
Cattle 0.44 -0.26 7.91 0.51
Cereal 0.48 -0.27 1.39 0.61
Dairyprod 0.11 -1.82 8.59 0.12
Meat 0.41 -1.37 19.79 0.53
Paddyrice 0.70 -0.40 1.39 1.27
Table 2.25: Venezuela Exports by sector (% variation)
Sector V1 V2 V3 V3nq
1 Agro-food 2.42 2.39 2.54 2.33
2 Oth 1.61 1.55 1.60 1.62
Bevandtob 1.94 1.89 1.94 1.94
Cereal 3.34 3.29 3.48 3.32
Foodprod 2.81 2.83 3.01 2.76
Meatprod 5.50 5.55 8.51 6.80
Primary 1.25 1.19 1.12 1.25
Sugar 1.66 1.70 2.43 1.68
VegFruit 1.70 1.60 2.74 1.10
Chapter 3
Shipping The Good Beef Out:
EU Trade Liberalization to
Mercosur Exports
1
1This paper benefited from the cooperation of Luca Salvatici from Molise University, Italie
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3.1 INTRODUCTION
Most applied models used in trade analysis can only distinguish a small number
of aggregated products. This is typically the case with computable general equi-
librium models that have increasingly been used for policy-oriented analysis in
recent trade negotiations. Products aggregates must be consistent with the level
of aggregation required by social accounting matrices and consumption statistics.
Data availability, computer limitations and numerical optimization constraints
restrict the number of product categories.2 As a result, quantitative assessments
of the impact of a trade agreement can seldom take into account the trade compo-
sition effects within a particular product category. Such effects can nevertheless
raise important issues, especially in the agricultural sector (Lavoie, 2005). This
is the case of the beef sector.
Large scale multicountry models are commonly used to assess the effects
of proposals for a agricultural agreement under the World Trade Organization
(WTO). Most simulations lead to the conclusion that a large decrease in EU tar-
iffs on beef would be required in order to result in significant imports, because of
the existing binding overhang (i.e., the fact that bound tariffs exceed the actual
gap between world and domestic prices). Market analysts are skeptical. They
argue that imports of high unit-value products have been increasing rapidly since
2000 in spite of very high tariffs. They believe that even a small tariff cut would
generate significant trade flows in this market segment, and that users of large
2Typical Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models, such as the Global Trade Analysis
Project (GTAP) model, the World Bank’s LINKAGE model or the MIRAGE model developed
by the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales, distinguish at best 30
agricultural and food products. The EU tariff schedules include some 2,200 products for these
categories at the eight-digit level (the level at which the EU bound its tariffs under the WTO),
and some 3,500 products at the ten-digit level (the level at which tariffs are actually set by EU
customs). In spite of recent efforts to model the traded sector in a much more disaggregated
way (Grant et al., 2006; Laborde and Gohin, 2006) and to investigate the bias caused by lack of
product differentiation (Hertel et al., 2004; Martin et al., 2003; Hallak, 2006), most large scale
models currently used for trade negotiation purposes still rely on rather aggregated product
categories, in particular when their structure involves dynamics and endogenous firm entry.
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scale models underestimate the future growth in imports by considering beef as
a commodity (EC, 2006).
This debate has important consequences in the Doha trade negotiations. Agri-
cultural liberalization has been a major obstacle to a WTO agreement. Beef is
one of the main sectors blocking the negotiations as far as market access is con-
cerned. European policymakers are not willing to commit to large tariff cuts
without reliable evidence of the degree in which imports will increase. Because
more than two thirds of EU beef consumption is supplied by the dairy herd and
is therefore quite price inelastic, the adjustment in domestic production would be
borne mainly by the suckling cow sector, of great social and political importance
throughout the EU given the large number of farmers involved. A more detailed
investigation of the effects of the present tariff structure, in particular on import
composition, is needed to determine the consequences of a multilateral tariff cut
in this sector.
The beef sector is also a major bone of contention in the EU-Mercosur negoti-
ations that have been going on since 1995. No agreement has yet been reached on
the issue of agricultural market access. The EU has offered to expand the present
Tariff-Rate Quotas (TRQs) for beef products.3 Mercosur countries have insisted
on a decrease in tariffs. The consequences of the two options differ significantly.
A cut in tariffs or an expansion of the TRQs are likely to result in imports of
very different types of products, with different consequences for the stakeholders
both in the EU and Mercosur countries. For example, Argentina is relatively
more specialized in exporting high-quality products than Brazil. In the EU, some
regions specialize in the production of young bulls in feedlots that are consid-
ered as lower quality than more extensive production of more mature animals.
A change in relative price would also affect French and Italian consumers, who
consume a larger proportion of grilled boneless cuts from the rear end of animals,
in a way that would not be the same as British and German consumers, whose
3TRQs differ from regular quotas as the exporter has to pay the Most Favored Nation (MFN)
tariff beyond a certain volume of exports. This introduces a three tier regime (in-quota, at-quota
and out-of quota exports), depending on whether the quota is binding or not.
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consumption is more oriented towards meat from the front end of the animal, not
de-boned, because of cooking habits. The various options for liberalizing trade
might also result in changes in the availability of a particular quality of variey
for EU consumers, and it is well known that in such cases the welfare changes
are complex.4 In the case of both multilateral and EU-Mercosur negotiations,
aggregate models that treat beef as a commodity and ignore the changes in im-
port composition are unlikely to provide a good assessment of the consequences
for the various types of producers.
Several features of the EU tariff structure suggest that the import composition
effects of trade liberalization options are complex. First, there is a large dispersion
of tariffs within the beef product category in the EU.5 The ad valorem equivalents
of the bound tariffs in the beef sector range between zero and 140 percent across
the different tariff lines. Even a uniform cut in tariffs would lead to significant
change in the relative (tariff inclusive) import price of, say, boneless cuts, carcasses
and offals. Second, the largest component of EU protection in the beef sector is
a specific tariff, i.e. a tariff per ton. There is also an ad valorem component that
provides a much lower level of additional protection. Specific tariffs impose a
proportionally higher protection on low unit value products. They give exporters
an incentive to ship higher quality products. Specific tariffs therefore have a
quality upgrading. A cut in such tariffs could significantly modify the relative
price of the various types of meat. Third, the EU tariff structure includes a
variety of TRQs. They were opened either to fulfill the minimum market access
commitments of the 1994 Agricultural Agreement of the Uruguay Round, or to
4Consider a prohibitive tariff on a particular variety or quality. In a horizontal differentiation
framework, welfare changes would result from the change in the number of variety available. In
a vertical differentiation framework, welfare changes would differ according to the segments of
consumers with a different willingness to pay for quality. Note that we consider that ‘quality’
refers to a vertical differentiation framework and ‘variety’ to a horizontal one.
5The EU tariff structure for beef includes 34 products at the eight-digit level. The EU
customs actually apply tariffs at an even more detailed level, i.e. ten-digit level and up to
twelve-digit level if one considers all the additional codes in the Integrated Tariff of the European
Communities.
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maintain existing arrangements that resulted in preferential trade flows. TRQs,
like standard quotas, also have an import composition effect. An exporter facing a
quantity constraint ships higher unit value products. In the case of certain TRQs
granted to Argentina, Brazil and the United States, this import composition
effect is strengthened by the fact that only high-quality beef is eligible. Fourth,
regulatory issues, such as complying to minimum quality standards, segregating
hormone-treated and hormone-free animals and providing sanitary certificates
also involve fixed costs, which also affect shift imports toward higher quality
products.6
In the following sections we analyze the different components of EU trade
policy that affect beef imports. We focus on imports from Mercosur countries,
that are the main potential source of competition for EU producers, given the
prospect of a regional agreement and of a reduction in tariffs under the WTO.
Indeed, Mercosur countries are likely to be the main exporters to the EU in the
case of multilateral trade liberalization, given the low production costs in these
countries, the difficulty for US industry to segregate hormone free-beef, and the
difficulty for African countries to meet EU sanitary and certification standards.
Using a partial equilibrium model with different product qualities, we investigate
how a set of trade policy instruments affect the composition of imports. These
instruments include the ad valorem and specific tariffs applied to in-quota and
to out-of-quota imports, and the quota level itself. We then draw policy lessons
from numerical simulations under a simplified framework.
3.2 Trade Barriers and Import Composition
The theoretical literature has shown that trade policy may have important con-
sequences on the composition of trade (both quality and variety).
It is well known that, under some particular assumptions (perfect competi-
6The EU bans imports of beef produced with hormonal growth activators. It also requires
some traceability inspection and certification procedures, all of which involve significant fixed
costs. These issues are not formally addressed in this paper.
3.2. TRADE BARRIERS AND IMPORT COMPOSITION 141
tion, perfect information, homogeneous products and auction as license allocation
mechanism), most classical trade policy instruments, such as ad valorem and im-
port quotas, could become equivalent in terms of volume of trade and welfare.
However, under more realistic hypotheses, such as product differentiation, the
application of these simple policy instruments does not lead to the same conse-
quences for trade, trade composition and welfare, because quotas are less efficient
than ad valorem tariffs (Anderson, 1988).
The study of trade policy effects on import quality composition dates back
to the 19th century, to the famous case of shipping the good apples out, whose
analytical version later became known as the Alchian-Allen effect. This effect
dictates that fixed per unit transport costs result in a bias towards the exports
of more expensive goods (Alchian and Allen, 1983). Because such transport
costs result in a higher relative price of the least expensive quality, they shift the
composition of imports so as to raise the relative consumption of the higher priced
product. The Alchian-Allen effect is intimately tied to microeconomic consumer
theory and the quality-upgrade effect of exports is only warranted under certain
conditions of substitutability when there are more than two goods.7 A condition
for the Alchian-Allen effect to hold is that high and low qualities from the same
product are closer substitutes than those of other (different) products; that is it
requires that low and high quality are not close complements. These conditions
are usually met in practice and the Alchian-Allen proposition is supported by the
empirical literature (Borcherding and Silberberg, 1978; Umbeck, 1980; Bauman,
2004). 8
7The Alchian-Allen effect results from the properties of the Hessian matrix of the expenditure
function; see Silberberg (1978:335). The Alchian-Allen effect is intuitive in a two-goods case
where higher and lower quality goods are substitutes. With more than two goods, there are
theoretical cases in which this effect is inverted (if the premium good is a close substitute for
the third composite good, for example, and when the inferior good is a complement to the third
good. However, these are rare phenomena.)
8There are potentially two distinct types of quality upgrading: changes in characteristics of
given varieties, and a shift in demand towards higher-quality varieties. This study focus on the
latter, and it is worth emphasizing that the quality change is purely a consequence of changes in
consumption patterns, not changes in the quality of any individual goods within the category.
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In addition to the well-known transport cost effect, trade policy instruments
also cause a Alchian-Allen type affect on the composition of imports. In a small
country, when world prices are fixed, if the only policy is an ad valorem tariff
and if there is a radial move towards freer trade, there will be no change in the
composition of imports. Ad valorem tariffs do not alter relative prices under
normal conditions (Boorstein and Feenstra, 1991; Falvey, 1979). However, in
the presence of a specific tariff (Borcherding and Silberberg, 1978; Hummels and
Skiba, 2004), a quantitative restriction (Anderson, 1985, 1991; Aw and Roberts,
1986; Feenstra, 1987), or a quality control (Rodriguez, 1979), trade liberalization
will lead to changes in import composition. In practice, the widespread use of
specific tariffs and quantitative ceilings in the EU agricultural and food sectors
is such that any trade liberalization scenario, either regional or multilateral, is
likely to significantly affect the composition of trade.
Note that, in practice, the link between trade liberalization and import com-
position is not limited to the simple quality upgrade effect described by Alchian
and Allen. For example, in the presence of more than one distortion, the introduc-
tion of an ad valorem tariff may reduce relative import demand for high-quality
imports (Hummels and Skiba, 2004). In addition, in the real life situation of
the EU, the widespread use of TRQs in agriculture introduces extra complexity.
TRQs differ from regular quotas as the exporter has to pay the Most Favored
Nation (MFN) tariff beyond a certain volume of exports. This kind of protec-
tion introduces three regimes (in-quota, at-quota and out-of-quota), depending
on whether the quota is binding or not.
3.3 The Model
In order to investigate the import composition effects caused by the EU tariff
structure, with TRQs and composite tariffs, we assume a representative consumer
who maximizes his/her utility. It is well known that if the utility function is
However, both aforementioned quality-upgrade effects are complementary, so our measure of
quality upgrading will be a lower bound.
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homogeneously separable, commodities may be consistently aggregated in the
sense that one may form composite commodities which may be treated as the same
manner as the primary commodities. When focusing on the beef sector, we work
with three types of goods: a domestic good (d) and two qualities of the imported
goods (mh, ml) where the subscript h denotes higher quality, and l lower-quality
imports throughout the paper. The domestic product is the numeraire. For
clarity of exposition, in this section, we assume that consumer’s preferences are
represented with a Cobb-Douglas utility function U .9 Under this assumption,
and after a monotonic transformation, U can be written as a function built-up
from subutility functions, ud and um.
U(d,m) = αdlog(ud(d)) + αmlog(um(mh,ml)). (3.1)
Under these assumptions, the marginal sub-utility u
′
m(mh,ml) is not affected
by changes in consumption of d, the domestic goods. We assume that the con-
sumer solves the utility maximization problem in two stages, first choosing be-
tween domestic and imported products, maximizing the overall utility function,
and then choosing between the two imported qualities. Since we are interested in
trade policy effects, we only focus on the second stage, considering that import
expenditure is equal to R = I − d, where I denotes the total consumer income
and d is the domestic goods expenditure. We assume that um(mh,ml) can be
represented by a CES function in equation (3.2). In the following sections we
focus on the composition of imports and on the maximization of um:
um(ml,mh) = (λh(mh)
ρ + λl(ml)
ρ)1/ρ, (3.2)
where mh denotes the demand for high-quality imports and ml the demand for
low-quality imports. All parameters are positive and ρ ≤ 1. The share parameters
of the CES function represent the consumer’s relative preferences for the two
qualities of imported products and as such that λh > λl.
10 We first consider this
9This assumption is highly restrictive and constrains the consumer’s budget shares between
imports and domestic production, but it makes it easier to explain the different effects at stake.
This assumption will be relaxed in the simulations and a CES-LES function will be used for U .
10Here, we consider that the λi parameters represent the quality preferences as in Hummels
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maximization problem under a free trade situation. We then introduce a TRQ
on high-quality imports and a composite tariff on low-quality imports so as to
match the actual EU policy.
3.3.1 Free Trade
In the absence of trade policies, and assuming exogenous world prices (phw, plw),
the consumer’s problem is:
Max um(ml,mh)
s.t. R = plwml + phwmh and mh,ml ≥ 0.
(3.3)
The Marginal Rate of Substitution (MRS) between qualities and the Marshallian
demand functions, mh and ml, are derived from the first-order conditions:
MRS =
(mh
ml
)(1/σ) λl
λh
=
plw
phw
, (3.4)
mh =
( λh
phw
)σ R
(λσl p
1−σ
lw + λ
σ
hp
1−σ
hw )
, (3.5)
ml =
( λl
plw
)σ R
(λσl p
1−σ
lw + λ
σ
hp
1−σ
hw )
. (3.6)
From (3.5) and (3.6) we obtain the demand for the high-quality imports relative
to the low-quality ones (3.7). This expression is used to analyze variations in the
composition of imports due to relative price changes.
mh
ml
=
(λhplw
λlphw
)σ
. (3.7)
and Skiba (2004). Note that it is possible to introduce an income effect through these pa-
rameters, as in Hallak (2006), who specifies a variable θ
νk
i
i as our λi, where ν
k
i is the income
parameter that varies across countries k (richer or poorer countries) and remains constant across
all qualities i. In our paper, since we work with only one importing country, there is no need
to detail the effect of the income parameters.
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3.3.2 The EU Trade Policy, TRQ’s and Composite Tariffs
We now introduce a stylized representation of the EU trade policy, which includes
two main instruments that affect imports. The first instrument is a TRQ for high-
quality imports. This TRQ includes a quantitative ceiling on imports (q¯h) under
which the (in-quota) ad valorem tariff th is lower than the out-of-quota tariff. The
EU out-of-quota tariff includes both an ad valorem component t and a specific
component T . The low-quality product is not affected by quantity restrictions but
faces the same out-of-quota tariff as the high-quality product. How complicated
this policy may look, it corresponds to the present regime that countries like
Brazil or Argentina face when they export into the EU. The TRQ leads to a
nonlinear import possibility curve, given the budget constraint, with an inflexion
point at q¯h.
Tariffs do not change the maximization problem (3.3) but the existence of a
TRQ for high-quality imports introduces extra restrictions. The first restriction
(mhin ≤ q¯h) refers to in-quota imports mhin. It makes it possible to define a
marginal tariff tm, depending on whether the quota is filled or not. The second
restriction (tm ≤
T
phw
+ t − th) refers tm and leads to determine whether high-
quality imports exceed the quota or not(mhout). The new problem (3.8) can be
solved as a mixed-complementarity problem or MCP (Rutherford, 1995).
Max um(ml,mh)
s.t.
R = plml + phmh
mh = mhin +mhout
mhin ≤ q¯h
tm ≤
T
phw
+ t− th
mh,mhin,mhout,ml, tm ≥ 0,
(3.8)
where mhout denotes the out-of-quota imports of high quality. We find the same
expressions for the demands as in (3.5) and (3.6), except that domestic prices
are no longer equal to world prices. The in-quota and out-of-quota prices for
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high-quality imports are determined by both the (exogenous) world prices and
by the tariffs, but the at-quota price varies with the marginal tariff, tm that is
bounded by 0 ≤ tm ≤ (t+
T
phw
− th), where the right hand side expression is the
value of the quota rent in the out-of-quota equilibrium situation. The value of
tm determines the domestic price for high-quality goods when the quota is just
binding, i.e., ph = phw(1 + th + tm) where phw is the CIF high-quality price and
tm varies according to the TRQ regime:
In-quota regime tm = 0 if mh < q¯h,
At-quota regime 0 < tm <
(
t+ T
phw
− th
)
if mh = q¯h,
Out-of-quota regime tm = t+
T
phw
− th if mh > q¯h.
We now turn to the import composition effect of the specific and ad valorem
components of the EU tariff. The introduction of a composite tariff affects low-
quality imports and changes the domestic low-quality price so that pl = plw(1 +
t) + T where plw is CIF price for low quality, i.e. including transportation cost
to the EU border. We assume that the CIF high-quality price exceeds the CIF
low-quality price. The TRQ introduces changes in relative prices and relative
import volumes according to the three different possible outcomes, i.e. in-quota,
at-quota or out-of-quota regimes for high-quality beef. In order to facilitate the
use of MCP techniques, we add the complementarity conditions (3.9) and (3.10)
to the problem (3.8):
mhin ≤ q¯h and tm ≥ 0; (mhin − q¯h)tm = 0, (3.9)
tm ≤ (t+
T
phw
− th) and mhout ≥ 0;
(
t+ T
phw
− th − tm
)
mhout = 0. (3.10)
We obtain an in-quota solution if the TRQs’ constraints (mhin ≤ q¯h and
tm ≤ (t+
T
phw
− th)) are non-binding. In this case the marginal tariff tm is equal
to zero and mh ≥ 0, mh = mhin ≤ q¯h and mhout = 0. With an at-quota solution,
tm is positive but smaller than the difference between the out-of-quota tariff and
the in-quota tariff (t + T
phw
− th). Under this condition mh > 0, mh = mhin = q¯h
and mhout = 0. Finally, an out-of-quota solution exits when the TRQ conditions
are binding and imports exceed q¯h. Under this regime, tm is positive and equal to
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the difference between the out-of-quota tariff and the in-quota tariff (t+ T
phw
−th).
Moreover, mhout is also positive with mh = mhin +mhout.
To sum up, the introduction of a high-quality TRQ leads to three possible
equilibria. If neither TRQ constraints are binding, high-quality imports face the
in-quota tariff (th), so tm = 0 and mhout = 0. If tm > 0 and mhout = 0, the first
constraint is binding and imports are set at the quota level. In this situation the
domestic price is endogenous and there is a positive quota rent (QR = q¯htm > 0).
Finally, tm > 0 and mhout > 0 lead to out-of-quota imports and the overall
imports face a higher (composite) tariff. In this case the quota rent is maximum.
[INSERT Figure 2.2]
Overall, the complex nature of the EU tariff structure results in similarly com-
plex demands for high and low-quality imports, given by (3.11) and (3.12). The
quality composition indicator is given by the ratio between these two equations
which result from the (3.8), (3.9) and (3.10).
mh =
(
λh
phw(1+th+tm)
)σ
R
λσl (plw(1 + t) + T )
1−σ + λσh(phw(1 + th + tm))
1−σ , (3.11)
ml =
(
λl
plw(1+t)+T
)σ
R
λσl (plw(1 + t) + T )
1−σ + λσh(phw(1 + th + tm))
1−σ . (3.12)
3.3.3 Trade Quality effect
Comparative statics shed light on the consequences of changes in the policy vari-
ables on the composition of imports. The following section presents the impact of
a change in the high-quality quota level and of changes in all tariffs components
for both qualities: in-quota ad valorem tariff, out-of-quota ad valorem tariff and
out-of-quota specific component.
• If the specific tariff varies:
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Three distinct cases can occur depending on the fill-rate of the TRQ. First,
when high-quality imports are below the quota level, a decrease in the spe-
cific tariff T affects only the price of low-quality imports. The consequence
is an increase in the relative share of the low-quality imports.
∂mh/ml
∂T
=
σλh
(
(plw(1+t)+T )λh
phw(1+th)λl
)σ−1
phw(1 + th)λl
> 0 if mh < q¯h. (3.13)
When high-quality imports exceed the quota, a reduction in the specific
tariff T also results in a quality downgrade due to the typical Alchian-Allen
effect as shown in (3.14):
∂mh/ml
∂T
= σ
( λh
(phw(1 + t) + T )λl
−
(plw(1 + t) + T )λh
(phw(1 + t) + T )2λl
)
((plw(1 + t) + T )λh
(phw(1 + t) + T )λl
)σ−1
> 0 if mh > q¯h. (3.14)
Finally, when high-quality imports are exactly at the quota level there are
two possible effects, because T affects pl but also affects the upper bound
of tm. The latter introduces a possible shift from an at-quota to an out-
of-quota regime. If the variation of T leaves the TRQ regime unaffected
(we remain in the at-quota regime), we have a quality downgrading due to
the increase in ml. But if the decrease in T switches the TRQ regime from
at-quota to out-of-quota regime, not only does ml increase but so does mh.
Even in that case a cut in the specific tariff results in quality downgrading,
because a reduction in T has a greater impact on ml than on mh, according
to the Alchian-Allen effect. The magnitude of this positive effect will vary
between the two cases depicted in (3.13) and (3.14).
The partial derivatives of the relative functions for both the in-quota and
the out-of-quota demands are positive. In brief, when the specific tariff
decreases, consumers demand relatively less of the expensive high-quality
product, in line with the traditional Alchian-Allen conjecture.
• If the out-of-quota ad valorem tariff varies:
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The case is more complex when the ad valorem component of the EU tar-
iff t varies, since t is imposed on imports of both qualities. The partial
derivatives relative to t show opposite signs depending on the fill rate of the
TRQ.
If high-quality imports are below the quota, a reduction in t affects only
low-quality beef, and results in larger ml imports (quality downgrading).
∂mh/ml
∂t
=
plwσλh
(
(plw(1+t)+T )λh
(1+th)phwλl
)σ−1
(1 + th)phwλl
> 0 if mh < q¯h. (3.15)
When high-quality imports exceed the quota, the left hand side of (3.15) is
negative since phw is greater than plw. The reduction of an ad valorem com-
ponent increases the relative quality of beef imports under our assumptions.
This result seems to be at odds with Falvey (1979) and with Boorstein and
Feenstra (1991). Both find that in a first-best setting, an ad valorem tariff
has no effect on the quality composition of trade. In our case, however, the
specific tariff plays a role similar to that of the per-unit cost in Hummels
and Skiba (2004). The ad valorem tariff dampens the effect of the specific
tariff on the relative demand for the high-quality product.
∂mh/ml
∂t
= σ
( plwλh
(phw(1 + t) + T )λl
−
phw(plw(1 + t) + T )λh
(phw(1 + t) + T )2λl
)
((plw(1 + t) + T )λh
(phw(1 + t) + T )λl
)σ−1
< 0 if mh > q¯h. (3.16)
If the high-quality quota is just binding, a change in t affects not only pl
but also the upper bound of tm. There is a possible shift from one regime to
another. If t decreases and the regime remains unchanged, pl also decreases
and there is a quality-downgrading. However, in the case of a shift to
the out-of-quota regime, the average quality of imports increases (quality
upgrading). For the at-quota regime the effect of the ad valorem component
of the out-of-quota tariff is ambiguous.
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In brief, the consequences of a change in the ad valorem tariff on the com-
position of imports are ambiguous. When high-quality imports are below
the quota a reduction in t has a quality downgrading. The opposite result
holds true when imports exceed the quota. The effect on quality cannot be
determined in a general case, under the at-quota regime.
• If the ad valorem in-quota tariff varies:
The ad valorem in-quota tariff th appears in the relative demand function
only when high-quality imports are below the quota level. When the quota
is not binding, a reduction of th has a quality upgrading.
∂mh/ml
∂th
= −
(plw(1 + t) + T )σλh
(
(plw(1+t)+T )λh
(1+th)phwλl
)σ−1
(1 + th)2pphwλl
< 0 if mh < q¯h.
(3.17)
When the quota is binding (both when imports are at-quota and exceed the
quota), the only effect is an increase in the quota rent. As a result, ph and
mh remain unchanged and a change in the ad valorem in-quota tariff has
no impact on the quality composition of imports.
• If the high-quality quota level varies:
When the equilibrium is in-quota, an increase in the high-quality quota level
has no effect on the relative quality of imports. When the high-quality quota
is binding, if the quota level increases, the high-quality imports increase as
well. The expansion of q¯h reduces tm and then ph since
∂tm
∂q¯h
< 0. Provided
that ml and mh are gross Marshallian substitutes (σ > 1), a reduction
of ph implies a reduction of ml. So, when q¯h increases, there is a quality
upgrading:
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∂mh/ml
∂q¯h
=
(plw(1 + t) + T )
σ
λσl R(
(λσh(phw(1 + th + tm))
1−σ + λσl (plw(1 + t) + T )
1−σ)2 +
(1− σ)λσh
q¯hphw
(phw(1 + th + tm))σ
∂tm
∂q¯h
)
> 0 if mh = q¯h. (3.18)
When high-quality imports exceed the quota there are two possible results.
If the increase in the quota level is such that the quota is still lower than
the high-quality equilibrium value, the result is merely a change in the
allocation of high-quality imports in and out of quota, but the import mix
is not affected. If the new quota level is larger than the initial high-quality
equilibrium, the new equilibrium will be either at-quota or in-quota. In
both cases mh increases while ph and ml decrease, resulting in a quality
upgrading through the same mechanisms as for the previous result (see
(3.18)).
In brief, starting from an out-of-quota equilibrium, a quota increase can
result in two possible outcomes: no quality effect if the equilibrium remains
out of quota; or a quality upgrading if the new equilibrium shifts to either
at-quota or in-quota equilibrium.
[INSERT TABLE 3.4.3]
3.3.4 Welfare variations
Under standard assumptions, any trade restriction imposes efficiency costs, at lest
in a first best setting. In the case of specific tariffs and TRQs, however, there is
an extra welfare effect caused by the composition of imports. The previous results
confirm that binding quotas and/or specific tariffs lead to quality upgrading, i.e.
a shift in the mix of traded products towards more expensive goods. Feenstra
(1995, pg. 1578) shows that such quality upgrading results in an extra welfare
cost. This extra cost tops the standard distortion that would result from ad
valorem tariffs, for example. To isolate the welfare effect of the quality change,
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let us consider an ad valorem tariff that has the same effect on the aggregate
import expenditure as the actual EU policy described before. The uniform ad
valorem tariff (τ) satisfies the following condition:
E(t, th, T, q¯h, pw, um) = E(τ, pw, um), (3.19)
where E(t, th, T, q¯h, pw, um) is the total expenditure in the beef sector with a TRQ.
Note that pw denotes the vector of world prices and m the quantity of imports
as before. Variables um and τ are the free trade expenditure/utility level and the
uniform ad valorem tariff respectively, calculated for each scenario.
If the actual policy mix of quotas and tariffs did not lead to a shift in demand
towards higher-quality varieties, it would have the same deadweight loss as the
uniform tariff. To evaluate the extra deadweight loss caused by the specific tariff
and the TRQ we use the conventional deadweight loss definition, based on the
difference between the rise in import costs due to the trade restrictions and the
revenue or rents generated from it. More specifically, we compare the deadweight
loss due to the actual trade policy mix (Lq) with the loss introduced by a uniform
ad valorem price-equivalent tariff (Lτ) applied over all imports:
Lq = E(t, th, T, q¯h, pw, um)−E(pw, um)−TR(m, pw, t, th, T )−QR(pw, t, th, T, q¯h),
(3.20)
Lτ = E(τ, pw, um)− E(pw, um)− TR(m, pw, τ), (3.21)
where E(pw, um) is the total expenditure under free trade and E(τ, pw, um) is the
total expenditure when protection is provided through the uniform ad valorem
tariff equivalent. TR(m, pw, t, th, T ) denotes the tariff revenue andQR(pw, t, th, T, q¯h)
the quota rent which is assumed to be kept by importers.11 In the results we also
report the equivalent variation EV (pw, t
0, t0h, T
0, q¯h
0, u0, ui), which represents the
11This assumption is controversial, and there is some debate on who keeps the rent. In the
particular case of the Mercosur exports of high-quality beef to the EU, there is evidence that at
least some of the rent is kept by exporters. Accordingly, our estimates provide a lower bound
of the real cost implied by the TRQ scheme for the EU.
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amount of income to be given to the representative consumer to hold his new
utility level after the trade policy shock (ui) but at the original prices (p0u).
TR(m, pw, t, th, T ) = thmhin + (th + tm)mhout +
(
t+
T
plw
)
ml, (3.22)
QR(pw, t, th, T, q¯h) = tmq¯h. (3.23)
EV (pw, t
0, t0h, T
0, q¯h
0, u0, ui) = E(p0u, u
i)− E(p0u, u
0), (3.24)
Following Boorstein and Feenstra (1991) we define the welfare cost of a quality
upgrading due to both the TRQ components and the low-quality protection, as:
WCofQ = (Lq − Lτ). (3.25)
The total welfare cost of any non-uniform ad valorem or specific tariff struc-
ture is equal to the conventional deadweight loss triangle because of a uniform
price increase, plus the extra loss due to quality upgrading WCofQ.
3.4 Mercosur Exports to the EU
3.4.1 EU Trade Policy and the Mercosur
Mercosur countries are eligible for the EU Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP), but most beef products are excluded from this scheme. Mercosur ex-
porters can export under the minimum-access TRQs, normally open to all WTO
members in 1995 to match the requirements of the Uruguay Round. Brazil,
Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay also export high-quality beef under a current-
access TRQ allocated to each of the four countries. Recently, significant exports
of beef originating mainly from Brazil have also taken place outside the TRQs,
under the MFN regime, in spite of very high tariffs that exceed 80 percent in ad
valorem equivalent (see figures 3.1 and 3.2).
[INSERT Figure 3.1]
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[INSERT Figure 3.2]
In the ongoing WTO negotiations, the EU resists the large tariff cuts in beef
imports, requested by Mercosur countries as member of either the “G20” group
or the Cairns group. In regional negotiations, the EU favors a managed-trade
scenario. The EU has offered Mercosur an increase in existing TRQs and the
possible opening of new TRQs, rather than large tariff cuts that might open the
door to unlimited imports.12
3.4.2 Data and Model Calibration
We use EU beef imports from Mercosur (in thousands of tons) and their CIF
value (in millions of Euro) to be at the eight-digit level of the EU classification,
a domestic subdivision of the International Harmonized System. The eight-digit
level is that at which the EU has bound its tariffs under the 1994 WTO agree-
ment. Rather than introducing a proxy variable to reflect unobservable quality as
it is often done in the literature (Crozet and Erkel-Rousse, 2004), we classify the
different types of beef imports as “high” or “low”quality according both conserva-
tion mode (fresh or chilled or frozen), the final use of the imports (final consumer
or processing) and an ad hoc distinction for some particular cuts known as being
offered in the highest quality segment of the market, relying on the classification
used by the EU Commission.13 Unit values of imports are used to approximate
CIF prices. The high-quality beef quota, the in-quota and out-of-quota tariffs for
high-quality beef and the import tariff for low-quality beef are found in the TARIC
12The EU-Mercosur Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement was signed on Decem-
ber 15th, 1995. Since 1999, the two parties have been engaged in several rounds of negotiations.
In the 9th round, agricultural products were grouped into 5 categories (A, B, C, D and E). Beef
falls in the category E, which includes the most sensitive products under negotiation. Since
then, Mercosur countries have requested much larger access to the EU market. In October
2004, the EU offered to open or expand several TRQs.
13Fresh and chilled are normally denoted high-quality and frozen low-quality beef. For high
quality beef, we considered all the tariff lines at the ten-digit level included in the following
codes of the Harmonized system of the United Nations: 020110, 020120 and 020130. For low
quality beef, the lines under the codes 020220, 020220, 020230, 020230 and 020230.
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database. Import figures come from Eurostat’s COMEXT data. The European
domestic beef expenditure (d) in Euro is obtained from the French marketing
board OFIVAL. For elasticities of substitution we used the GTAP elasticity for
bovine meat products. As usual with CES specifications, results are very sensi-
tive to the elasticity chosen (Hertel et al., 2004). Here we therefore carried out
a sensitivity analysis using alternative values for the elasticities. In Table 3.2 we
present the calibration data, which correspond to the situation in 2005. The 2005
benchmark is characterized by an out-of-quota equilibrium, as the EU imports of
beef far exceed the quantities under TRQs.
In the numerical simulations, we replace the Cobb-Douglas specification for
U(m, d) that was used to keep simple the comparative statics results, by a LES-
CES one, that makes more realistic assumptions as far as the substitution between
domestic production an imports are concerned. This utility specification intro-
duces a subsistance quantity for which no utility is obtained. Given the subsis-
tance expenditure, the rest of income is allocated between the domestic good and
two imported beef qualities. The coefficients of the LES-CES function and other
parameters of the model are calibrated to the initial values of the expenditure
shares in the base data (Table 3.2) with the domestic price set to 1.
[INSERT TABLE 3.2]
3.4.3 Scenarios of trade liberalization
We now compare the 2005 situation to various trade liberalization scenarios. We
focus on the impact of various forms of trade liberalization on the composition of
EU beef imports from Mercosur. In the bilateral negotiations, it is proposed that
market access be achieved through different channels, including a quota expansion
and tariff cuts. In the Doha negotiation, tariff cuts are normally the standard
way to liberalize trade, but the 2004 Framework Agreement states that a WTO
member might declare some sensitive products. In such a case, tariffs might be
cut less dramatically but TRQs would have to be expanded. This also allows
some arbitration between tariffs and quotas and raises the issue of choosing one
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option or the other.
The first scenario considers the elimination of the in-quota ad valorem tariff
(th) for high-quality beef. The second scenario consists of eliminating the ad
valorem component of the out-of-quota tariff (t), a relatively minor component of
the composite tariff. The third scenario eliminates the specific component of the
out-of-quota tariff (T ). Finally, the fourth scenario considers an increase in the
TRQ for high-quality beef (q¯h). In practice, Mercosur countries have proposed an
expansion of the high-quality beef quota by a factor of eight,14 while the EU has
offered to expand the existing TRQ to 100,000 tons, i.e. a factor of 2.5. These
two cases are considered in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 as Scenario 4-A for the small quota
expansion and Scenario 4-B for the large quota expansion.
Table 3.3 presents the effects of the four scenarios on prices and quantities
traded, as well as on the quota rent (QR), export revenue (XR), tariff revenue
(TR) and equivalent variation (EV ). Results regarding the welfare effects of the
change in import composition are provided in Table 3.4. The variable WCofQ is
defined in Equations (3.25) with the quality composition indicator (QRatio) given
by the ratio between imports demands of both qualities. All scenarios results are
compared to the initial situation shown in Table 3.2.
[INSERT TABLE 3.3]
[INSERT TABLE 3.4]
As expected, results for the first scenario show that the elimination of the
in-quota tariff for high-quality beef has no effect on the composition of imports.
Given that in the initial situation the TRQs are filled, only rents are affected.
In a general case, there is a considerable controversy regarding who keeps the
benefits of the rent, between exporters and importers (Skully, 1999; Olarreaga
and Ozden, 2005; Abbott, 2002). Here we have assumed that rents were kept by
14Mercosur countries request a 315,000-ton quota, a quantity which represents 5% of EU beef
consumption and is significantly larger than the present TRQ, 40,300 tons of “Hilton beef”, i.e.
high-quality beef. Note that an extra 10,000-ton quota was exceptionally granted to Argentina
in 2002 and 2003.
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EU importers. In the case of the high-quality beef quotas allocated to Mercosur
countries, there are reasons to believe that exporters keep a significant share of
the quota rent, given the method used to allocate TRQ licenses and the rather
competitive structure of the beef industry in the EU. This suggests that the
elimination of tariffs within the TRQs is a policy that would be favored by those
producers who currently export under the TRQs. Some producer groups have
made it explicit that they favored this option, rather than a general decrease in EU
out-of-quota tariffs, but this position has not been followed by their government.
Typically, this scenario would be of particular interest to Argentinean producers,
who specialize in high unit-value products exported under the current quotas. It
would, however, bring little benefit to Brazilian producers who presently export
outside the TRQs.
Because it is a small component of the out-of-quota protection, the elimina-
tion of the ad valorem tariff (second scenario) would only have a limited impact
on the overall trade. It would nevertheless affect the composition of imports,
since the high-quality imports would increase more than low-quality ones. Even
though the ad valorem tariff is a distortion in itself, it helps reduce the bias
due to the quality upgrading caused by the specific tariff, according to the effect
described by Hummels and Skiba (2004). The welfare loss associated with the
quality upgrading (WCofQ) appears slightly higher under scenario 2 than in the
initial situation (Table 3.4). Overall, Mercosur countries would benefit from an
increase in export revenue (Table 3.3) but the quota rent would be lower than
that of the first scenario and the gain in welfare limited. Brazil could participate
more in high-quality trade by expanding its recent out-of-quota exports to the
EU. However, those producers who currently have access to the EU TRQ, e.g.
producers of high-quality beef in Argentina in particular, are likely to benefit less
under the second scenario than under the first one.
The third scenario, i.e. the elimination of the specific component of the out-
of-quota tariff would reduce the present bias towards high-quality exports and
this explains the drastic reduction of the deadweight loss caused by the bias in
import composition (Table 3.4). The overall welfare gains would be large due to
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the large distortion imposed by the specific tariff, because of both the high level of
this tariff and its effect on the import composition. The quota rent would decrease
considerably (Table 3.3).15 EU consumers would reap large gains through lower
import prices. All exporting countries would benefit from a larger access to the EU
market. Brazil would perhaps benefit more than Argentina, given that Brazilian
producers are less specialized in high-quality cuts than Argentinean exporter.
Simulation results for the two cases under the fourth scenario are conditional
to the fact that the present level of the TRQ is binding for high-quality beef and
that the EU imports beef from Mercosur out of the quota. Under Scenario 4-A,
the expansion of the TRQ level is limited and the quota is still binding. Because
the initial situation is an out-of-quota equilibrium, a small quota increase has
no effect on either trade creation or quality composition of imports. On the
contrary, the only impact would be a reduction in the tariff revenue for the EU
and an increase in the quota rent for exporters of high-quality beef. Scenario 4-B
considers the result of a much larger increase in the TRQ for high-quality beef.
The quota would no longer be binding. The EU domestic price for high-quality
beef would fall (Table 3.3). High-quality imports would increase significantly,
while low-quality imports would decrease, leading to a significant increase in
the welfare loss due to the import composition bias. Under this scenario the
quality upgrading would represent a large share (almost fifty percent) of the total
deadweight loss. The reduction in price and the increase in imports would benefit
EU consumers, even though EU tariff revenue would go down. High-quality
producers, particularly those of Argentina, are likely to be the main beneficiaries
of this scenario due to the trade creation in the high-quality segment of the
market.
15In Table 3.3, the quota rent (QR) falls to zero as there is a complete elimination of the
specific tariff, i.e. the in-quota and out-of-quota tariff become the same. This is obviously a
particular case.
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Conclusion
The EU has recently become a net importer of beef after being a major exporter
during decades. Mercosur countries have now become the largest source of im-
ports and have taken a significant share of the EU market. Changes in domestic
policy, in particular the progressive decoupling of direct support since 1992 and
the elimination of the intervention price in 2002, have certainly played a role in
reducing the incentives to produce in the EU. However, the tariff cuts resulting
from the 1994 Uruguay Round Agreement have allowed Brazilian exporters to
penetrate significantly the EU market.16 A cut in the EU tariffs as the one dis-
cussed in the Doha negotiations or an ambitious regional or bilateral agreement
with a competitive supplier such as Brazil or Argentina could result in a very large
increase in imports, given that the current MFN tariffs, albeit still very high, do
not succeed in keeping these products out of the EU market. This scenario is
particularly feared by EU producers, since it would involve a considerable ad-
justment in the EU beef sector. By-products of the dairy production supply two
thirds of the EU beef consumption and this supply is rather inelastic in relation
to beef prices, meaning that producers of suckling cows would have to bear most
of the adjustment, making a large cut in tariff politically difficult.
The particular tariff structure for beef explain why imports have been highly
biased towards high-quality products, namely fresh boneless cuts. Indeed, the
combination of high specific tariffs, low ad valorem tariffs and TRQs, some of
which are restricted to high-quality beef imports, together with a series of fixed
costs in the transportation, inspection and certification sectors have resulted in a
significant Alchian-Allen effect. The resulting bias in the composition of imports
16The tariff cuts of the Uruguay Round, that have taken place between 1995 and 2001, have
left very high MFN tariffs for many beef products. However, the EU had cut most initial
tariffs by 36 percent, which has clearly played a role in the subsequent surge in imports. It is
noteworthy that beef has not been subject to the strategic allocation of tariff cuts, that most
countries have used to minimize the consequences of the Uruguay Round agreement on market
access (Bureau et al., 2000). Indeed, the minimal cut for a given tariff line was 15 percent, but
the EU chose not to treat beef as a sensitive product and to apply a 36 percent cut to all tariff
lines in this sector.
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could be either reduced or increased with trade liberalization, depending on the
way freer trade is achieved.
Under the bilateral negotiation between the EU and Mercosur, the proposals
of the two parties differ on whether trade liberalization in the beef sector should
rely on a tariff reduction or a quota expansion. In the WTO negotiations, trade
liberalization is supposed to take place through reductions in MFN tariffs, but
the proposed provisions on“sensitive products”, as agreed upon in 2004, have also
introduced some flexibility between tariff cuts and expansion of TRQs. A quota
expansion might favor high-quality imports, while a cut in the current specific
tariff reduces the present bias towards higher-quality imports. For Mercosur
countries as a whole, there is a trade-off between larger rents in one case but
larger possibility of expanding exports in the second case. Individual Mercosur
countries, might prefer one approach or the other according to the composition
mix of their exports. For the EU, managed trade through quantitative ceilings
might provide some insurance that some domestic production will persist, in
a sector that is important from a social standpoint. On the other hand, this
would maintain high prices for consumers and the quota expansion would further
increase the quality bias, contributing significantly to the overall welfare cost.
These trade-offs could perhaps lead to designing a combination of instruments
and to a compromise acceptable for the different parties.
In the Doha framework, the EU is tempted to classify beef products as ‘sensi-
tive’ and to propose a low tariff cut and an expansion of the TRQs. The EU should
nevertheless keep in mind that this would encourage an even more unbalanced
structure of imports, which would affect the various producers and consumers in
a different way. Quality upgrading of imports is responsible for an extra dead-
weight loss that must be accounted for, in addition to the standard distortions
caused by tariffs.
Most large scale models used in empirical analyses of trade negotiations tend
to overlook the import composition issue in cases such as agricultural imports.
The analytical framework developed in this paper suggests that the overall effect
of a trade agreement on EU beef imports may be different from what one might
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expect when looking at the traditional flows of frozen carcasses. The complexity
of the EU tariff structure is such that trade liberalization scenarios might result
in non linear effects. Even though we only address this issue under simplifying
assumptions, without an explicit modeling of EU supply and of the complex
interactions with the dairy production so as to focus on the comparative statics,
we believe that the analytical framework developed in this paper could be adapted
for simulation purposes in more global models.
FIGURES AND TABLES 162
Figures and Tables
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
60
80
100
120
140
1000 Tons
LQ
HQ
Figure 3.1: EU15 beef imports by quality from Mercosur in 1,000 tons
Source: COMEXT
Table 3.1: Alchian-Allen effect under TRQ and specific tariff: summary of com-
parative statics results
In-quota At-quota Out-of-quota
th - 0 0
t + + or - +
T + + +
q¯h 0 + 0 or +
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Figure 3.2: EU25 beef imports by quality from Mercosur and the Rest of the
World in 1,000 tons
Source:COMEXT
Table 3.2: Calibration Data (2005)
Variables and Parameters Initialization Values Source
mh 147.56 (1000 tons) COMEXT
ml 115.93 (1000 tons) COMEXT
d 37.5 (million Euros) INRA/OFIVAL
I¯ 39.5 (million Euros) Appendix
phw 4.81 (Euro/kg) COMEXT
plw 2.75 (Euro/kg) COMEXT
t 12.8% TARIC
th 20% TARIC
T 3.02 (Euro/kg) TARIC
q¯h 40.3 (1000 tons) TARIC
ph 8.43 (Euro/kg) Appendix
pl 6.11 (Euro/kg) Appendix
pd 1 Appendix
σ 4.4 GTAP
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Table 3.3: Prices, Trade and Welfare results (in millions Euro and in tons)
Variables Initial Sit. Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4A Scenario 4B
σ = 4.4
ph 8.43 (Euro/kg) 0% -7% -32% 0% -23%
pl 6.11 (Euros/kg) 0% -6% -46% 0% 0%
mh 147.56 (1000 tons) 0% 20% 119% 0% 113%
ml 115.93 (1000 tons) 0% 12% 521% 0% -31%
d 37.5 (million Euro) 0% 0% -6% 0% -2%
EV 0 (1000 Euro) 0 142.92 1439.66 0 420.07
TR 817.77 (1000 Euro) -5% 3% -14% -19% -30%
QR 107.44 (1000 Euro) 36% -23% -100% 148% 119%
XR 1027.9 (1000 Euro) 0% 18% 243% 0% 69%
σ = 2.5
ph 8.43 (Euro/kg) 0% -7% -32% 0% -32%
pl 6.11 (Euro/kg) 0% -6% -46% 0% 0%
mh 147.56 (1000 tons) 0% 12% 63% 0% 96%
ml 115.93 (1000 tons) 0% 7% 195% 0% -24%
d 37.5 (million Euro) 0% 0% -1% 0% -1%
EV 0 (1000 Euro) 0 138.41 1059.51 0 553.41
TR 817.77 (1000 Euro) -5% -4% -49% -19% -30%
QR 107.44 (1000 Euro) 36% -23% -100% 148% -100%
XR 1027.9 (1000 Euro) 0% 10% 104% 0% 59%
σ = 6.5
ph 8.43 (Euro/kg) 0% -7% -20% 0% -16%
pl 6.11 (euro/kg) 0% -6% -37% 0% 0%
mh 147.56 (1000 tons) 0% 31% 59% 0% 113%
ml 115.93 (1000 tons) 0% 17% 644% 0% -34%
d 37.5 (million Euro) 0% -1% -8% 0% -2%
EV 0 (1000 Euro) 0 148.22 1113.4 0 305.51
TR 817.77 (1000 Euro) -5% 11% 67% -19% -31%
QR 107.44 (1000 Euro) 36% -23% -64% 148% 274%
XR 1027.9 (1000 Euro) 0% 27% 241% 0% 68%
Note: Author’s calculations
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Table 3.4: Welfare cost of quality change (in millions Euro)
Variables Initial Sit. Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4A Scenario 4B
σ = 4.4
Lq (1000 Euro) 2515.99 2515.99 2141.07 232.51 2515.99 2062.24
Lτ (1000 Euro) 2171.81 2171.81 1791.98 191.92 2171.81 1183.37
WCofQ (1000 Euro) 344.18 344.18 349.09 40.59 344.18 878.87
Qratio 1.27 1.27 1.37 0.45 1.27 3.96
τ 0.9 0.9 0.77 0.17 0.9 0.57
σ = 2.5
Lq (1000 Euro) 917.16 917.16 761 76.51 917.16 655.18
Lτ (1000 Euro) 824.31 824.31 665.7 69.06 824.31 280.16
WCofQ (1000 Euro) 92.86 92.86 95.3 7.45 92.86 375.03
Qratio 1.27 1.27 1.33 0.7 1.27 3.29
τ 0.9 0.9 0.77 0.18 0.9 0.46
σ = 6.5
Lq (1000 Euro) 5832.74 5832.74 5048.37 1654.17 5832.74 5266.03
Lτ (1000 Euro) 4820.75 4820.75 4027.65 1405.89 4820.75 3322.9
WCofQ (1000 Euro) 1012 1012 1020.72 248.28 1012 1943.12
Qratio 1.27 1.27 1.42 0.27 1.27 4.1
τ 0.9 0.9 0.77 0.34 0.9 0.66
Note: Author’s calculations
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Appendix
MCP model
In order to model the TRQ problem in GAMS, we use the following equation
system:
• Demand functions
In order to avoid known limitations of the Cobb-Douglas function, for sim-
ulations we replace it by a LES-CES demand as following:
d− dmin = αdu
(Pu
pd
)σu
[d]
m−mmin = αmu
(Pu
pm
)σu
[m]
where σu =
σ−1√
2
+ 1 as in the MIRAGE CGE model (Bchir et al., 2002;
Decreux and Valin, 2007).
mh = λhm(
pm
ph
)σ [mh]
ml = λlm(
pm
pl
)σ [ml]
puu = pd(d− dmin) + pm(m−mmin) [u]
• Prices equations
pd = 1 [pd]
mpm = mlpl +mhph [pm]
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ph = phw(1 + th + tm) [ph]
pl = plw(1 + t) + T [pl]
where the budget constraint is:
I¯ = pdd+ pmm [pu, I¯]
• TRQ constraints
mh = mhin +mhout [mhin]
mhin ≤ q¯h [tm]
tm ≤ (t+
T
phw
− th) [mhout]
mpm = phw(1 + τ)mh + plw(1 + τ)ml [τ ]
Under a MCP program each inequality must refer to a particular variable
which satisfies the complementary slackness Rutherford (1995).
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EU-Mercosur bilateral trade relationship
Mercosur countries export large quantities of products that face no or little pro-
tection in the EU market, such as soybeans and coffee. However, the products
in which Mercosur countries are particularly competitive, including sugar and
beef, face a high protection in the EU. Mercosur exports to the EU are therefore
limited.
The EU grants large tariff preferences to a variety of countries; as a result
so that EU applied tariffs are in general much lower than the tariffs bound at
the WTO. However, not all countries are eligible for EU preferential regimes.
Mercosur countries, in particular, only have limited preferential access to the EU
market, at least since the 1995 regional ongoing negotiations, have not yet resulted
in an agreement. All Mercosur countries are eligible for the EU Generalized
System of Preferences (GSP). However, the GSP does not cover all agricultural
products, and the preferential margins are often small relative to the MFN tariffs.
Most beef products are not covered by the GSP, and Mercosur exports must also
face the MFN tariffs.
In compliance with WTO requirements, the EU has opened TRQs for some
agricultural products. There are current-access quotas, related to historical trade
that are therefore allocated to particular countries, and quotas under minimum
access.
The EU has allocated an important “Hilton” beef quota to Mercosur. This
quota has been expanding in 2002 when Argentina was granted a larger quota
of 28,000 tons of high-quality beef,17 Uruguay a 6,300-ton quota of high-quality
17CN codes: 0201 30 and 0206 10 95. “...Special or good-quality beef cuts obtained from
exclusively pasture-grazed animals aged between 22 and 24 months, having two permanent
incisors and presenting a slaughter live weight not exceeding 460 kilograms, referred to as
“special boxed beef”, cuts of which may bear the letters “sc” (special cuts)”. Commission
Regulation (EC) No.936/97.
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beef,18 Brazil a 5,000-ton quota.19 Paraguay was added to the list of exporters
with the grant of a 1,000-ton quota of high-quality beef since 2002.20 Mercosur
countries can also benefit from minimum-access quotas that are not allocated to
a particular country and which are not limited to high-quality beef.
Each Mercosur country administrates the licenses for “Hilton” quotas. For
example, in Argentina’s case, the Secretary of Agriculture (SAGPyA) allocates
the quota between exporters. In order to access in-quota tariffs for their products,
exporters first need an authorization to export to the EU delivered by the EU
Commission. They also have to fulfill all the tributary and sanitary obligations of
their country. Then, licenses for the quotas are allocated to traditional exporters,
considering their total beef export (except“Hilton”beef) during the last two years
(FOB values) as proven by customs certifications. The new producers, who fulfill
all sanitary conditions and have obtained EU authorization, benefit from 300-ton
quota for the first year and 200 tons for the second year. Because it does not
renew automatically, every year each exporter has to re-request the attribution of
the “Hilton” quota-part from the SAGPyA (SAGPyA Resolutions 914/2001 and
18CN codes: 0201 30, 0202 30 90, 0206 10 95, 0206 29 91. “...Special or good-quality beef
cuts obtained from exclusively pasture-grazed animals presenting a slaughter liveweight not
exceeding 460 kilograms, referred to as “special boxed beef”. These cuts may bear the letters
“sc” (special cuts)”.Commission Regulation (EC) No.936/97.
19CN codes: 0201 30, 0202 30 90, 0206 10 95, 0206 29 91. “Beef cuts obtained from steers
(novilhos) or heifers (novilhas) aged between 20 and 24 months, which have been exclusively
pasture-grazed, have lost their central temporary incisors but do not have more than four
permanent incisor teeth, which are of good maturity and which meet the following beef-carcase
classification requirements: meat from B or R class carcases of rounded to straight conformation
and a fat-cover class of 2 or 3; the cuts, bearing the letters “sc” (special cuts) or an “sc” label
as a sign of their high-quality are to be boxed in cartons bearing the words “high-quality beef”.
Commission Regulation (EC) No.936/97.
20CN codes: 0201 30 00 and 0202 30 90. “...fillet (lomito), striploin and/or Cube roll (lomo),
rump (rabadilla), topside (carnaza negra) obtained from selected crossbred animals with less
than 50% of breeds of the zebu type and having been exclusively fed with pasture grass or
hay. The slaughter animals shall be steers or heifers falling under category V of VACUNO
carcase-grading system producing carcases not exceeding 260 kg”. Commission Regulation
(EC) No.1524/2002.
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186/2002).
For all these TRQs the tariff in-quota is an ad valorem tariff of 20% and the
out-of-quota tariff a combination of an ad valorem tariff (12.8%) and a specific
tariff (from 141.4 per 100kg to 304.1 per 100kg) which changes for each CN code.
EU-Mercosur trade negotiation
In December 1995 the finalization of the EU-Mercosur Interregional Framework
Cooperation Agreement took place in Madrid. The agreement entered into force
on July 1, 1999 and the two regions began negotiations in November of that same
year.
The first round of negotiations (Buenos Aires, April 2000), established the
general principles of current and future talks. These included the following pro-
visions: free trade, no exclusion of any sector, conformity with WTO rules, the
reinforcement of consultations on WTO matters, the single undertaking principle,
intentions to aim at comprehensive negotiations and balances results, and con-
clusion at the earliest possible time,. The parties also set up technical groups21
for trade and subgroups for co-operation areas. They also established a working
program on the objectives, methodology, information exchange, modalities on
non-tariff measures, and the schedule for progressive tariffs in goods and services.
During the second (Brussels, June 2000) and third (Brasilia, November
2000) rounds of negotiations the parties continued to exchange information and
drafts about trade, non-tariff obstacles and trade, political and co-operation ob-
jectives for a future agreement.
In the fourth round (Brussels, March 2001) the parties presented their
proposals and working documents about non-tariff issues and“Business Facilities”
such as e-commerce were introduced as new subject in the negotiations.
The fifth round (Montevideo, July 2001) was the point of “takeoff” for tariff
and service negotiations. The EU presented Mercosur the tariff and negotiation
21Subgroups of Technical groups:liberalization trade in goods and services, government pro-
curement, investment, intellectual property rights, competition policies, trade defence instru-
ments and dispute settlement mechanism.
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texts for goods, services and government procurement. The objective of this offer
was the progressive and reciprocal liberalization of almost all exchange, without
exclusion of any sector and lasting for a ten-year period.
In the sixth round (Madrid, October 2001) Mercosur presented its tariff
offer as well as negotiation texts on services and public markets. The point
of contention with the EU proposal was the 33% reduction for EU import tar-
iffs for a ten-year period. During this round and the seventh round (Buenos
Aires, April 2002), the parties made substantial progress in the political and co-
operation chapters (Science, Telecommunications, Energy, Transport). Moreover,
the parties agreed on and finally adopted the Trade Facilitation Measures Package
that had been discussed in Madrid.
The eighth round (Brasilia, November 2002) focused on the discussion of
consolidated texts detailing for services, competition, market access for goods,
technical barriers to trade, rules of origin, customs and dispute settlement. They
also started discussions about trade of wine and spirits.
In the ninth round of negotiations (Brussels, March 2003) the discussion
focused on reciprocal tariff proposals. Regarding agricultural tariffs, the parties
distinguished several product categories (A, B, C, D, E) which were included in
the tariff elimination agenda. The EU proposal included ad valorem tariff offers
for all categories, except for category E22 for which does not yet have defined
methods of tariff reduction. However, the EU plans to propose TRQs rather
than tariff elimination for E category products and not tariff elimination. The
Mercosur proposal included the tariff elimination (over ten years) of 8042 tariff
headings which account for 83,5% of Mercosur imports coming from the EU. For
Mercosur, the majority of meat products (poultry, bovine, pork), fish and sugar
are in category C, live animals are in categories A, B, C, while vegetables and
fruits are in categories C and D along with cereals, oilseeds and vegetable oils.
Mercosur does not consider agricultural imports to be sensitive under category E
definition (only food and manufactures).
22The products of E category are: cereals, rice, olives, oils, bovine and pork meat, eggs,
poultry meat, sugar and fruit and vegetables.
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In the tenth round (Asuncion, June 2003) discussions focused again on
agricultural products. The EU expressed concerns regarding the Mercosur pro-
posal for an accelerated tariff reduction on agricultural imported products. In
this round the EU made a proposal for tariffs on category E which had not been
defined in the previous round. Discussions also took place on the SPS agreement,
in particular on the issues of animal welfare, and wine and spirits.
The eleventh round (Brussels, December 2003) showed some progress on
technical trade issues related to market access in goods, government procure-
ment and investment, wines and spirits, business facilitation, intellectual property
rights. They also agreed on the work-program for the 2004 rounds as well as the
two Ministerial Meetings to conclude the EU-Mercosur Association Agreement.
The twelfth round (Buenos Aires, March 2004) saw progress on trade as-
pects for manufactured goods. The parties finalized the discussions about TBT,
competition and customs procedures.
In the thirteenth round (Brussels, May 2004) the discussion about poli-
tics, co-operation and trade aspects went on but no important conclusions were
reached.
After this final meeting of the Bi-regional Negotiations Committee, the parties
continued to exchange of proposals and engage in informal discussions. The final
proposals were exchanged in September 2004 in hopes of reaching an agreement
at the end of October. However, no EU-Mercosur trade agreement was achieved
because the two parties did not agree about crucial subjects such as agricultural
trade liberalization and government procurement and investment. Nevertheless,
dialogue between the EU and Mercosur has been recently renewed and future
proposals are subject to the results of the WTO Doha Round.
Chapter 4
Not in Your Backyard ? Selective
Tariff Cuts for Environmentally
Preferable Products
1
1Estelle Gozlan, researcher at the UMR Economie Publique INRA/AgroParisTech is coau-
thor of this paper.
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4.1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the WTO has become increasingly involved in trade-related en-
vironmental issues that have convinced its members of the need to promote free
trade in a way that is consistent with sustainable development. In 2001, mem-
ber countries agreed to negotiate “the reduction, or as appropriate, elimination
of tariff- and non-tariff barriers to environmental goods and services” (EGS) in
order to enhance the mutual supportiveness of trade and environment.2 The
idea is that an expansion of the market for environmental goods shall provide
gains from trade and help countries to address some pollution / resource use
issues. While no clear definition of environmental goods has been agreed upon
yet, several countries have raised the possibility of broadening the definition to
include Environmentally Preferable Products (EPP’s), that is, goods with “high
environmental performance and/or low environmental impact” or goods “causing
significantly less environmental harm at some stage of their life cycle than alterna-
tive products that serve the same purpose” (WTO; ICTSD and IISD; UNCTAD).
Such a definition could include goods produced with cleaner production processes
and methods (PPMs, such as sustainably grown timber or organic products), in
order to strengthen the “green” exporting capacities of developing countries.3
Economists are usually careful about the optimality of tariffs as an instru-
ment of environmental policy, and there is widespread agreement that trade in-
tervention can only be second best (Beghin et al., 1994; Whalley, 1998). Lawyers
and international trade specialists are sometimes skeptical about the feasibility of
lower “green tariffs”due to the impossibility to discriminate between environmen-
tally preferable and conventional goods on the basis of the Harmonized System
Custom classification. Moreover, as stated by Verbruggen (van den Bergh, ed,
1999), in the WTO circuit, the current understanding is that a country cannot
2Doha Ministerial Declaration, paragraph 31(iii).
3Although this position is supported by UNCTAD as a challenging opportunity for devel-
oping countries, the ICTSD (2005) recalls that developing countries fear production method
distinctions could be misused for ‘green protectionism’ through the requirements of standards
or eco-labels.
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take trade measures against another country on the basis of PPM differences.4
Such objections raise questions about both the practical feasibility and the op-
timality of implementing a new distortion in the tariff structure, and require an
in-depth examination of its welfare implications. The two classes of environmen-
tal goods under discussion in current WTO negotiations (Hamwey, 2005) cover
a wide range of environmental benefits, stemming from either Class A final-use
(goods produced to provide environmental service, e.g. filters) or Class B higher
environmental performance, - whether in consumption (e.g. energy-efficient light
bulbs) or during the production process (e.g. organic agricultural products or
chlorine-free paper). Moreover, because the reduced externality may be local,
transboundary, or global, the distribution of environmental benefits from selec-
tive tariff cuts in EGS is not trivial.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the nature and distribution of welfare gains
expected under the present negotiations, for the family of EPPs characterized by a
reduced local pollution during the production process. We focus on EPPs because
by definition, close substitutes (“Environmentally worse” products) exist, which
can be valued differently by consumers, and the question of a substitution of green
for conventional products has received little attention in the non-strategic trade-
and-environment literature. Using a simple North-South trade partial-equilibrium
model with two substitutable goods (resp. ‘conventional’ and ‘environmentally
preferable’), we seek to address the two following questions: first, what are the
environmental and welfare consequences of selective tariff cuts for EPPs for large
importing and exporting countries, and how does such a “green” liberalization
scenario perform compared to a general, non-selective cut in tariffs? and second,
should (large exporting) developing countries rely on such selective tariff cuts,
or rather implement whenever feasible a strategic environmental policy aimed at
improving their terms of trade while reducing local pollution?
Surveys and economic papers dealing with current Doha negotiations in envi-
ronmental goods have focused on (i) the right definition for EGS/EPPs (Vikhlyaev,
2004; Howse and van Bork, 2005) and the various implications of negotiating tariff
4“In WTO jargon, unilateral measures with extraterritorial impact are not allowed.”
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cuts upon criteria (more flexible when technology changes) vs. a list of products
(more realistic if an agreement has to be reached); (ii) whether extending the
scope of environmental goods to include EPPs will provide new export opportu-
nities for developing countries (Singh, 2004; Hamwey, 2005)- highlighting some
non-tariff concerns;5 (iii) the practical and legal feasibility of discriminating be-
tween otherwise similar products based on their PPM’s within the WTO frame-
work (Carpentier et al., 2005; Steenblik, 2005; Howse and van Bork, 2005): these
contributions suggest that though complicated, the EGS preferential liberaliza-
tion is not impossible (tariff cuts need not to rely on the HS custom classification),
and that multilateral negotiations aimed at lowering tariffs, even upon PMM’s,
cannot be compared with (inadmissible) unilateral trade restrictions; (iv) the po-
tential benefits or adverse impacts of early EGS liberalization (Hamwey, 2005;
Carpentier et al., 2005; Howse and van Bork, 2005; Alavi, 2007): despite the
many interesting arguments provided in these studies, they consider a range of
products that is too wide to allow a sound assessment of economic mechanisms.
Theoretical literature on trade and the environment has extensively explored
the links between trade and environmental policy with important contributions
in both a strategic- and a non-strategic trade framework. Indeed, the presence
of externalities modifies the optimality of policy instruments. The scale (global,
transboundary or local pollution) and the source (consumption/ production) of
the externality, and also the size (large/ small countries) and the status of trade
partners (net exporting/ importing countries) constrain the optimal policy choice.
5Discussions at a recent meeting of the WTO Committee on Trade and the Environment
(CTE) focused mainly on environmental requirements and market access issues, particularly
standards in organic agriculture. During the brief meeting on 2 May, 2007, many Members said
they saw organic standards as an opportunity, but also recognised the difficulties sometimes
faced by developing countries in particular in achieving conformity with organic standards.
Discussions, according to one trade source, took place in a ‘solutions-oriented’ mode. The
WTO secretariat provided an informal document containing a list of environmental impact
assessments of trade liberalization under multilateral, regional and bilateral initiatives being
carried out in a number of developing countries. The document was submitted to Members for
comments, and will be further discussed in the future.
4.1. INTRODUCTION 177
When countries have no influence on world prices (small country assumption),
free trade is always the first-best solution if paired with the appropriate environ-
mental policy instrument (Krutilla, 1991). However, trade policy may become a
second-best solution when it is not possible to implement an optimal regulation
(e.g. a Pigouvian tax) aimed at internalizing environmental damages (Anderson,
1992; Krutilla, 1999; Gozlan and Ramos, 2006). For example, when a country
is harmed by transboundary emissions generated by a trading partner, Copeland
(1996) has demonstrated the optimality of a “pollution-content tariff” that taxes
imports according to the pollution generated.
For large countries, the optimality of tariffs and environmental regulations is
complicated by terms of trade effects (TOT), since their policies have an impact
on world prices. Therefore, even when efficient environmental regulations are
possible, a large importing country always has an incentive to set a non-zero tariff.
Focusing on a bilateral production externality between two trading countries,
Markusen (1975) has built on the idea that monopoly power in trade can influence
foreign production. With a simple general equilibrium model, he compares a first-
best policy menu (combining consumption taxes, production taxes, and import
tariffs) with second-best policies (when one of the instruments is constrained): the
optimal tariff differs under the first best and second best settings, reflecting the
TOT consequences of the internalization of the domestic externality. However in
both cases, the optimal tariff contains a positive term aimed at addressing foreign
pollution, which does not depend upon the domestic environmental policy.
The TOT consequences of environmental policy have also been addressed in
a partial equilibrium framework. In the absence of trade instruments (which
can be constrained by multilateral negotiations), Krutilla (1991) shows that large
countries have an incentive to distort their domestic environmental policy in order
to improve their terms of trade: the optimal environmental tax is greater (lower)
than the standard Pigouvian tax in the case of an exporting (importing) country.
This strategic over-internalization (under-internalization) mechanism is used by
Kraus (2000) as the very definition of “Not in my backyard” (NIMBY) and eco-
dumping strategies: eco-dumping then refers to the “environmental policy whose
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level (...) is lower than the Pigouvian tax because of open economy reasons”
and NIMBY to a more stringent environmental regulation than optimal under
autarky. Such unilateral policies may degenerate into an ”environmental race
towards the bottom”6 when countries retaliate, and thus reduce welfare for both
partners (Rauscher, 1991, 1995).
Pigouvian taxes may not always be an available instrument for the domestic
policy maker, due to political reasons or pressures. This is especially true when
it comes to agriculture, where the strict implementation of the polluter-pays-
principle should be translated e.g. into a tax on polluting inputs (fertilizers,
pesticides...), while many European governments are reluctant to face farmers’
hostile reactions.7
Most related to our framework are the contributions of Krutilla (1991) (partial
equilibrium model with trade a single polluting good), Kraus (2000) on eco-tariffs,
i.e. “import tariffs levied on the goods whose PPM pollutes the environment”,8
and LeClair and Franceschi (2006), analyzing the rationale behind differential tar-
iffs as a means to address externalities embedded in traded goods. The originality
of our approach relies on the explicit modeling of an environmentally preferable
substitute to the traded polluting good, which is valued by at least a fraction of
consumers.9
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 presents the
model. Section 4.3 describes the equilibrium conditions in the world market.
Section 4 is devoted to the consequences of trade liberalization with large coun-
tries and compares an unselective tariff cut for the conventional variety and its
6“The outcome of inter-jurisdictional competition, when regulatory entities compete each
other down to undesirably low levels of environmental regulation because some or all countries
engage in eco-dumping” (Kraus, 2000)
7See Rauscher (1999) for a clear survey of economic mechanisms at stake on the interface
between environmental and trade policies, including regulatory capture.
8Note that this possibility is not discussed under present EGS negotiations, even though this
could be a way to discriminate among polluting and Environmentally preferable products
9Moreover, we focus on the cut in ad valorem tariffs, while Krutilla chose specific tariffs.
Specific tariffs simplify the expression of tariff revenue, but complicate the expressions of the
derivatives of other surpluses.
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green substitute (subsection 4.1) with selective tariff cuts for the environmentally
preferable product (4.4.2). Section 4.5 considers the environmental and terms-of-
trade consequences of an environmental tax in the exporting country, and section
4.6 concludes.
4.2 The Model
Consider two countries (bloc of countries): a large Northern country, ‘Home’ (e.g.
the European Union), and a large Southern country, ‘Foreign’ (e.g. the Mercosur),
and assume away the rest of world. Given the initial prices of inputs, Home is a net
importer and Foreign a net exporter. We denote variables pertaining to Foreign
by an asterisk (∗). The main features of our analysis are (1) a partial equilibrium
model with two substitutable goods: a conventional variety whose production
causes local pollution, and an environmentally preferable variety that is valued by
consumers in the Northern country; (2) perfect competition among producers, but
international trade between large countries allowing for terms-of-trade effects; (3)
classical policy instruments: tariffs (homogeneous vs. differentiated upon PPMs)
and environmental taxes.
Consumers are able to distinguish between green and conventional goods with-
out ambiguity (perfect labeling). In Home (the Northern country), they display
preferences for the green product. Traditional assumptions are made about the
utility function: increasing in each of its arguments, quasilinear and concave, with
parameters such that products are imperfect substitutes and G preferred to C for
the same price.
Let DG(pG, pC) and DC(pG, pC) represent the demand for green and conven-
tional goods in the Northern country. In the Southern country, we assume that
there is no demand for the Environmentally Preferable Product: the green prod-
uct is an export commodity.10 Let D∗(p∗C) represent the Southern demand of
conventional goods.
In each country, green and conventional goods are produced in two distinct
10This simplifying assumption will be discussed in the conclusion.
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competitive sectors (hereafter G and C). Technologies do not differ from one
country to another. Let f(x) = f(xp;x−p) be a production function of x, a
vector of inputs priced r, where xp is the subset of polluting inputs and x−p is the
subset of other“clean”factors (labor, non-polluting capital). f displays decreasing
returns to scale. To make things simple we limit xp to one single polluting input
xp, priced rp. The conventional production process is characterized by a local
negative production externality E(xp), linked to the use of the dirty input. The
environmental damage is an increasing function of the polluting input (E ′(xp) >
0). The green technology differs only by the additional constraint that the use
of the polluting input xp is exogenously set to zero.
11 Both sectors (in both
countries) are competitive and producers are price-takers.12
Denoting yC and yG the output of, respectively, conventional and green prod-
ucts, the profit maximization program of a representative producer in each sector
is given by
max
yC
piC = pC .yC − r.x
s.t. yC = f(x)
(4.1)
max
yG
piG = pG.yG − r−p.x−p
s.t. yG = f(x−p;xp = 0)
(4.2)
where pC and pG represent equilibrium prices of conventional and green out-
puts and r is the vector of input prices.
Due to the additional constraint that xp = 0 in the Green cost minimization
program, its marginal cost is higher than in the conventional sector and thus, its
supply function SG(pG) is more inelastic than the conventional one, SC(pC).
11Similar results can be derived by assuming a simple threshold in the use of the polluting
input (Gozlan and Ramos, 2006) for the green technology, but for expositional convenience we
set xp to zero. When looking for a specification of the production function -e.g. for simulations-
the need to set the use of the xp to zero may require a non-conventional form allowing the use
of non-essential inputs (Just et al., 1982; Soloaga, 1999).
12The possibility that producers switch from conventional to green production processes is
not addressed here, which could be the result of existing barriers to conversion in the short run
(e.g. delay before a producer is entitled to use the “organic” label.)
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Let TE denote an environmental tax on the polluting input (initially set to
zero). The dirty input demand schedule is determined by the equality of its
private cost (including the environmental tax whenever implemented) and the
value of its marginal product, that is, its marginal physical productivity valued
at the world price. Therefore, producers will demand the polluting input in the
domestic importing / foreign (∗) exporting countries until the marginal revenue
for an additional unit of this input (pC .
∂f(.)
∂xp
) equals its marginal cost, (rp + TE).
Our initial assumption of TE = 0 in the importing country is supported by
the strategic underinternalization of the environmental damage when trade policy
is constrained by negotiations. When the government cannot increase tariffs in
order to improve its terms of trade, lowering environmental taxes is optimal.
4.3 Trade
Both countries (bloc of countries) are engaged into trade negotiations aimed at
reducing tariffs. Following the empirical evidence, developed countries tend to
have a high level of protection in agricultural products (tariff picks), while many
developing countries protect relatively more industrialized products. According
to this specification of their tariff structures, a trade liberalization will improve
access conditions in developing markets for industrialized sectors in developed
countries and vice-versa for agricultural sectors in developing countries. Consid-
ering a “green” tariff cut, developed countries will distort their patterns of trade,
exporting ‘clean’ technologies to developing countries and importing relatively
more ‘sustainable’ agricultural products from developing countries.
Although in this paper we focus on the consequences of a trade liberalization
scenario in agricultural (conventional and organic) products only, we keep in
mind that developed countries will also benefit from reciprocal export gains in
the sector of industrialized products.
Selective tariff cuts for environmentally preferable products would result in
a lower tariff τG for the green product compared to the conventional substitute
(remaining with an unchanged tariff τC=τ). However, it is also possible to reduce
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tariffs in a non selective manner. Further, we assume that the exporting country
does not retaliate against the importing country.
By convention, equilibrium prices are expressed as domestic prices p = (pG, pC),
so the price received by foreign producers is pi/(1 + τi) where i = G,C and τi
is the tariff rate applied by Home on imports of i. Let Xi(pi) denote the export
supply of product i = G,C defined as the difference between foreign supply and
foreign demand at each price level, and Mi(p) the import demand defined as the
difference between the domestic demand and the domestic supply at each price
level. The equilibrium in the world market is characterized by the two following
conditions:
XC(
pC
1 + τC
) = MC(p) (4.3)
XG(
pG
1 + τG
) = MG(p) (4.4)
Note that the import demand functions depend on the vector of prices p,
where the substitution effect between varieties comes from the demand side in
Home, while the export supply functions only depend on their own prices, due to
our simplifying assumptions on demand in the Southern country.
The Southern country has an absolute advantage vis-a`-vis the Northern coun-
try in the production of all varieties, and comparative advantage in the “green”
product: this is because the green technology requires a substitution of capital
(polluting inputs) to labour and wages are lower in the Southern country.
To analyze the implications of trade and environmental policies, we totally
differentiate the equilibrium conditions (4.3) and (4) with respect to the relevant
policy variable.
4.4 Trade liberalization: selective vs. unselec-
tive tariff cuts
We first consider the consequences on domestic and foreign equilibrium prices
of a uniform reduction in the (undifferentiated) tariff rate τ , and then derive
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the environmental and welfare implications of such a ‘full’ liberalization scenario.
This shall serve as a benchmark in order to discuss the opportunity for large
countries to negotiate tariff cuts upon the environmental characteristics of the
production process.
4.4.1 Unselective tariff cuts
Let εi > 0 (i = C,G) represent the price elasticity of the export supply function
of product i, ηii < 0 represent the own-price elasticity of import demand functions
Mi(.), and ηij, with i 6= j, the cross-price elasticity of import demands (ηij > 0
since i and j are substitutes).
Lemma 1 Let peG (resp. p
∗e
G ) and p
e
C (resp. p
∗e
G ) represent the equilibrium prices
in the importing (resp. exporting) country.
• A cut in τ results in a decrease in domestic equilibrium prices under the
following condition:
dpeG(τ)
dτ
=
pG(τ)
(1 + τ)
[εG(εC − ηCC) + εCηGC
∆
]
> 0 (4.5)
dpeC(τ)
dτ
=
pC(τ)
(1 + τ)
[εC(εG − ηGG) + εGηCG
∆
]
> 0 (4.6)
• A cut in τ results in an increase in foreign equilibrium prices under the
following condition:
dp∗eG (τ)
dτ
=
pG
(1 + τ)2
[εC(ηGC + ηGG) + ηCGηGC
∆
]
< 0 (4.7)
dp∗eC (τ)
dτ
=
pC
(1 + τ)2
[εG(ηCC + ηCG) + ηGCηCG
∆
]
< 0 (4.8)
The sign of the own- and cross-price elasticities, and the fact that direct effects
are greater than cross-price effects (|ηii| > |ηij|) ensure the validity of the signs
derived above, where ∆ = (εC − ηCC)(εG − ηGG)− ηCGηGC > 0.
Fig.1 illustrates the impact of a unselective tariff cut in both markets (green
and conventional equilibria expressed in terms of domestic prices).
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[INSERT FIGURE 1 and 2]
The interpretation is straightforward: a cut in τ results (i) in a shift (in-
crease) in both export supply curves, lowering equilibrium prices pC and pG. (ii)
The decrease in pi has a downward shifting effect on the import demand curve
Mj(pG, pC), which further decreases domestic prices. Conversely, the increase in
foreign prices p∗ei =
pi
(1+τ)
is the expected terms-of-trade improvement resulting
from a lower tariff in the large importing country. The shift in the import demand
functions when equilibrium is derived in terms of world prices (Foreign markets
for C and G) is depicted in fig.2.
In other words, variations in prices resulting from changes in the undifferen-
tiated tariff have the same sign than in the single-product market treated in the
literature, but the magnitude of price variations is greater due to the substitution
effects from the demand functions.
Let’s turn to the welfare implications of unselective tariff cuts. Let W =
V (pG, pC) + PSC + PSG − E(pC) + TR represent the domestic welfare function,
where V (pG, pC) is the indirect utility function of consumers, PSi =
∫ pei
0
Si(pi)dpi
represents the surplus of producers of good i (i = G,C), E(pC) is the externality
and TR = τ
1+τ
[pCMC(pG, pC) + pGMG(pG, pC)] is the tariff revenue from the
undifferentiated ad valorem tariff τ . Similarly, foreign welfare isW ∗ = CS∗(p∗C)+
PS∗C +PS
∗
G−E
∗(p∗C) where the expression of consumer surplus is simply CS
∗ =∫∞
p∗e
C
D∗C(p
∗
C)dp
∗
C , because the green product is not consumed in the South. Let us
start by totally differentiating each term in W and W ∗ with respect to τ .
Using Roy’s Identity and the quasilinearity of the domestic utility function,
gives the following variation in domestic consumers’ surplus:
dV (pG, pC)
dτ
= −DG(pG, pC).
dpG
dτ
−DC(pG, pC).
dpC
dτ
(4.9)
while for foreign consumers we have:
dCS∗(p∗C)
dτ
= −D∗(pC).
dp∗C
dτ
(4.10)
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The variation of domestic and foreign producer surplus in each market i = C,G
is:
dPSi
dτ
= Si(pi).
dpi
dτ
(4.11)
dPS∗i
dτ
= S∗i (p
∗
i ).
dp∗i
dτ
(4.12)
The variation in domestic and foreign environmental costs can be decomposed as
follows:
dE(pC)
dτ
=
∂E
∂SC
∂SC
∂pC
dpC
dτ
(4.13)
dE∗(p∗C)
dτ
=
∂E∗
∂S∗C
∂S∗C
∂p∗C
dp∗C
dτ
(4.14)
where ∂E
∂SC
= ∂E
∂xp
∂xp
∂SC
> 0 is the marginal environmental damage. Finally, the
tariff revenue in Home varies as follows:
dTR
dτ
=
pCMC + pGMG
(1 + τ)2
+
dpC
dτ
[
aCMC+
τ
1 + τ
pG
∂MG
∂pC
]
+
dpG
dτ
[
aGMG+
τ
1 + τ
pC
∂MC
∂pG
]
(4.15)
where aC =
τ
(1+τ)
(1 + ηCC) and aG =
τ
(1+τ)
(1 + ηGG).
From the sign of the price variations given in Lemma 1, it is easy to derive
the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Unselective tariff cuts for both conventional and green products
result in:
• a decrease in domestic pollution and an increase in foreign pollution;
• a decrease in Home producers’/ an increase in Foreign producers’ profits;
• an increase in domestic consumption of C and G and consumers surplus /
a loss in foreign consumers’ surplus;
• a loss in domestic tariff revenue.13
13Provided that the initial tariff rate was not greater than the optimal tariff, which would be
surprising for rational governments participating in multilateral trade negotiations.
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Since a cut in τ results in a lower domestic price for the conventional product,
the domestic polluting production decreases while imports and consumption of C
increase. Domestic producers of C and G suffer from lower domestic prices, tariff
revenues decrease, while consumers benefit.
The net effect on domestic welfare depends upon the initial level of protection.
Rearranging the sum of the variations in surpluses derived above, it is possible
to express the variation in welfare as follows:
dW
dτ
=
dTR
dτ
−MG(pG, pC)
dpG
dτ
−MC(pG, pC)
dpC
dτ
−
∂E
∂pC
dpC
dτ
(4.16)
where the first term is the change in tariff revenue, the second and the third terms
reflect effects of the tariff variation on imports of both commodities, and the last
term reflects its environmental consequences.
Substituting the change in tariff revenue given in eq. (4.15) and rearranging
the expression of dW yields:
dW
dτ
=
pCMC + pGMG
(1 + τ)2
+
dpC
dτ
[
MC(aC − 1)−
∂E
∂pC
+
τ
1 + τ
pG
dMG
dpC
]
+
dpG
dτ
[
MG(aG − 1) +
τ
1 + τ
pC
dMC
dpG
]
(4.17)
The first term in this expression is positive, as well as the derivatives of prices
with respect to τ . The sign of the welfare variations varies with τ and the thresh-
old value such that (4.17) is zero (optimal tariff) depends on the values of the
terms between the brackets. It is easy to see that (ac − 1) < 0 and (aG − 1) < 0,
− ∂E
∂pC
< 0 while the cross-price derivatives of the import demand functions are
positive. In the absence of externalities and without cross-price effects, this ex-
pression would reduce to
dW
dτ
=
pCMC + pGMG
(1 + τ)2
+
dpC
dτ
[
MC(aC − 1)
]
+
dpG
dτ
[
MG(aG − 1)
]
(4.18)
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This shows that (i) the negative externality of the production process lowers the
optimal tariff since there is a benefit to substitute polluting domestic production
for imports while (ii) the existence of cross-price effects tend to increase the
optimal tariff.14
In the Southern country (foreign), exporters of both varieties benefit from
higher prices and supply increases, resulting in a higher pollution. Consumers
suffer from the increase in p∗C and still won’t consume the ‘green’ variety since its
price increases further. The net welfare effect of a full liberalization in Foreign
simplifies to the following expression:
dW ∗
dτ
=
dp∗G
dτ
XG(pG) +
dp∗C
dτ
[
XC(pC).−
∂E∗
∂p∗C
]
(4.19)
From Lemma 1, the derivatives of foreign prices with respect to τ are neg-
ative, while from our assumptions about the conventional technology, external
costs increase with conventional prices. Equation (4.19) shows that the bene-
fits from trade liberalization in Foreign are reduced due to the increase in the
(uninternalized) local pollution.
The global impact of a full liberalization on the welfare of Home and Foreign
depends on the relative magnitude of the effects described above (Equations 4.17
and 4.19), and shall be discussed later.
4.4.2 Selective tariff cuts for EPPs
We now turn the impact of a selective tariff cut for the green product, holding
the tariff on the conventional product τC=τ unchanged at its initial level. Totally
differentiating the equilibrium conditions with respect to τG leads to the following
lemma in the neighborhood of the equilibrium:
Lemma 2 • A variation in τG affects the domestic prices pG and pc as fol-
lows:
dpeG(τG)
dτG
=
pG(τG)
(1 + τG)
[εG(εC − ηCC)
∆
]
> 0 (4.20)
14Although countries participating in multilateral negotiations do not set import tariffs such
that their domestic welfare is maximized, the level of the optimal tariff is interesting for com-
parisons.
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dpeC(τG)
dτG
=
pC(τG)
(1 + τG)
[εGηCG
∆
]
> 0 (4.21)
• A cut in τG affects foreign prices as follows:
dp∗eG (τG)
dτG
=
pG
(1 + τG)2
[ηGG(εC − ηCC) + ηCGηGC
∆
] < 0 (4.22)
dp∗eC (τG)
dτG
=
pC
(1 + τC)(1 + τG)
[εGηCG
∆
]
> 0 (4.23)
In other words, a selective tariff cut for the Environmentally Preferable Prod-
uct -holding constant the tariff on the polluting good- decreases the domestic
prices for both varieties. The decrease in pC comes from a substitution in the
domestic consumption pattern.
World prices react differently to a cut in τG: while the foreign price for the
EPPs increases, the foreign price of the conventional variety p∗C =
pC
1+τC
decreases,
due to the reduction in the domestic price while holding τC constant.
Let’s turn to the welfare implications of selective tariff cuts, and differentiate
the surpluses with respect to τG.
The variation in domestic consumer surplus becomes:
dV (pG, pC)
dτG
= −DG(pG, pC).
dpG
dτG
−DC(pG, pC).
dpC
dτG
(4.24)
while for foreign consumers we have:
dCS∗(p∗C)
dτG
= −D∗(pC).
dp∗C
dτG
(4.25)
The variation of domestic and foreign producer surplus in each market writes:
dPSi
dτG
= Si(pi).
dpi
dτG
(4.26)
dPS∗i
dτG
= S∗i (p
∗
i ).
dp∗i
dτG
(4.27)
Similarly, variations in domestic and foreign environmental costs are:
dE(pC)
dτG
=
∂E
∂pC
.
dpC
dτG
(4.28)
dE∗(p∗C)
dτG
=
∂E∗
∂p∗C
.
dp∗C
dτG
(4.29)
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Finally, the tariff revenue in Home varies as follows:
dTR
dτG
=
pGMG
(1 + τG)2
+
dpC
dτG
[
αCMC +
τG
1 + τG
pG
dMG
dpC
]
+
dpG
dτG
[
αGMG +
τC
1 + τC
pC
dMC
dpG
]
(4.30)
where αC =
τC
1+τC
(1 + ηCC) and αG =
τG
1+τG
(1 + ηGG). From the sign of the
price variations given in Lemma 2, it is easy to derive the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Selective tariff cuts for green products result in:
• a decrease in pollution in Home and in Foreign;
• an increase in consumer surpluses in Home and in Foreign;
• a decrease in conventional producers’ profits in Home and Foreign;
• a decrease in profits of green domestic producers / increase in profits of
green foreign producers.
[INSERT FIGURES 3 and 4]
In other words, a selective tariff cut for EPPs makes it possible to reduce the
environmental damage in both countries, because the conventional production
in both countries decreases through substitution effects from the demand side in
Home (see fig.3). It lowers domestic profits in both sectors and conventional prof-
its in Foreign. Profits, production and exports only increase in the green foreign
sector. Consumers in both countries, according to their pattern of consumption,15
benefit from the reduction in prices.
The net welfare impact on Home is found by summing up the previous surplus
derivatives and reduces to dW
dτG
= dTR
dτG
− dpG
dτG
MG(pG, pC)−
dpC
dτG
[
MC(pG, pC) +
∂E
∂pC
]
.
Substituting the expression of dTR
dτG
given in (4.30) and rearranging:
15This is due to our assumption that there is no demand for green products in the southern
country.
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dW
dτG
=
pGMG
(1 + τG)2
+
dpC
dτG
[
MC(αC − 1)−
∂E
∂pC
+
τG
1 + τG
pG
dMG
dpC
]
+
dpG
dτG
[
MG(αG − 1) +
τC
1 + τC
pC
dMC
dpG
]
(4.31)
leading to similar conclusions than previously, but with a different magnitude of
price variations.
In the Southern country, the net welfare variation under selective tariff cuts
writes:
dW ∗
dτG
=
dp∗G
dτG
XG(pG) +
dp∗C
dτG
[
XC(pC).−
∂E∗
∂p∗C
]
(4.32)
From Proposition 2, exporters of the green variety benefit from higher prices
and supply increases, consumers and the environment benefit from the decrease in
p∗C , while conventional producers lose. In other words, Foreign enjoys traditional
gains from trade in the green market, while the net effects on the conventional
market depend on the relative magnitude of producers’ losses, consumers’ gains
and environmental benefits.
4.4.3 Discussion
Propositions 1 and 2 show that cutting tariffs upon the environmental charac-
teristics of the PPMs has important implications in terms of the distribution of
welfare gains and losses, as compared to unselective tariff cuts.
This results from differences in the sign and the magnitude of price variations
under each liberalization scenario (Lemma 1 and 2), which can be resumed as
follows:
1. p∗C decreases under a “green” liberalization scenario, but increases under a
“full” liberalization scenario (resulting in a different distribution of benefits);
2. Under both scenarios, p∗G increases while domestic prices decrease;
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3. The effect of unselective tariff cuts is unambiguously stronger on both do-
mestic and foreign prices, as direct- and cross-price effects add up (amplify-
ing the magnitude of gains and losses for those variable varying in the same
directions under both scenarios).
The last point can be easily seen by comparing, for example, the variations in
the green domestic price. The decrease in pG under a full liberalization scenario
consists of two terms (eq. 4.5), one accounting for the own-prices effects, the
second accounting for the cross-price effect εCηGC , that is, the further decrease in
the green price resulting from the decrease in the price of its polluting substitute.
Under a “green” liberalization scenario (eq. 4.20), this second effect vanishes.
The distribution of benefits from selective tariff cuts for the EPP is interesting,
since it allows for an improvement in consumer surpluses and in the environment
in both Home and Foreign. However, the gains to domestic consumers and the
environment in Home would be greater under a full liberalization scenario, and
whether these greater gains would more than offset foreign losses is ambiguous,
depending on the own and cross-price elasticities of the demand functions and
on the price elasticity of the demand for the polluting input in each country
(comparative statics are provided in the appendix).
Conversely, a full trade liberalization leads to a greater terms-of-trade deteri-
oration (improvement) for Home (Foreign).
Let’s turn to the comparison of the variation in domestic welfare under selec-
tive (eq. 4.31) and unselective tariff cuts (eq.4.17). Starting from the same initial
equilibrium (with τC = τG = τ) and assuming that this initial tariff is not greater
than the optimal tariff, we get:
dW
dτ
−
dW
dτG
| τG=τ =
pCMC
(1 + τ)2
+
[dpC
dτ
−
dpC
dτG
][
MC(aC − 1)−
∂E
∂pC
+
τ
1 + τ
pG
dMG
dpC
]
+
[dpG
dτ
−
dpG
dτG
][
MG(aG − 1) +
τ
1 + τ
pC
dMC
dpG
]
(4.33)
where the differences between price variations are positive. In other words, if the
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initial tariff was below the optimal tariff, the magnitude of the domestic welfare
losses is likely to be greater under a full liberalization scenario, depending on
whether the greater loss from the deterioration in terms of trade can be offset by
the greater environmental benefits.
For the Southern country, the comparison of the net welfare variations under
both liberalization scenarios is also ambiguous - unselective tariff cuts allowing
higher traditional gains from trade, while green tariff cuts provide a different
distribution of gains from trade and the environment.
4.5 Environmental Policy in the exporting coun-
try
In the previous section, we have assumed away the possibility that countries could
address externalities and terms of trade issues by implementing an environmental
policy. This was supported by the empirical evidence in many Northern countries
that governments are reluctant to increase producers’ production costs, and that
environmental taxes are still unfrequent in Southern countries. Moreover, the the-
oretical arguments from the trade-and-environment literature suggest that large
importing countries have an incentive to underinternalize environmental damages
in order to improve their terms of trade. However, as large exporting countries
have an incentive to overinternalize damages for strategic reasons, it is interest-
ing to analyze the impacts of an environmental policy in the Southern country,
in order to discuss the rationale for Foreign to rely on multilateral negotiations
on environmental goods to improve its welfare, when environmental policy is an
available tool.
Let εCT ∗
E
< 0 represent the elasticity of the foreign export supply function for
conventional products with respect to the level of tax on the polluting input.
Lemma 3 • A tax on the polluting input implemented if Foreign T ∗E results
in an increase in domestic equilibrium prices. In the neighborhood of the
equilibrium, caeteris paribus we get:
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dpeC(T
∗
E)
dT ∗E
= −
pC
T ∗E
[εCT ∗
E
(εG − ηGG)
∆
]
> 0 (4.34)
dpeG(T
∗
E)
dT ∗E
= −
pG
T ∗E
[ηGCεCT ∗
E
∆
]
> 0 (4.35)
• A tax on the polluting input implemented in Foreign increases the foreign
equilibrium prices as follows:
dp∗eC (T
∗
E)
dT ∗E
= −
pC
(1 + τ)T ∗E
[εCT ∗
E
(εG − ηGG)
∆
]
> 0 (4.36)
dp∗eG (T
∗
E)
dT ∗E
= −
pG
(1 + τ)T ∗E
[εCT ∗
E
ηGC
∆
]
> 0 (4.37)
The impact of a foreign tax on the polluting input on Home (for a given level
of the import tariff τ) is depicted on figure 5. The environmental tax shifts the
export supply of the conventional good downwards, resulting in an increase in
its domestic price pC , which in turn results in an upward shift of the demand
function for the green substitute, resulting in an increase in pG as well. Fig. 6
displays the mechanism on the foreign conventional market.
[INSERT FIGURES 5 and 6]
As the tariff remains unchanged, the foreign price p∗G increases due to the
increase in pG.
The welfare implications are, again, highlighted by differentiating domestic
and foreign surpluses with respect to T ∗E.
The variations in consumers surpluses, domestic producer surpluses and for-
eign ‘green’ producer surpluses remain formally similar to variations resulting
from tariff changes, since the only impact on these agents is through variations
in (domestic or world) prices:
dV (pG, pC)
dT ∗E
= −DG(pG, pC).
dpG
dT ∗E
−DC(pG, pC).
dpC
dT ∗E
(4.38)
and in Foreign:
dCS∗(p∗C)
dT ∗E
= −D∗(pC).
dp∗C
dT ∗E
(4.39)
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For domestic producers of both varieties and “green” producers in Foreign:
dPSi
dT ∗E
= Si(pi)
dpi
dT ∗E
(4.40)
dPS∗G
dT ∗E
= S∗G(p
∗
G)
dp∗G
dT ∗E
(4.41)
However the change in conventional producers surplus in Foreign results both
from the increase in the price of the polluting input, and from the subsequent
change in the price of the conventional output:
dPS∗C
dT ∗E
= S∗C(p
∗
C).
dp∗C
dT ∗E
+
εCT ∗
E
T ∗E
∫ p∗eC
0
S∗C(pC)dpC (4.42)
Similarly, while variations in domestic environmental costs result only from changes
in prices, in Foreign it also depends upon the tax-elasticity of the supply function:
dE(pC)
dT ∗E
=
∂E
∂pC
.
dpC
dT ∗E
(4.43)
dE∗(p∗C)
dT ∗E
=
∂E∗
∂p∗C
.
[dp∗C
dT ∗E
+ S∗C(p
∗
C)
εCT ∗
E
T ∗E
]
(4.44)
The tariff revenue in Home is influenced by the changes in prices resulting from
the tax in Foreign:
dTR
dT ∗E
=
dpC
dT ∗E
[
aCMC +
τ
1 + τ
pG
dMG
dpC
]
+
dpG
dT ∗E
[
aGMG +
τ
1 + τ
pC
dMC
dpG
]
(4.45)
where aC and aG have been defined in section 4.4.1. Eventually, the Environ-
mental tax revenues ETR collected in Foreign vary as follows with respect to the
level of the tax:
dETR
dT ∗E
= x∗p(p
∗
C) + T
∗
E.
[ dx∗p
dT ∗E
+
∂x∗p
∂p∗C
.
dp∗C
dT ∗E
]
(4.46)
where x∗p(p
∗
C) represents the derived demand for the polluting input in Foreign.
From lemma 3, we are able to derive the following proposition:
Proposition 3 An foreign environmental tax on the polluting input results in:
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• a decrease in pollution in Foreign but an increase in pollution in Home;
• a decrease in consumer surpluses in Home and in Foreign;
• a increase in green producers’ profits in Home and Foreign;
• a increase in conventional producer’s profits in Home / an ambiguous effect
on foreign conventional producers.
In other words, a positive environmental tax on the polluting input in the
foreign country improves the environmental conditions in Foreign because of a
shift in the conventional supply function, while the green supply increases (via
the substitution effect on the domestic demand side). However, the environmen-
tal damage increases in the domestic country due to higher domestic prices. As a
consequence of the increase in domestic and foreign prices, consumers surpluses
decrease in both countries. Conventional consumption in Home and Foreign de-
creases, while the demand of green increases in Home because of the change in
relative prices. This change in the relative prices leads to an increase in green
trade while the conventional trade decreases. However, we have to highlight that
the positive variation in green trade flows does not compensate the decrease in
the conventional one.
4.5.1 Discussion
It is interesting to compare, from the Southern (exporting) country’s viewpoint,
the welfare implications of a domestic environmental policy with the consequences
of trade liberalization scenarios. Indeed an environmental tax reduces its pollution
while improving its terms of trade (because the shrinking of its conventional
supply and exports results in an increase in both conventional and green world
prices), reinforcing its “green exporting capacities”. These objectives are precisely
the point put forward in the debates on the opportunity to extend current EGS
negotiations to EPPs of interest for developing countries (organic products).
Table 4.6 summarizes the magnitude and the direction of surplus variations
under the three policy scenarios described in propositions.
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[INSERT TABLE 4.6]
The comparison of the magnitude of price variations under trade- and envi-
ronmental policy changes is not immediate as it depends on the respective levels
of tariffs and taxes. Therefore whenever needed, we discuss price effects assuming
an ad valorem tax-equivalent of T ∗E equal to τ .
1. The improvement in green exporting capacities of Foreign is greater un-
der selective tariff cuts for the EPP than under an environmental policy,
because the latter does only result from cross-price effects; however a full
liberalization would perform even better.
2. The pollution in Foreign decreases under both selective tariff cuts and an
environmental policy; the comparison of the net effect depends on the tax-
elasticity of the demand for the polluting input. A full liberalization would
result in a dramatic increase in environmental damages in Foreign.
3. Foreign consumers are hurt by the increase in p∗C resulting either from a tax
on the polluting input or from a full liberalization; this loss is likely to be
greater under a full liberalization because direct and cross-price effects add
up. This loss does not occur under a green liberalization scenario.
These results suggest that it could be rational for developing countries to
insist on the inclusion of agricultural EPPs in the list of environmental goods
eligible for selective tariff cuts under the present WTO negotiations, even when
environmental policy is an available instrument.
Among the three policy scenarios considered in this paper, the “green” liber-
alization is the only one resulting in an improvement in environmental conditions
and consumer surpluses in both countries. It also avoids a too harsh deterioration
of the terms of trade for the importing country. However its net overall welfare
implications are ambiguous: focusing on EU-Mercosur trade in organic and con-
ventional products, it would be interesting to calibrate the model for a specific
commodity in order to determine which effect would prevail.
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4.6 CONCLUSION
In this paper we had two distinct objectives: (i) to model explicitly the conse-
quences of trade and environmental policy in partial equilibrium when, in addition
to the externality-generating good, there is an environmentally preferable substi-
tute and (ii) to shed some light on the current WTO negotiations on environ-
mental goods liberalization, focusing on the group of Environmentally Preferable
Products for which developing countries could have a comparative advantage.
Many simplifying assumptions have been made necessary, among which the
fact that there is no demand for green products in the Southern country. While
this may be consistent with empirical observations, and allows to link the green
and conventional markets in a simple manner -through the demand functions
of the sole importing country, we ought to clarify under which conditions trade
policy might modify the relative prices faced by foreign consumers in a way that
would challenge this assumption.
The definition of an “environmentally preferable product” that we used -an
exogenous constraint on the use of the polluting input- also deserves a deeper
analysis. Indeed, this definition is an environmental standard and it could work
as a non-tariff barrier for trade. Even if developing countries could benefit from se-
lective tariff cuts for environmentally preferable products, our analysis overlooked
an important issue about the mutual recognition of “environmentally preferable”
production processes: in a large part, this is a traditional certification issue, which
raises concerns about the ability of Northern countries to use green labels in a
protectionist manner.
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Figures and Tables
Table 4.1: Impacts of Trade and Environmental Policy changes
Variables ց τ ց τG ր T
∗
E
peC ցցց ց րր
peG ցցց ցց ր
p∗eC րրր ց րր
p∗eG րրր րր ր
SC ցցց ց րր
S∗C րրր ց ? ց
E ցցց ց րր
E∗ րրր ց ? ց
SG ցցց ցց ր
S∗G րրր րր ր
DG ? րր ?
DC ? ց ցց
D∗C ցցց ր ցց
MC րր ց ցց
MG րր րր ր
XC րր ց ցց
XG րր րր ր
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Figure 4.1: Home effects of unselective tariff cuts
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Figure 4.2: Foreign effects of unselective tariff cuts
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Figure 4.3: Home effects of ’green’ tariff cuts
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Figure 4.4: Foreign effects of ’green’ tariff cuts
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Figure 4.5: Home effects of a Foreign environmental tax
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Figure 4.6: Unselective tariff cut: foreign prices
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Appendix
Comparative statics
In order to express the variations in supply and demand functions in terms of
elasticities, we totally differentiate them with respect to the relevant policy vari-
able, and rearrange after substituting the values of price derivatives calculated in
Lemma 1, 2, and 3.
Since these comparative statics require the introduction of new price elas-
ticities for supply and demand functions, by convention we add a superscript
denoting the function being derived (e.g. εXC and ε
S∗
C resp. for the conventional
export supply and the foreign supply of C).
Unselective tariff cuts
• The transmission of changes in export prices to foreign supply functions
depends on their own price elasticity of supply:
dS∗C
dτ
=
S∗c (.)
1 + τ
εS
∗
C
[εXG (ηMCC + εMCG) + ηMCG)ηMGC
∆
]
< 0 (4.47)
dS∗G
dτ
=
S∗G(.)
1 + τ
εS
∗
G
[εXC (ηMGC + ηMGG) + ηMGCηMCG
∆
]
< 0 (4.48)
• The same is reciprocally true in the case of domestic supply functions:
dSC
dτ
=
Sc(.)
1 + τ
εSC
[εXC (εXG − ηMGG) + εXGηMCG
∆
]
> 0 (4.49)
dSG
dτ
=
SG(.)
1 + τ
εSG
[εXG (εXC − ηMCC) + εXC ηMGC
∆
]
> 0 (4.50)
• The impact of changes in export prices on foreign levels of consumption
depends on the price elasticity of demand:
dD∗C
dτ
=
D∗C(.)
1 + τ
ηD
∗
C
[εXG (ηMCC + ηMCG) + ηMGCηMCG
∆
]
> 0 (4.51)
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• On the demand side in Home, own-price effects and cross-price effects add
up:
dDC
dτ
=
DC(.)
1 + τ
ηDCC [ε
X
C (ε
X
G − η
M
GG) + ε
X
Gη
M
CG] + η
D
CG[ε
X
G (ε
X
C − η
M
CC) + ε
X
C η
M
GC ]
∆
< 0
(4.52)
dDG
dτ
=
DG(.)
1 + τ
ηDGG[ε
X
G (ε
X
C − η
M
CC) + ε
X
C η
M
GC ] + η
D
GC [ε
X
C (ε
X
G − η
M
GG) + ε
X
Gη
M
CG]
∆
< 0
(4.53)
• The effect on domestic demands and domestic supplies reflects the impact
on the import demand function. An unselective cut in tariff results in an
increase in both import demand functions:
dMC(pG, pC)
dτ
=
MC(.)
1 + τ
εC
[ηCC(εG − ηGG) + ηCG(εG + ηGC)
∆
]
< 0 (4.54)
dMG(pG, pC)
dτ
=
MG(.)
1 + τ
εG
[ηGG(εC − ηCC) + ηGC(εC + ηCG)
∆
]
< 0 (4.55)
• Variations in export supplies are found using comparative static for the
foreign supply and demand functions.
When the undifferentiated tariff reduces the export supply increases due to
the positive effect on export prices, as we can see in the following compar-
ative statics:
dXC(
pC(τ)
(1+τ)
)
dτ
=
XC(
pC(τ)
(1+τ)
)
1 + τ
εC
[εG(ηCC + ηCG) + ηGCηCG
∆
]
< 0 (4.56)
dXG(
pG(τ)
(1+τ)
)
dτ
=
XG(
pG(τ)
(1+τ)
)
1 + τ
εG
[εC(ηGC + ηGG) + ηCGηGC
∆
]
< 0 (4.57)
Under an undifferentiated tariff reduction both import prices reduces and
export prices increases. The effect on prices are transmitted to the demand
and supply functions depending on their (own- and cross-) price elasticities.
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Selective tariff cuts for EEPs
• When the importer country differentiates tariff according
to the PPMs, a preferential tariff reduction for EPPs leads to an increase
(decrease) in Green (Conventional) trade.
• On the supply side
Under a selective tariff cut on EPPs the conventional supply reduces while
the green supply increases.
dS∗c
dτG
=
S∗C(.)
1 + τG
εS
∗
C
[εXGηMCG
∆
]
> 0 (4.58)
dS∗G
dτG
=
S∗G(.)
1 + τG
εS
∗
G
[ηMGG(εXC − ηMCC) + ηMGCηMCG
∆
]
< 0 (4.59)
In contrast, both conventional and green production increases in the do-
mestic country as a consequence of the increase in their domestic prices.
dSc
dτG
=
SC(.)
1 + τG
εSC
[εXGηMCG
∆
]
> 0 (4.60)
dSG
dτG
=
SG(.)
1 + τG
εSG
[εXG (εXC − ηMCC)
∆
]
> 0 (4.61)
• On the demand side
Foreign demand of conventional product increases under a selective tariff
cut on green commodities. This effect is possible though the cross-price
effect in the international market.
dD∗C
dτG
=
D∗C(.)
1 + τG
ηD
∗
C
[εXGηMCG
∆
]
< 0 (4.62)
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Domestic demand on the conventional product decrease as a consequences
of a selective tariff cut on green products, through a simple substitution
effect.
dDC
dτG
=
DC(.)
1 + τG
εXG
[ηDCCηMCG + ηDCG(εXC − ηMCC)
∆
]
> 0 (4.63)
dDG
dτG
=
DG(.)
1 + τG
εXG
[ηDGG(εXC − ηMCC) + ηDGCηMCG
∆
]
< 0 (4.64)
• The impact on trade is:
dMG(pG, pC)
dτG
=
MG(.)
pG(τG)
εG
[ηGG(εC − ηCC) + ηCGηGC
∆
]
< 0 (4.65)
dMC(pG, pC)
dτG
=
MC(.)
(1 + τG)
εG
[ηCG(εC − ηCC) + ηCCηCG
∆
]
> 0 (4.66)
dXG(
pG(τG)
1+τG
)
dτG
=
XG(.)
(1 + τG)
εG
[ηGCηCG + (εC − ηCC)ηGG
∆
]
< 0 (4.67)
dXC(
pC(τG)
1+τC
)
dτG
=
XC(.)
(1 + τG)
εC
[εGηCG
∆
]
> 0 (4.68)
The impact of a “green” tariff reduction on its own-price is greater than
the impact of this tariff cut on the conventional price, that is why in the
neighborhood of the equilibrium a preferential tariff cut for EPPs increases
(decreases) the “green” (conventional) trade.
Foreign Environmental Tax
Totally differentiating demand and supply functions and rearranging terms
in order to express the results in terms of elasticities, we find that the follow-
ing expressions for comparative statics when the foreign country punishes
the conventional production with an environmental tax.
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• impact on the international market (imports and exports)
According to the the Lemmas the increase in the import prices makes con-
ventional import demand reduces and “green” import demand slightly in-
creases, because the environmental tax affect more the conventional import
price than the “green” price. There are two effects: the first one is that
the variation on the conventional price is greater than for the “green” price
and the second one is that the own price effect is always greater than the
cross-price effect. On the conventional demand both effects reinforce the
decrease on the import demand but on the “green” demand both effect go
in opposite directions
dMC(pG, pC)
dT ∗E
= −
MC
T ∗E
εXCT ∗
E
[(ηMCC(εXG − ηMGG) + ηCGηGC)
∆
]
< 0 (4.69)
dMG(pG, pC)
dT ∗E
= −
MG
T ∗E
εXCT ∗
E
[ηMGCεXG
∆
]
> 0 (4.70)
The impact of the environmental tax on the exporter price differs. This
policy in the foreign country increases conventional export price and thus
conventional exports; however ...
dXC
dT ∗E
= −
XC
T ∗E
εCT ∗
E
[ηCC(εG − ηGG)− ηCGηGC
∆
]
< 0 (4.71)
dXG
dT ∗E
= −
XG
T ∗E
εCT ∗
E
[ηGCεG
∆
]
> 0 (4.72)
• the impact of the foreign environmental tax on the domestic country
As the price increases the supply in the domestic country also does for
both products; however the conventional production increases more than
the “green” one. Demand for conventional product reduces but for “green”
products increases due to the change in the relative price which favor the
“green” demand.
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dSC
dT ∗E
= −
SC
T ∗E
εXCT ∗
E
[εSC(εXG − ηMGG)
∆
]
> 0 (4.73)
dSG
dT ∗E
= −
SG
T ∗E
εXCT ∗
E
[εSGηMGC
∆
]
> 0 (4.74)
dDC
dT ∗E
= −
DC
T ∗E
εXCT ∗
E
[ηDCC(εXG − ηMGG) + ηDCGηMGC
∆
]
< 0 (4.75)
dDG
dT ∗E
= −
DG
T ∗E
εXCT ∗
E
[(ηDGC(εXG − ηMGG) + ηDGGηMGC)
∆
]
> 0 (4.76)
• impact on the foreign market
dS∗C
dT ∗E
=
S∗C
T ∗E
εS
∗
CT ∗
E
[(εXG − ηMGG)(εXC − ηMCC − εS∗C )− ηCGηGC
∆
]
< 0 (4.77)
dS∗G
dT ∗E
= −
S∗G
T ∗E
εS
∗
CT ∗
E
[ηMGCεS∗G
∆
]
> 0 (4.78)
dD∗C
dT ∗E
= −
D∗C
T ∗E
εS
∗
CT ∗
E
[ηD∗CC(εXG − ηMGG)
∆
]
< 0 (4.79)
FINAL CONCLUSION
In this dissertation we have tried to address four important questions linked to
the EU-Mercosur negotiations, with a special focus on agricultural trade liberal-
ization.
Primarily, because the close relationships between multilateral and bilateral
trade agreements condition welfare and trade gains for partners under a preferen-
tial trade agreement, our first objective was to simulate and compare the welfare
and trade implications of a EU-Mercosur preferential trade agreement, when it
is conditioned by the success or the failure of a multilateral trade agreement.
The main idea was to investigate whether the success of WTO negotiations and
the enlargement of a custom union (with the entry of Venezuela) would lead to
welfare and trade gains for a subsequent preferential trade agreement.
Moreover, since the end of the Uruguay Round, agricultural trade liberaliza-
tion has resulted in non-negligible improvements in terms of market access, but
this has been made possible by the use of more complex trade policy instruments.
These new tools, such as tariff-rate quotas, also lead to more complex effects on
trade and welfare. Our second objective was to improve the modeling of agricul-
tural protection, especially through the TRQ modeling in a CGE framework by
avoiding aggregation biases.
Furthermore, the implementation of these new trade policy instruments in the
agricultural sector may have important implications on the composition of trade
when products are not homogeneous. This is the case in the segmented beef
market, which displays different qualities for which the European Union applies
different trade policy instruments. In the third chapter of this dissertation, we
aimed at analyzing the complex effects of mixed tariffs and TRQs on trade, trade
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composition and welfare when commodities are vertically differentiated.
Finally, the increasing connection between trade and environmental objectives
has recently pushed WTO members to negotiate alternative trade liberalization
patterns (i.e. selective tariff cuts EPPs), which could provide new trade opportu-
nities for developing countries in some particular niches like organic products or
certified timber. Our last purpose, with regard to this empirical question, was to
analyze the consequences of different patterns of trade liberalization in the case of
high-added value commodities in the agricultural sector (EPPs and high-quality
agricultural products).
Regarding the first empirical question (”Will Regionalism survive Multilater-
alism?”), we showed how a Doha output and the accession of Venezuela into the
Mercosur will condition welfare and trade gains for a EU-Mercosur agreement.
The main result of this paper is that even after the Doha conclusion, the EU-
Mercosur PTA would improve market access for all partners. However, reaching
a bilateral agreement after the DDA achievement and Venezuela’s accession to
Mercosur would only benefit Mercosur countries in terms of welfare, because the
EU and Venezuela would suffer from a deterioration in their terms of trade.
The two main contributions of this paper, compared with other empirical
works in a CGE framework, concern (1) the update and re-calibration of trade
data through productivity improvement, transaction cost reduction and capi-
tal accumulation and (2) the enhancement of protection data (tariff-rate quota
information, and bound and applied tariffs from MAcMapHS6-v2) following in-
novating papers (Jean et al., 2005) for the choice of sensitive products. However,
several advances could be made in order to bring the simulated scenarios closer
to the reality: the consideration of all other PTAs involving EU and Mercosur
countries and the rest of the world (e.g. the EU-Chile PTA); the assumption
of different hypotheses about TRQ-rent distribution between production factors
(i.e. between land and capital). Further, these scenarios should be tested under
the TRQ modeling introduced in the second chapter of this dissertation in order
to shed light on the consequences on beef and sugar markets. This paper should
not be considered as a contribution to the theoretical literature. However, for
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empirical literature, and especially for policymakers’ decision, this work is one of
most complete in its genre.
The second paper of this dissertation provides a methodological contribution
to the TRQ modeling literature in a general-equilibrium framework. The lit-
erature on TRQ modeling is quite recent and makes strong TRQ aggregation
hypotheses that lead to biased trade and welfare results. The originality of our
contribution relies on the introduction of TRQ modeling at a detailed level, which
would lead to non-biased results. Moreover, the comparison of different versions
of the Mirage CGE model allows us to isolate data aggregation biases from those
linked to the lack of TRQ modeling. Our results show that most part of biases
due to simplifying assumptions (i.e. exogenous TRQ-rents) are explained by the
impossibility to shift from one TRQ-regime to another. Our explicit TRQ mod-
eling leads to greater welfare and trade gains when quantitative restrictions of
TRQs are relaxed and the in-quota tariff becomes the effective protection. This
methodological contribution helps to a better understanding of TRQ mechanisms,
and of their trade and welfare consequences under an agricultural trade liberaliza-
tion scenario. Many TRQ aspects could still be improved, such as the distinction
between multilateral and bilateral TRQs due to their licenses allocation hypothe-
ses, intermediate regimes for multilateral TRQs (De Gorter and Kliauga, 2006)
and the impacts of TRQ administration methods and positive market power of
traders. These and other aspect of TRQ modeling will be the source of motivation
for future research.
In accordance with our two last objectives, focused on more specific trade
issues, in chapters 3 and 4 we have developed two partial-equilibrium trade mod-
els. The third paper addresses the question of the typical Alchian-Allen effect
when tariff structures are mainly composed by mixed tariff and tariff-rate quo-
tas. The originality of this work is that it tackles with a classical question of the
“shipping the good apples out” effect by introducing complex policy instruments
largely used in agricultural protection. The results shows that different patterns
of trade (ad valorem or specific tariffs reduction, and the quota volume expansion)
lead to different consequences in terms of trade volume, welfare and especially
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on trade composition (quality upgrading or downgrading). These results confirm
that the different components of complex tariff structures (quotas vs. tariffs) are
not equivalent neither in terms of trade (and trade composition) nor in terms of
welfare (Anderson, 1988; Hranaiova et al., 2006). Our results show that a quota
expansion might favor high-quality trade and lead to greater TRQ-rents, while
a cut in the specific component of a mixed tariff might reduce the bias towards
high-quality trade increasing total trade. Moreover, in the importing country,
the quota expansion guarantees the persistence of the domestic production, while
leading to a lower equivalent variation. More generally, our results can provide
interesting insights for the analysis of the possible consequences of the Doha and
the bilateral EU-Mercosur proposals concerning the beef market liberalization.
In the particular case of the EU-Mercosur negotiations, the EU has characterized
beef as a “sensitive” product, leading to two possibilities of liberalization: a small
(specific) tariff cut or a quota expansion; however she has to take into account
the non-equivalence of these trade liberalization patterns. Finally, it would be
interesting to find the combination (tariff cut plus quota expansion) that would
lead to a convergence in trading partners’ interests.
The fourth and last chapter analyzed the rationale for large trading part-
ners to engage into preferential trade liberalization for environmentally preferably
products. This work focuses on the comparison of environmental and terms-of-
trade gains for one net importing and one net exporting countries. Compared to
the trade-and-environment literature, the originality of this paper consists in the
capture of cross effects between a polluting commodity and its environmentally
preferable substitute. The main results that can be drawn from this paper is
that, when the importing country displays preferences for EPPs, a selective tariff
cut on these products improves the exporter’s terms of trade and always results
in lower pollution in both countries, due to the substitutions in the importing
country’s consumption pattern. Full trade liberalization and an unilateral envi-
ronmental taxes in the exporting country may result in greater environmental and
terms-of-trade benefits in one country, but it will always hurt its trading partner.
This theoretical contribution gives an answer to the distribution of welfare gains
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of the multilateral liberalization in Environmental Goods and Services (EGS) at
the WTO with regard to both trade and the environment.
Moreover, depending on the definition of EPPs used in current WTO nego-
tiations, our results suggest that even developing countries could benefit from
market access improvements, because some of them, such as Argentina, are net
exporters of grown timber products or organic food. However, this work should
be extended in order to address the problem of non-tariff barriers, which are
likely to constrain the possibilities to improve market access for EPPs because of
”green” certification issues. This is the case when neither equivalence agreements
nor mutual recognition procedures are established between trading partners.
Using different approaches and methodologies, theoretical and empirical frame-
works, this dissertation sheds light on several important empirical questions at
stake in multilateral and bilateral negotiations, especially in the case of the EU-
Mercosur negotiations.
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